UBER是强力买入;市场对自动驾驶竞争的担忧被夸大,因为该竞争影响不到10%的利润,而核心业务基本面(利润率、广告、配送)依然强劲。
逐段跳播
过去三年,Uber 的自由现金流增长了两倍,达到每年约 100 亿美元。然而,该股的交易价格仍低于我们 15 个月前首次在本节目推荐它时的价格。
Over the last three years, Uber tripled its free cash flow to roughly $10 billion a year. And yet, the stock trades below where it traded when we first pitched it on this show 15 months ago.
Whimo 最近以 1260 亿美元的估值融资,其市值实际上与 Uber 相同,尽管其收入仅为 Uber 的一小部分且尚未盈利。
With Whimo just recently raising money at $126 billion valuation, it has effectively the same market capitalization as Uber despite having a fraction of the revenues and being unprofitable.
市场显然表明它相信自动驾驶的未来,但并不一定认为 Uber 是受益者。因此,要么市场对我们拥有的最佳业务之一错误定价,要么机器人真的正在取代我们最大的持仓。
So the market is clearly saying it believes in the future of ABS and it doesn't necessarily see Uber as a beneficiary. So either the market is mispricing one of the best businesses we own or the robots are really coming for our largest holding.
Uber 是全球最大的网约车平台,但它实际上是三个不同的业务。出行是我们熟知的网约车业务。还有配送,指的是 Uber Eats,现在实际上还包括越来越多的杂货店和零售商,而不仅仅是餐厅配送。
此外还有一个较小的货运经纪业务,将卡车司机与托运人连接起来。
Uber is the world's largest ride hailing platform, but it is really three different businesses. Mobility is the rides business we all know. There's delivery and that refers to Uber Eats and actually now includes a growing list of grocery shops and retailers beyond just restaurant delivery. And then there's a smaller freight brokerage business that connects truckers with shippers.
我们今天将较少关注这一点,因为它对我们关于公司的论点并不重要,也不会产生太大的财务影响。
And we're going to pay less attention to that today because it's not material to our thesis about the company, nor does it really generate much of a financial impact.
再次强调,对于刚接触 Uber 的人来说,这听起来可能很奇怪,但思考 Uber 的方式是:Uber 是一个市场。它是一个连接供给与需求的中介,无论是乘车需求还是配送需求。
And again, for anybody kind of new to Uber, this will sound strange, but the way to think about Uber is that Uber is a marketplace. They are an intermediary connecting supply with demand, whether that be demand for rides or demand for pad tie deliveries.
Uber 不拥有汽车,实际上在大多数市场也不雇佣司机。他们是承包商。然后它在约 70 个国家匹配乘客与司机、食客与配送员,并从每一笔交易中抽取分成,这被称为抽成率。它通过聚合供需和协调物流来赚取这笔费用。这至少是他们增加的部分价值。
And so Uber owns no cars and they actually technically employ no drivers, at least in most markets. They're contractors. And then it matches riders with drivers and eaters with couriers across roughly 70 countries and takes a cut of every single one of those transactions, which is called the take rate. And they earn that for aggregating demand and supply and coordinating the logistics. That's at least part of the value they add.
作为背景,每月约 2 亿乘客和食客在过去一年通过 Uber 应用花费了约 1900 亿美元以上。这个 1900 亿美元的数字,就是公司所称的总预订量,即通过平台产生的订单总额。
And for context, $200 million or so monthly riders and eaters spent about $190 billion plus through Uber's apps over the past year. And that 190 billion figure, that's what the company calls gross bookings, a total amount of the order values that go through the platform.
Uber 的收入大约是总预订量的 20%,基本上是在支付司机或餐厅之后。Uber 不拥有人们乘坐的车辆或餐厅,这实际上是整个 Uber 论点的关键,对吧?尤其是当我们稍后讨论它相对于像 Whimo 这样的自动驾驶公司的优势时。
And then Uber's revenue is roughly a 20% slice of that gross bookings number basically after they pay out the drivers or the restaurants. And the fact that Uber doesn't own the cost that people ride in or you know the restaurants. It's really the point of the entire Uber thesis, right? Especially later when we talk about its advantage over AV companies like for example Whimo.
所以基本上你需要理解的是,Uber 只是一个旨在服务司机、餐厅老板和客户的平台,无论是通过食品还是我们熟知的乘车服务。
So basically what you have to understand is that Uber is just a platform meant to serve drivers, restaurant owners and customers whether that be through food or you know rights as we all know it for.
