$LULU

由于折扣增加和管理层不稳定,LULU已从投资组合中卖出;虽然五年内可能复苏,但当前的风险状况过高,不适合持有。

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Adobe, Lululemon, PayPal – Are our Biggest Losers a Buy Now?
The Intrinsic Value Podcast发布 2026-08-16 · 28 段内容
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28 段内容
2:3973:12

我想首先再次介绍一下内在价值投资组合是如何运作的。我认为这在今天尤其重要,因为我们将讨论一些仓位,其中我们中的一个人比另一个人更看好或曾经更看好。所以基本上,内在价值投资组合是 Sean Kyle 和我共同管理的一个共享投资组合,我们处理这个问题的方式基本上是一个简单的规则。

显然,这个投资组合是一个付费投资组合,因为我们不提供任何财务建议,也不实际管理资金。然而,投资组合中持有的每个仓位都必须至少在我们主持人之一的个人投资组合中。有些显然在我们所有人的投资组合中,但主要规则是,我们中的一个人必须拥有这家公司。

所以,对于我们内在价值投资组合中的所有股票以及我们今天讨论的那些股票,你可以肯定我们实际上在它们上面亏了钱。

And I want to actually start by giving another introduction to how exactly the intrinsic value portfolio works. And I think this will be particularly important today because there will be positions that we discuss in which one of us is or was more bullish than the other one. So the basics basically the intrinsic value portfolio is a shared portfolio that Sean Kyle and I manage and the way we handle this is basically by a simple rule. So the portfolio is obviously a paid portfolio since we don't give any financial advice nor do we actually manage money. However, each of the positions owned in the portfolio has to be in the personal portfolio of at least one of us hosts. Some are obviously in all of our portfolios, but the main rule, one of us has to own the company. So, for all the stocks in our intrinsic value portfolio and the ones that we discuss today, you can be sure that we actually lost money on them.

好的,我们从一个最近卖出的仓位开始,那就是 Lululemon。作为背景,该股以平均约 200 美元的价格进入我们的投资组合,以每股 116 美元的价格离开。

Okay, how about we start with the most recent sell in our portfolio, which would be Lululemon. And for context, the stock entered our portfolio at an average price of about 200 bucks and left it at $116 per share.

我可能应该在这个问题上带头,因为这是我的提议。我仍然没有完全放弃Lulu会好转的想法。我认为,从现在起五年后回顾,尤其是在当前估值下,它很可能看起来是一个相当不错的入场点,并且可能已经达到了悲观情绪的顶峰,但持有已经下跌超过40%的股票确实存在机会成本。这影响了我们决定将其从投资组合中移除的理由。

I should probably be the one to take the lead on this one since it was my pitch. And I should say I still haven't fully given up on the idea that Lulu will turn around. I think there's a good chance that looking back five years from now, especially at the current valuation, it will have looked like a pretty good entry point and will probably have been peak pessimism, but there is definitely an opportunity cost of holding a stock in your portfolio that is already down more than 40%. And that played into our rationale for why we decided to remove it from the portfolio.

所以为了提供背景,这个论点是你能够以行业领先的利润率、35%的投入资本回报率、20%的历史增长率以及一个非常非常强大的运动休闲品牌——实际上是运动休闲的先驱——来购买这个高质量零售品牌。

所有这些在我看来都是以15倍市盈率的非常合理的价格,同时他们还在大规模回购股票等等。

And so just for context, the thesis was that you could buy this really high quality retail brand with industryleading margins, 35% returns on invested capital, 20% kaggers on historical growth, and a very very strong athleisure brand. Really the pioneer of athleisure. All for what seemed to me like a very reasonable price of 15 times earnings while they were buying back stock massively and all those sorts of things.

显然,你不希望为那些历史增长率支付溢价,对吧?仅仅因为一家企业过去表现良好并不意味着它保证会继续表现良好。但我相信,并且在某种程度上仍然相信,Lululemon不是一个会昙花一现的品牌。

如果有的话,它是一个可以在主流中继续蓬勃发展的品牌。所以,就像我说的,它基本上发明了运动休闲风格。我认为这可能比它看起来的更有帮助,至少从过去一年业务发生的情况来看是这样。

And obviously you don't want to pay a premium for those historical growth rates, right? Just because a business has done well previously doesn't mean that it's guaranteed to continue to do well. But I believed and to some extent still do that Lululemon is not a brand that's just going to come and go. And if anything, it's a brand that can continue to thrive while being mainstream. And so, like I said, it basically invented the athleisure style. And I thought that that might help them more than it seems to have, at least when you look at what's happened to the business in the last year.