当我们最初报道 Uber 时,我的一个顾虑正是这项业务能有多盈利,因为他们有很多增量成本。我的意思是,你曾将 Uber 的规模经济比作沃尔玛而非谷歌,认为每一笔增量乘车都需要支付司机时间和保险费用。
因此利润率将始终远低于其他软件公司所能获得的水平。
And when we covered Uber originally one of my hang-ups was exactly how profitable this business could be because they have a lot of incremental costs. I mean you called Uber's economics of scale more like Walmarts than Google's with the idea being that every incremental ride requires paying a driver for their time and also the insurance. So margins would always be kept well below what other software companies could earn.
当时营业利润率约为 6%。但仅仅一年内,季度营业利润率就翻了一番。所以即使只看你对公司的财务模型,我们可能都低估了 Uber 实际能取得的成就。
So operating margins were about 6% back then. But just in a year, quarterly operating margins have doubled. So even just looking at your financial model for the company, we may have both underestimated what Uber could actually accomplish.
如你所知,如果你听过我们关于最大赢家的节目,大幅超出我们的利润率预期是我们所有最大赢家的共同点。我真的用 Uber 作为例子。
And as you know, if you listen to our biggest winners episode, outperforming our margin estimates by white margin is a common denominator with all of our biggest winners. I literally used Uber as an example.
我想当我谈到 Remley 的利润率扩张和利润拐点时。所以这是一家像其他少数公司一样展示了如何迅速成为一家利润率高得多的公司的企业。
I think when I talked about Remley's margin expansion and profit inflection. So this is a company that shows as well as few others do how you can quickly become a way more profitable company.
如你所知,我喜欢谈论 Uber 过去五年营业利润率的波动。这是我在鸡尾酒会上最喜欢提起的话题之一。收入增长很好,但如果你看他们的利润率图表,那真的是我见过的最美的东西之一。
Well, as you know, I love to talk about Uber's swing in operating margins over the last 5 years. It's one of my favorite topics to bring up at cocktail parties. The revenue growth is great, but if you look at a chart of their margins, it really is one of the most beautiful things I've ever seen.
从 2020 年至今,Uber 的营业利润率从负 43% 波动到正 12%。如果你在家记录,那就是在不到 6 年内,一家已经拥有数十亿美元收入的公司,其利润率盈利能力波动了 55 个百分点。我的意思是,这真是令人震惊。
From 2020 through today, Uber's operating profit margins have swung from negative 43% to positive 12%. If you're keeping along at home, that is a 55 percentage point swing in margin profitability in less than 6 years for a company that was already doing billions in revenue. And I mean, that is come on, that's astounding.
我同意 Uber 的上限比我去年认识到的要高。但核心逻辑仍然成立,即 Uber 可能永远不会拥有微软 40% 的利润率,但随着进一步扩大规模、更高利润率的广告、Uber Rides 和 Eats 之间的交叉销售以及较低的客户获取成本、Uber 会员计划推动更高的订单频率,以及将自动驾驶汽车整合到其应用中——这带来了不同的成本结构,并且不会完全取代人类司机,我们稍后可以详细讨论——Uber 可能成为一个比几年前任何人所能想象的更具结构性的业务。
I'd agree that Uber's ceiling is higher than I appreciated last year. And the core logic though still holds that Uber probably won't ever have Microsoft's 40% margins, but with further scale, higher margin advertising, cross-selling between Uber Rides and Eats with lower customer acquisition costs, Uber's membership program driving more order frequency, and then integrating AVs into its app, which comes with a different cost structure and without totally displacing human drivers, which we can speak more to. Uber could become a structurally better business than was imaginable to anyone just a few years ago.
为了进一步强调你刚才快速提到的那些可能推动 Uber 利润率更高的观点。首先你提到了广告,Uber 的广告业务在几年前并不存在,现在它已经是一个年运行率超过 20 亿美元的业务。
因此每年增长超过 50%,而且众所周知,广告收入相对于核心业务几乎是纯利润。
Just to double down on those points you quickly made there about what could further drive Uber's margin higher. Think you firstly mentioned advertising and Uber's ads business didn't exist just a few years ago and now it's a business with more than $2 billion annual run rate. So growing more than 50% a year and ad dollars are as we all know nearly pure profit compared to the core business.
这就是为什么我们拥有这么多至少正在扩展到广告领域的业务。我的意思是,Macad Libra、Amazon,所有这些公司,对吧?
That's why we own so many businesses that at least expanding into the advertising space. I mean, Macad Libra, Amazon, all of those companies, right?
这些广告可以展示在司机车辆后座的设备上,也可以作为应用内广告位,甚至仅仅是在人们查看行程状态时,将你的餐厅在Uber地图上更突出地展示,对吧?或者你还可以使用基于搜索的广告,当你在Uber Eats应用中搜索“附近的中餐”时,餐厅可以竞价成为第一个结果。
And these are the ads that can be shown on devices in the back of drivers cars, inapp ad placements with even just having your restaurant positioned more prominently on the Uber map while people just check on their ride status, for example, right? Or you could even have search based ads where restaurants bid to be the first result when you search something like Chinese food near me in the Uber Eats app.
我还记得去年在里斯本,我们站着叫Uber,基本上在讨论如何在地图上最好地放置广告。现在看来,那正是现在正在发生的事情。
And I still remember us standing, I think it was in Lisbon last year, ordering an Uber and basically discussing how you could best place ads on the map. And it looks like that's what's now happening.
而且,正如我们之前提到的,Uber Eats不再仅仅是送餐服务。它可能需要某种形式的品牌重塑。我的意思是,你现在可以订购的远不止食物。
And then, as we've alluded to, Uber Eats is no longer just eats. It probably needs I know a sort of rebrand. I mean, you can now order a whole lot more than just food.
说实话,他们在某种程度上至少踩到了亚马逊的脚趾。我的意思是,Uber可以为配送带来紧迫感,而亚马逊至少目前在设计上无法匹敌。
And honestly, they're stepping to some extent at least on Amazon's toes here. I mean, Uber can bring an urgency to delivery that Amazon, at least currently, is not designed to match.
我的意思是,我不知道,假设你的化妆品用完了,而你在2小时后有一个派对,对吧?你可能没有足够的时间跑去商店,但你还需要做其他所有为派对做准备的事情。那么,你可以叫一个Uber司机去取你的订单,比如说,从Ulta Beauty取货,并在45分钟内送到你手上。
I mean, I don't know, let's say you run out of makeup and you have a party in 2 hours, right? And you might not have enough time to actually run to the store, but you also have to do all the other stuffs that you need to prepare to go to a party. Well, then you can just call an Uber driver to pick your order up from, let's say, Ulta Beauty and bring it to you in 45 minutes time.
我用这个例子不一定是因为你喜欢化妆,而是因为Uber不久前确实与Ulta Beauty合作了。所以,这是现在在现实世界中正在发生的事情。
And I use that example not necessarily because you me just love wearing makeup, but because Uber literally partnered with Ulta Beauty not too long ago. So, this is something that is happening right now in the real world.
是的,我非常兴奋看到他们与Uber合作。而且,正如你所说,Uber在全球拥有超过150万商家合作伙伴。其中很多是餐厅,但也有杂货店、化妆品店、体育用品店、酒类零售商、花店,以及介于两者之间的各种商家。他们的扩张速度比我们俩想象的要快得多。
And yeah, I was really excited to see them partnering with Uber. And to your point, Uber has over 1.5 million merchant partners globally. And that ranges from a lot of that is restaurants, but grocery stores, cosmetic stores, sporting goods stores, alcohol retailers, florists, and really everything in between. They expanded much quicker than I think both of us thought they would do.
在利润率方面,我们还没有提到的另一件事,我认为是保险。我的意思是,疫情后这成为了一个巨大的成本阻力,因为车辆价格暴涨。所以,如果车辆更贵,那么显然保险费也必须相应上涨。
And another thing on the margin front that we didn't yet mention, I think, is insurance. I mean, that became a huge cost headwind postco because vehicle prices just exploded. And so, if vehicles are more expensive, then obviously insurance premiums must rise correspondingly.
但是你知道,汽车保险确实出现了前所未有的通货膨胀,尤其是在美国,而美国仍然是Uber最大的市场。但正如我在为即将发布的一集关于Copart的研究中所发现的,我认为这些胜利现在开始改变。我认为这未来可能成为Uber的一个顺风。
But you know there was really an unprecedented inflation in car insurance and especially in the US which is still Uber's biggest market. But as I come across in my research for an episode that I will soon release which is Copart. I think those are wins that are now starting to change right. I think this could be a tail one for Uber in the future.