但总的来说,我同意你的看法,Lulu五年后可能会交易得更高。尽管我对此的信心可能比你低。但我认为,当你说Lulu在主流中生存下来时,那肯定意味着他们在被穿着和看到的同时保持酷,对吧?

这就是像Blue Lemon这样的零售品牌想要实现的。这基本上就是像Nike和Adidas这样的品牌已经实现的。他们是例外,而不是常态。我应该这么说。

But generally, I agree with you that Lulu might be trading higher five years from now. Although I probably have lower conviction on that than you have. But I think when you say that Lulu survives the mainstream, that certainly means that they're staying cool while being worn and seen all the time, right? That's what a retail brand like Blue Lemon wants to achieve. And it's basically what brands like Nike and Adidas have already achieved. And they are the exception, not the rule. I should say that.

我大体上同意,但对我来说,Lulu实际上已经在主流中存在了很长时间,以至于我仍然相信它具有这种有韧性的主流品质。对吧?时尚是一个节奏非常快的行业。当然,如果你的系列一两个季度不受欢迎,你可能会很快陷入困境,你会有所有这些过剩库存,这真的会迅速摧毁你的现金储备,但当系列再次走红时,事情也可以同样快地好转。

所以,Lulu肯定正在经历从快速增长业务向更成熟业务转变的痛苦过程,可能不包括中国,但我们也还不知道中国增长的持久性如何。

>> I generally would agree but for me Lulu has actually been in the mainstream for such a long time now that I do still believe it has these kind of resilient mainstream qualities. Right? Fashion is a really fast-paced business. Of course, if your collections are unpopular for a season or two, you can get in trouble quickly and you have all this excess inventory and that can really destroy your cash pile quickly, but things can turn around just as fast when collections go viral again. And so, Lulu is definitely going through the painful process of transitioning from a rapid growth business to a more mature business, excluding maybe China, but we also don't know how durable growth in China is going to be anyways.

所以他们确实有一些产品发布在来自像Aloe和Vori这样的品牌日益激烈的竞争下表现不佳。与此同时,你还有这场争议,公司创始人对董事会公开批评了一段时间,然后CEO在业务开始表现不佳时离职,现在今年剩余时间由临时管理层接管。

所以这对任何股票来说都是一年内要处理的大量波动。

And so they definitely have a few product releases that have fallen flat in light of more and more competition from brands like Aloe and Vori in particular. And then at the same time, you've had this dispute where the founder of the company has been openly critical of the board for some time and you've got the CEO stepping away right as the business starts to underperform and then now for the rest of the year you have interim management in place. And so that's a lot of volatility for any stock to process in one year.

从我的角度来看,我仍然一直穿Lulu。我仍然认为它是一个非常非常强大的品牌和高质量的产品,这就是为什么如果它变得便宜,就像Crocs那样,我们谈论的是每股自由现金流五到六倍,我可能会说服自己再次购买。

但当你在公司历史上如此关键的转折点,没有一位真正强大的领导者铺路,只有临时人员填补管理层时,考虑到自我们最初投资以来论点发生了多少变化,这不是我觉得适合我们继续持有的赌注。

And from my vantage point, I still wear Lulu all the time. And I still think it's a really, really strong brand and a really high quality product, which is why I could probably talk myself into buying it again if it gets cheap in the way that Crocs was where we're talking about trading at like five or six times free cash flow per share. But when you have people just temporarily filling in at the management level at such a critical inflection point in the company's history without a really strong leader paving the way, it's just not a bet that I felt was appropriate for us to continue holding on to given how much had changed in the thesis from when we first invested in it.

有很多品牌会过时一段时间,然后多年后回归。我想对我来说问题在于,我很难看到那在任何时候变成一个复合增长者。我更难预测何时跳上跳下潮流。Lulu的想法是购买一个没有这些典型时尚周期的公司。

这只是一个艰难的游戏。我认为在这些公司上赚钱的时间是在他们生命周期的非常早期。

>> There are many brands that, you know, go out of style for a while and then they come back many years later. And I guess the problem for me is that I just have a hard time seeing that turn into a compounder at any point. And I have an even harder time sort of anticipating when to jump on and off the bandwagon. And the idea with Lulu has been to buy a company that doesn't have these typical fashion cycles. And it's just a tough game to play. I think the time to make money on these companies is just very early on in their life cycle.

所以我假设在某个时候它会遇到类似你现在看到的little lemon所面临的障碍,除了奢侈品公司之外,很少有品牌能够永远逃脱那个周期。当你谈论像Nike这样的公司时,情况有点不同,它们不一定被定义为试图成为高端或奢侈品,但像Aritzia和Lulu,存在这种增长悖论:你越成为主流,你就越不可能被视为高端和奢侈品。

so I assume that at some point it will hit a similar roadblock to what you know little lemon is currently seeing and apart from luxury companies there's just very few brands that can escape that cycle for good is a bit different when you're talking about with companies like Nike where they're not necessarily by definition trying to be premium or luxury but like with Aritzia and Lulu There is this paradox of growth where the more you become mainstream, the less premium and luxury you're likely to be seen as.

所以我认为Lulu可能与众不同的原因是,在我几乎整个青少年和成年生活中,它一直非常受欢迎。所以这不是一个流行了两年然后你押上一切的品牌。但自2010年以来,它在全国范围内,至少在美国和加拿大,一直是一个非常强大的品牌。

它确实有16年或更长时间的类似复合增长的经济学,同时他们也开始在国际上获得真正的吸引力,在中国等地有40% 30%的同比增长,或者一些最近的数据。

And so the reason I thought Lulu could perhaps be different is that for pretty much my entire teenage and adult life, it has continued to be extremely popular. So it's not like this is a brand that shot up in popularity for two years and then you bet everything on it. But since 2010, it has really been a very strong brand nationally, at least across the US and Canada. And it did have these compounder-l like growth economics for 16 years or more, while they also began really gaining traction internationally, 40% 30% year-over-year growth in places like China or some of the recent numbers.

但不幸的是,北美业务减速然后下降的速度比我预期的要快得多,我承认。没有零售股票能够在核心市场放缓的情况下生存,而不经历其市场倍数的重大重估。所以,即使Lulu是一个仍然拥有行业领先的每平方英尺销售效率、客户保留率、资本回报率以及所有这些其他指标的品牌,如果没有股价的大幅削减,他们也无法生存。

And so unfortunately though, the business in North America decelerated and then declined much faster than I anticipated admittedly. And no retail stock is going to survive a slowdown in its core market without a significant revaluation of its market multiple. So, even if Lulu is a brand that still boasts industryleading sales efficiency per square foot, customer retention, returns on capital, and and all these other kind of metrics, they just aren't going to be able to survive that without a massive cut to the stock price.

所以,在实际上抵抗了多种不同品牌作为竞争威胁,贯穿他们进入主流及以后的过程中,我要说来自Aloe和Viori以及亚马逊等网站上更便宜的仿冒品的压力在他们的核心市场变得太大了,尤其是在美国,运动休闲领域已经变得非常饱和。

And so after actually resisting a handful of different brands as competitive threats throughout their rise into the mainstream and beyond, the pressure I would say from Aloe and Viori and also these cheaper knockoffs on sites like Amazon has just become too much in their core markets, especially in the US, things have just gotten really saturated in athleisure.

特别让我停下来的是最近几个月他们提供的所有折扣。最初我说过,如果我们看到Lulu更依赖折扣来推动销售,那可能标志着它作为高端品牌时代的结束,那将在未来几年摧毁他们的利润和收益。那一直是我最大的担忧。

And what really gave me pause in particular was seeing all the discounts that they were offering in recent months. And originally I had said that if we saw Lulu rely more on discounts to drive sales that would likely mark the end of its era as being perceived as a premium brand and that would destroy their margins and their earnings over the following years. And that was always my big concern.

所以当我最近在Lululemon网站上购物时,我不得不承认,我对有多少服装在打折感到震惊。再说一次,我多年来为自己、为妻子、为朋友的礼物等访问Lululemon网站。真的感觉有大量的东西在打折。

然后当我更深入挖掘时,我确实找到了数据。我认为是来自CNBC的数据支持了Lululemon实际上一直在进行不寻常的折扣活动的说法。所以,这不仅仅是完全轶事的猜测。

And so when I had been shopping on the Lululemon site recently, I really I had to admit I was shocked by how much apparel was on sale. And again, I I've spent, you know, many years visiting the Lululemon site for myself and for my wife and for gifts for friends and stuff like that. And it really felt like there was an extraordinary amount of stuff on sale. And then when I did some deeper digging, I did find data. I think it was from CNBC that supported the claim that Lululemon has in fact been doing an unusual amount of discounting. So, it wasn't just totally anecdotal speculation.