所以,作为背景,Uber每年三月与保险公司重新谈判费率。今年的续约费率,我记得是个位数的低增长,这是多年来最温和的增长。此外,他们还从州级保险改革中获得了数亿美元的节省。
So for context, Uber renegotiates rates with its insurance carriers every March. And this year's renewals came in at I think it was low singledigit increases, which is the most benign increase in many years. And this happened in addition to receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in savings from state level insurance reforms.
这当然是个好观点。更不用说,在未来,假设Uber车队中有30%是自动驾驶汽车、无人机,也许还有配送机器人,那么保险成本占收入的比例就会持续下降。
It's a great point for sure. And that's not even to mention that in a future where say 30% of Uber's fleet is autonomous vehicles and drones and maybe delivery robots, then insurance costs as a share of revenue would just keep dropping.
而且就在几天前,关于这一点,Uber宣布与一家名为Zipline的公司合作,到2029年底为数百万美国人提供无人机配送。
And and just a few days ago on that point actually Uber announced that it was partnering with a company named Zipline to bring drone delivery to millions of Americans by the end of 2029.
我认为Uber在那里暗示的雄心真的非常非常大。他们甚至不是在暗示,这不太微妙。他们非常明确地表示,他们想要彻底改变便利性。这是吸引每个人的东西。每个人都重视便利。
And the ambition I think Uber is hinting at there is really, really big. And they're not even hinting, it's not very subtle. They're pretty explicit about that they want to revolutionize convenience. And that is something that appeals to everybody. Everybody values convenience.
从新闻稿中读到,Uber说,引用:“它正在构建世界上最灵活的混合配送网络,无缝整合快递员、人行道机器人和无人机,将每次配送与最佳运输方式相匹配。”
And just reading from the press release, Uber said, quote, "It's building the world's most flexible hybrid delivery network, seamlessly integrating couriers, sidewalk robots, and drones to match every delivery with the best mode of transportation.
所以,Daniel,我不知道你怎么想,但我等不及要收到我的第一次Uber Eats无人机配送了。那对我来说将是美好的一天。
So, I don't know about you, Daniel, but I can't wait to get my first drone delivery from Uber Eats. That is going to be a great great day for me."
而且,是的,我们之前谈到过,Daniel和我不是那种喜欢自己动手的人。我们真的很欣赏便利性。[笑声] 就这么说吧。所以,这个我们正在进入的新世界,以及Uber正在引领我们进入的这个无与伦比的便利新时代。
我个人对此感到非常兴奋,作为投资者我也非常兴奋。
And uh, yeah, we were talking beforehand about how, you know, we're not the most DIY types of people, Daniel and I. We really appreciate convenience. [laughter] Let's just put it that way. So, uh, this this new world that we're entering into and that Uber is ushering us into this new age of unrivaled convenience. I'm I'm pretty excited about that personally and I'm pretty excited about it as an investor.
我有点跑题了,但我主要想说的是,无人机没有保险成本,或者至少没有与道路上的司机相同的保险成本。然后,如果你相信自动驾驶汽车总体上会比人类驾驶员更安全,这在有限的情况下到目前为止是正确的,那么保险成本占毛预订量或收入的比例几乎肯定会下降,这为利润率扩张创造了空间。
And so, I'm getting a little carried away, but my main point was actually that drones don't come with insurance costs or at least not the same insurance costs as drivers on a road. And then if you believe that AVs will broadly be safer than human drivers, which does so far to be true in limited cases, then insurance costs as a share of gross bookings or revenue will almost certainly go down and that creates room for margin expansion.
但所有这些,你知道,只是让我兴奋地思考世界在10年、15年后可能会是什么样子。我认为这也是我们喜欢研究这些公司的很大一部分原因,尤其是Uber是那种你能看到很多可能让你的生活变得更好的东西的公司之一。
But all of that, you know, just gets me excited thinking about where the world could be in 10, 15 years time. And I think that's also a great part of why we like to look at these companies and especially Uber is one of those where you just see so many things that could just make your life better.
但无论如何,补充一点,我认为在几年里,Uber的美国业务明显放缓,而欧洲和拉丁美洲仍然增长相当快。我记得大约是30%。事实证明,在某种程度上,其中一些是自找的,因为美国的保险成本以我之前说过的两位数的速度膨胀,Uber将这些成本转嫁到了美国的定价上。
而且没有证据表明,更高的定价减缓了需求,我想这应该不会让任何人感到惊讶。
But anyway, just to add to that, um, I think for a couple of years, Uber's US rights business was noticeably slowing while Europe and Latin America still grew quite fast. I think was about 30%. And it turns out that some of this was self-inflicted in a sense since US insurance costs were inflating at, I said it before, doubledigit rates and Uber pass those costs onto US pricing. And there's no evidence, and I guess it shouldn't really come as a surprise to anyone, that higher pricing slowed down demand.
管理层实际上将其描述为一次关于价格弹性的意外A/B测试,美国作为测试组。我不太确定对此有何看法。我认为这可能有点过于重要,不适合变成A/B测试。
And management actually described it as an accidental AB test on price elasticity with America as the test group. I don't really know what I think about that. I think um this is perhaps a bit too important to turn into an AB test.
但无论如何,既然保险已经正常化,他们将这些节省的成本转嫁为更低的价格,美国业务正在显著重新加速,这很好,因为它显然是Uber业务中最重要的部分之一。
But anyway, now that insurance has normalized, they are passing those savings back into lower prices and the US business is very much reacelerating, which is great because it's obviously one of the most important parts of the Uber business.
但同样,说美国在人均经济方面不一定是Uber最赚钱的市场,这有点好笑,因为在某些国家,我认为即发展中市场,Uber甚至不需要提供保险。因此,那里的每趟行程可能比美国的行程更有利可图,至少在百分比上是这样。
But also, it's kind of funny to say that the US is not necessarily Uber's most profitable market in terms of per capita economics because in some countries, and I think it's namely developing markets, Uber isn't even required to provide insurance at all. So, each ride there can be more profitable than a ride in the US, at least in percentage terms.
但我们仍然不会抱怨美国的增长再次回升。不,一点也不。而我一直最兴奋的事情之一是Uber One,那是公司的会员计划。我们俩都是会员,对吧,Daniel?它正日益成为亚马逊Prime的替代品,或者更好的说法是,它就像按需当日达便利服务的亚马逊Prime。
But still, we're not complaining that growth in the US is turning up again. No, no, not at all. And one of the things I've also been most excited about is Uber one. that is uh the company's membership program. Proudly we are both members of it, right Daniel? And it's increasingly becoming an alternative to Amazon Prime or maybe better way to put that is it's like the Amazon Prime of ondemand same day convenience.
在美国,它大约是每月10美元,你可以获得免费的Uber Eats配送,以及每次Uber行程6%的积分,还有其他一些福利。但对我来说,它确实物有所值。
And so in the US it's something like $10 a month and it gets you free Uber Eats deliveries and then 6% credits on every Uber ride plus some other benefits there. But for me, it it does pay for itself.
无论如何,Uber One现在拥有5000万会员。这比我们去年查看业务时增加了1400万付费订阅者。你可以算一下,对于一家1500亿美元的公司来说,这笔订阅收入并不是特别重要。
在其他市场,订阅费率甚至没有每月10美元那么高。
And anyways, Uber 1 now has 50 million members. And so that's an increase of 14 million paying subscribers just from when we looked at the business last year. And you could do the math and realize that this amount of subscription revenue for $150 billion company is not terribly consequential. And in other markets, the subscription rate is not even as high as $10 a month.
但真正思考它的方式是,Uber One提高了对Uber平台的忠诚度。总体而言,这显著增加了订单频率。我可以作证。我以前很少订购外卖,也许每三个月一次,难得一次,但现在我发现自己可能每月订购两三次,这不算多,但我有动力这样做,以利用Uber Eats的优惠。
But the way to really think about it is that Uber 1 drives greater loyalty to the Uber platform. And in aggregate that significantly increases order [snorts] frequency. And so I can attest to it. You I used to order food delivery very infrequently. Maybe once every 3 months, you know, once in a blue moon, but now I actually find myself doing it maybe two or three times a month, which is not a ton, but I I'm incentivized to do so to capitalize on the perks of Uber Eats.
作为股东,我们有机会测试产品,对吧?Uber One会员确实是超级用户。他们现在贡献了Uber总预订量的大约一半,以及约23%的配送预订量。
And you know, as shareholders, we got to test out the product, right? And Uber 1 members really are are they're like super users. They now are driving roughly half of Uber's total gross bookings and about 23 of delivery bookings.
所以你可以看到,对于大多数Uber One会员来说,Uber Eats的优惠尤其突出。他们贡献了不成比例的配送预订量。
So, you can see that for most Uber 1 members, the Uber Eats perks are what particularly stand out. They're driving a disproportionate amount of delivery bookings.