关于打折,它是一个非常有吸引力的短期解决方案,因为你可以提升销售额、清理旧库存,而且对现金流数字看起来非常好,但问题在于它会让顾客习惯于等待打折再购买你的产品。因此,这会削弱品牌的感知价值。

顾客不再愿意为这些紧身裤支付100美元,而是会等待它们降到70或60美元或更低。这随着时间的推移会侵蚀品牌。最初让这项业务如此特别的东西开始消退,而他们过去实际上拥有行业领先的正价销售率,这指的是他们无需任何折扣就能周转的库存比例。

随着这一现实开始改变,尤其是在过去一年里,这让我真正开始怀疑这个投资论点。

And the thing is with discounting is that it's a very attractive short-term solution because you can boost sales and clear out old inventory and it looks really good for your cash flow numbers, but the problem is that it conditions your customers to wait for discounts to shop and buy your products. And so it diminishes the brand's perceived value. It's no longer, hey, I'm willing to pay $100 for these leggings. I'm going to wait for them to sell at 70 or maybe 60 or whatever it is. And that just erodess the brand over time. And what had made the business so special in the first place begins to fall off where again they had actually industryleading rates of full price sales which refers to the percentage of their inventory that they would turn over without needing any discounts in the past. And as that reality has started to change, especially in the last year, that is what made me really begin to doubt the thesis.

每当你试图判断一只股票是否是价值陷阱时,你会寻找这些领先指标,对吧?很多时候你会看到头条数字看起来仍然很好,比如收入、利润率等等。对于这些零售公司,你可以看的一个指标是打折情况,即他们的库存中有多少被打折,以及销售情况如何。

这可能在收入数字中看不到,也许在利润率中,但不必立即显现。但随着时间的推移,你会发现如果他们继续这样做,品牌的感知价值下降,他们将无法像以前那样为商品和服务收取同样的金额。所以随着时间的推移,你会看到销售下降,利润率下降,这就是为什么你要寻找这些领先指标。

Whenever you try to figure out whether a stock is a value trap or not, you sort of look for these leading indicators, right? A lot of times you see the headline numbers that they still look great, you know, revenue, margins, and all of that. When something that you can look at for these retail companies is discounting, how much of their inventory is getting discounted and how does it sell? And it would still, you know, not be visible in the revenue numbers, perhaps in the margin, but it doesn't have to be immediately. But you will figure out that over time if they just keep doing that and the perceived value of the brand is going down they will not be able to take the same amount of money for their goods and services as they did before. So over time you will see sales decline, you will see margins decline and that's why you look for these sort of leading indicators.

而且我相信,至少对Lululemon来说,问题的一大部分在于他们的管理团队不是为未来而建的。当负责决策的人不会在长期内留任时,做出短期痛苦但长期有益的决策要困难得多。

And I believe that a huge part of the problem for Lulle Lemon at least is that they do have a management team that's not built for the future right at now. It's much harder to make decisions that hurt in the short term but benefit in the long run when the person responsible for those decisions won't be there anymore.

我完全同意这一点。并且再次澄清你所说的,Daniel,该公司目前由临时联席CEO领导,这比只有一个短期领导者更加复杂,因为他们的前CEO Calvin McDonald已经离开了公司。

所以部分来说,我确信这个决定是受到Lululemon创始人Chip Wilson的压力,他非常公开地表达了对Lululemon的不满。甚至离职本身可能本可以成为更多乐观情绪和公司新方向的机会。

但当Lulu宣布来自Nike的Heidi O'Neal将接任时,这并没有帮助。考虑到Nike在过去几年中犯下的巨大错误,听到来自那家公司的人来拯救Lululemon,肯定不是最令人兴奋的消息。

>> I fully agree with that. And just to clarify again what you're referring to, Daniel, that company is currently led by interim co-CEOs, which is even more complicated when you're having two short-term leaders instead of just one after their former CEO Calvin McDonald left the company. And so in part, I'm sure that decision was due to pressure from the founder of Lululemon, Chip Wilson, who uh made his discontent with Lululemon very well known. And even the departure could have probably been an opportunity for a bit more optimism and maybe a new direction for the company. But it did not help things when Lulu announced that Heidi O'Neal from Nike would be the replacement. And so just given the massive challenges and mistakes that Nike has made in the last few years, there's definitely more exciting news to get than hearing that someone from that company is coming to rescue Lululemon.

所以,正如我几个月前向你和我们mastermind社区的成员发送更新时所说的,关于我们决定卖出该头寸,我可能能够为我的个人投资组合承受很多这种不确定性,因为我对这个品牌有信心,而且我的投资时间跨度很长,我不介意承受很多波动。

但将其作为我们内在价值投资组合中的持仓则是另一回事,在那里我在某种程度上将信心强加给你和Kyle,如果你们对这个品牌不那么热情,而且我们还在不断将投资组合中的所有头寸与每周在节目中提出的新股票进行比较。

So, as I told you and members of our mastermind community when I sent out an update a few months ago on our decision to sell the position, I could probably stomach a lot of this uncertainty for my personal portfolio because of the conviction I have in the brand and I have such a long investing time horizon that I don't mind really stomaching a lot of volatility. But it's really another thing to keep it as a holding in our intrinsic value portfolio where I'm forcing the conviction to some extent onto you and Kyle if you don't feel as enthusiastic about the brand and then we're also constantly comparing all the positions in our portfolio against the new stocks that are being pitched each week on the show.

这就是我们在Adobe、Lululemon以及所有这些公司身上看到的情况。

That's what we saw with Adobe, Lululemon, all of those companies.

为了给出全貌,持有PayPal和Lululemon这类头寸的理由是相信你以足够便宜的价格买入了资产,从长远来看,你会以某种方式赚回你的钱或获利。

>> And just for the sake of giving the whole picture, the argument for why you should hold on to positions like PayPal, but also Lululemon is to trust that you bought the asset at a cheap enough price that in the long run you will make your money back or make a profit one way or the other.

这显然是一个比PayPal更好的业务,可能也比Lulu曾经更好。如果你看Lulu和PayPal的股价图表,然后将营收增长叠加在上面,你会发现这两家公司的相关性相当强。

It's a much better business obviously than PayPal and probably also Lulu ever were. If you look at both Lulu's and PayPal stock chart, then you just layer the topline growth over it, you will see there's a pretty strong correlation there for both of those companies.

Lulu罢免了CEO,转而任命临时联席CEO。而创始人则公开与自己的公司开战。

Lulu push outed CEO in favor of interim co-CEOs. While the founder was publicly at war with his own company,

而且我也不会感到惊讶,如果我们再次看到类似Lulu的情况,如果你真的从今天起持有该股票5年,我不会对事情最终变得不错感到惊讶。但问题是,在事情已经发生巨大变化之后,你是否愿意承受那些损失?

And I also wouldn't be surprised again if we saw something similar with Lulu where if you actually held the stock for 5 years from today, I would not be surprised if things ended up being okay. But the question is just are you willing to ride out those losses after things have already changed pretty dramatically?

所以我不知道Lululemon是否会被收购。可能不会。但肯定会有情绪、基本面方面的转变,尤其是随着他们继续在中国增长,然后这可能会极大地改变估值。

And so I don't know if it'll be an acquisition for Lululemon. Probably not. But certainly there could be a shift in sentiment, business fundamentals, especially as they continue to grow in China, and then that could all change the valuation dramatically.

我们显然知道你永远不会买PayPal,我也永远不会买Lululemon。

I mean we obviously know you would have never bought PayPal and I would have never bought Lululemon.

以上 28 段为这条视频中谈及 $LULU 的全部内容。

这个频道对 $LULU 的历次判断

The Intrinsic Value Podcast 在这只股票上只有这一条判断。

2026-08-16看跌本条
我想首先再次介绍一下内在价值投资组合是如何运作的。我认为这在今天尤其重要,因为我们将讨论一些仓位,其中我们中的一个人比另一个人更看好或曾经更看好。所以基本上,内在价值投资组合是 Sean Kyle 和我共同管理的一个共享投资组合,我们处理这个问题的方式基本上是一个简单的规则。显然,这个投资组合是一个付费投资组合,因为我们不提供任何财务建议,也不实际管理资金。然而,投资组合中持有的每个仓位都必须至少在我们主持人之一的个人投资组合中。有些显然在我们所有人的投资组合中,但主要规则是,我们中的一个人必须拥有这家公司。所以,对于我们内在价值投资组合中的所有股票以及我们今天讨论的那些股票,你可以肯定我们实际上在它们上面亏了钱。
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