我实际上很惊讶听到Uber One在美国是10美元。我想我付的是5欧元,即使换算成美元,那仍然相当便宜,这让我怀疑我是否得到了和你一样的优惠。
I'm actually surprised to hear that Uber 1 is 10 bucks in the US. I think I'm paying €5 and even with the conversion of euros to USD that's still quite cheap which kind of makes me question whether I even get the same perks as you.
所以我应该检查一下 Uber 1 是否真的给了我它给美国人民带来的同样的优势。我认为Uber首席执行官达拉有一句话很有意思,他将Uber One比作Netflix,基本上你支付一笔费用,然后拥有最多内容的平台获胜。
只不过Uber的内容基本上是汽车、快递员、餐厅,现在还有杂货、酒店、停车等等。
So I should probably check whether Uber 1 is even giving me the same advantages as it is giving people in the US. Um, I think there was quite an interesting line from Dara, Uber CEO, who compared Uber 1 to Netflix, where you basically pay one fee and then the platform with the most content wins. Except Uber's content is basically cars and couriers and restaurants and now also groceries and hotels and parking and all sorts of stuff.
是的,我确实说了停车。顺便说一下,在二月,Uber宣布收购停车应用Spot Hero,你可以在超过我认为是13000个车库预订车位。
And yes, I did say parking. By the way, in February, Uber announced that it was acquiring the parking app Spot Hero, where you can basically reserve spots at more than I think it's 13,000 garages.
这起初听起来可能有点随意,但如果你将Uber视为一个全方位的便利平台,我认为这很有意义。我的意思是,尤其是在汉堡,当我想去某个地方时,问题不在于车程是否要10分钟,而在于我需要花多少时间才能找到停车位。
所以,我认为这是所有拥有大量汽车的大城市最重要的问题之一,而且这不是一项大业务。
Um, and that might sound a bit random at first, but if you see Uber as a convenience platform in all regards, I think it makes a lot of sense. I mean, especially right now here in Hamburg, when I want to go somewhere, it's not really about will the car take, let's say, 10 minutes. It's more about how much time do I need to actually find a parking spot. So, I think this is one of the most important problems for all big cities where you have a lot of cars and it's not a huge business.
但这是那种你只是多了一个打开应用的理由,如果Uber做得好,它就可以向你交叉销售,例如,通过Uber支付他们的服务。
Um, but it's one of those where you just have one more reason to open the app and if Uber does job well, it can then cross-ell you on, for example, paying for their services from Uber.
所以,他们基本上尽可能多地将东西融入Uber One,作为额外的增值,只是为了让你进入应用,然后向你交叉销售其他东西。他们发现,多产品用户的支出是单一产品用户的三倍多。
So, they basically bake as much stuff as possible into Uber 1 as an additional value ad just to get you on the app and then cross-ell you on other things. And what they found is that multi-product users spend more than three times what single product users do.
因此,仅仅通过让现有用户使用更多Uber的不同服务,他们就能以较低的获取成本推动大量增长。正如他们所说,获得一个你已有的客户显然比获得一个新客户更便宜。
So just by getting existing users to use more different services from Uber, they can drive a ton of growth at lower acquisition costs. And as they say, getting a customer you already have is obviously cheaper than getting a new one.
我认为这也是我们第一次报道该公司时我想到的事情之一,我当时想,难道不是每个人都已经有 Uber 了吗?他们怎么能继续以 20% 以上的速度增长?嗯,正是这样,让这些现有客户变得更有利可图。
And I think that's also one of the things that I thought about the first time we covered the company where I was like, doesn't everybody already have Uber? How are they supposed to keep growing for 20 plus%? Well, it's exactly this, you know, getting these existing customers and making them more profitable.
但无论如何,我相信我们可以谈论 Uber 的其他令人兴奋的事情,但我今天更感兴趣的是真正进入市场关注的话题,因为再说一次,Uber 的股价在过去一年中并不完全与其业绩相匹配。
But anyway, I'm sure we could talk about half a dozen other things that we're excited about for Uber, but I would be more interested today in actually getting into what the market is paying attention to instead because again, Uber stock isn't exactly matching its results over the past year.
我认为这在很大程度上归结于我们的名字,不出所料,就是 Whimo。
And I assume that largely boils down to our name, which shouldn't come as a surprise, is Whimo.
私人市场对 Whimo 的估值大约与整个 Uber 相同,而相比之下,Uber 每季度完成超过 30 亿次出行,并拥有 100 亿美元的自由现金流。
you've got the private markets valuing Whimo at roughly the same valuation as all of Uber, a company that I should say, in contrast is doing more than three billion trips a quarter and has $10 billion in free cash flow.
Whimo 要么被严重高估,要么 Uber 被严重低估。至少在我看来是这样。
Whimo is either grossly overvalued or Uber is grossly undervalued. At least in my opinion.
那么,Whimo 能否完全取代 Uber?这就是问题所在。它能否从 Uber 手中夺取足够的市场份额,以长期削弱 Uber 的业务,而这一领域本已增长极其迅速?因此,我认为他们仍有很多需要证明的地方,才能配得上这样的估值。
And so, can Whimo fully replace Uber? That's the question. And can it take enough market share from Uber to undermine Uber's business long-term in a space that's already growing incredibly quickly? And so, I think they have a lot to prove still to warrant that kind of valuation.
目前很多处于边缘的人都是 Uber 或 DoorDash 的客户。我相信随着自动化降低价格,他们会被吸引成为更频繁的用户。
a lot of folks who are on the margins as Uber or Door Dash customers at the moment. I do believe they'll be one over as more frequent users as automation brings prices down.
至于谁能从 Uber 手中夺取市场份额,他们几乎肯定会。但如果整个蛋糕增长得足够快,就会有足够的空间容纳多个巨大的赢家。你想要 Uber 的总预订量,它就在那里。
And with the point being who could take a slice of market share from Uber, they almost certainly will. But if the whole pie is growing fast enough, there will be more than enough room for multiple huge winners. You want Uber's gross bookings, it's there.
我知道,因为我们在关于 Uber 和 Caspie 的播客中提取了这些指标。
And I know because we pulled these metrics for our podcast on Uber and Caspie.
众所周知,很多 Whimo 的乘客实际上是通过 Uber 应用下单的,而不一定 exclusively 通过 Whimo 应用,这反映出直到现在,两家公司一直试图合作。
a lot of Whimo ridites have actually been ordered through the Uber app as we all know and not necessarily the Whimo app exclusively reflecting that until now the two companies have tried to partner
我认为最简单的论点一直是,尽管如此,Whimo 只是在利用 Uber,对吧?他们利用其白色分销来建立自己的品牌知名度,然后试图自己独立运营,基本上是通过分道扬镳,将 Uber 的用户吸引到 Whimo 应用的独家服务上,从而在 Uber 背后捅刀子。
and I think the bare argument has always been despite that that Whimo is just using Uber, right? that they are exploiting their white distribution to build their own brand awareness and then they're trying to pull it off by themselves and you know just sort of pulling the rug out from you know underneath Uber and just by breaking up and basically pulling Uber's users to the Whimo app to the exclusive offering
我的意思是,Uber 的股价在 7 月底左右跌至 52 周低点,当时 Whimo 正式通知 Uber 将终止他们的独家合作关系,我想是在奥斯汀和亚特兰大。
I mean, Uber stock was knocked to its 52- week low in I think it was late July after Whimo formally notified Uber that it will end their exclusive partnerships and I think was Austin and Atlanta.
在那两个城市,Whimo 的机器人出租车也只能通过 Uber 应用使用,而在他们实际合作的其他城市并非如此。因此,Whimo 计划在这两个城市推出自己的应用。我认为他们的现有合同将在 2028 年初到期。
And those were two cities where also Whimo's robot taxis were available only through the Uber app, which is not the case in every city that they actually partner in. So, Whimo plans to launch its own app in both of those cities. And I think it's early 2028 when their existing contracts with Uber expire.
如果 Whimo 无限期地从 Uber 应用中移除他们的车队,那对 Uber 来说无疑是一个挫折。这也是为什么 Uber 正在竞相与尽可能多的其他自动驾驶汽车公司合作。这样就不会有单一的自动驾驶汽车制造商突然出现并主导整个市场,而是让许多参与者相互竞争。
然后 Uber 在该领域成为客户需求的中立聚合者。
And if Whimo were to indefinitely remove their fleets from Uber's app, that would be a setback for Uber without a doubt. And that's also why Uber is racing to partner with as many other AV companies as they can. So that no single AV maker actually comes around the corner and, you know, dominates the entire market and instead you have many players competing with each other. And then Uber is sort of the neutral aggregator of demand for customers in that field.
你可能会认为这对 Uber 来说是不利的,因为它是最大的品牌,你可以说它是第一。人们会因为忠诚度而选择 Uber,但我实际上认为这是一个优势,因为如果没有忠诚度,你就需要一个需求聚合者。
那么即使人们不是因为它的名字或品牌而选择 Uber,他们也会因为它是最好的需求聚合者而选择它,因为它拥有最大的规模。
And you would probably think that's a negative for Uber because it's the biggest brand and you could say, you know, it's the number one. People will choose Uber because of the loyalty, but I actually think it's an advantage because if there's no loyalty, you need an aggregator of demand. Then even if people don't choose Uber because of its name or because of the brand, they just choose it because it will be the best aggregator of demand because it has the most scale.
这意味着要么是最便宜的,要么就是来得更快。你知道,如果我在餐厅,我只想回家。如果我能打开Uber应用,然后10分钟就能到,我就不想等20分钟,对吧?即使他们为此多收一点钱。
So that means either it's the cheapest or just coming faster. You know, if I'm at a restaurant, I just want to get home. I don't want to wait for 20 minutes if I can go into Uber app and then it's a 10-minute ride, right? Even if they charge up a bit for that.
但是,Uber和Whimo之间的不和是真实的。《金融时报》报道称,大约在7月这个时候,两家公司已经开始游说监管机构采取对立的框架,这使得它们之间的矛盾日益加剧。
But yeah, the Uber and Whimo fallout is real. in the Financial Times reported that around this time back in July, the two companies had begun lobbying regulators for opposing frameworks, which is what has put them at odds increasingly.
Uber希望制定这些规则,以确立人类司机和机器人协同工作的混合网络。例如,在新泽西州,Uber的游说者提议,任何提供机器人出租车服务的平台,在为期三年的试点项目中,必须要求人类司机提供至少85%的行程。
Uber wants these rules in place that enshrine hybrid networks of human drivers and robots working together. So, for example, in New Jersey, Uber lobbyists propose that any platform offering robo taxi services be required to have human drivers provide at least 85% of all rides during a three-year pilot program.
因此,这显然不是针对Whimo并使其倒退的意图。说实话,Whimo指责Uber没有妥善保养他们的车辆,而Uber则反过来指责Whimo存在安全问题。我认为这已经变得个人化了。
And so, that is not very subtly clearly intentioned at Whimo and setting them back. Honestly, Whimo has accused Uber of not taking good care of their vehicles and then Uber has turned around and pointed the finger back at them complaining about safety issues on Whimo's end. It's getting personal, I think.
Uber模式的美妙之处在于,车辆不在其资产负债表上,司机可以根据实时需求选择是否提供服务。因此,Uber司机在响应乘车请求或缺乏请求方面可以非常灵活。
The beauty of Uber's model is that the vehicles are not on their balance sheet and drivers can opt to make themselves available in response to demand in real time. Thus, Uber drivers can be incredibly flexible about responding to ride requests and a lack thereof.
另一种说法是,Uber平台上的供应会自然地适应需求。
Another way to maybe say that is that supply on Uber's platform naturally adjusts to demand.
这就是为什么最好部署更有限的车队,并与Uber合作,利用他们的网络进行预订,然后车辆可以用于其他目的,或者只是作为常规Uber的偶尔替代。
which is why it's better to deploy a more limited fleet and just partner with Uber, tapping into their network for bookings, and then the vehicles could be used for other purposes or as just an occasional alternative to a regular Uber.
我的意思是,市场肯定有自己的看法,我认为目前可以说市场并不完全看好Uber。但我认为,那段视频的逻辑实际上已经得到了验证。
I mean, the market certainly has an opinion and I think at the moment it's fair to say that it doesn't exactly favor Uber. but I would argue that actually the logic of that clip has been validated.
乘车需求仍然极度波动,这从根本上不会改变。一天内乘车需求的峰值与谷底之比大约是4:1,而一个按需求峰值规模配置的固定机器人出租车车队,在需求低谷时段将闲置,而按需求低谷规模配置的车队则会在高峰时段让乘客滞留,并且完全不可靠。
demand for rides remains wildly spiky and that is just fundamentally not going to change. The peakto trough ratio within a single day's demand for rides is something like 4:1 and a fixed fleet of robo taxis that's sized for peaks in demand is going to sit idle during those trough times of the day while a fleet that's sized for the demand troughs is going to leave riders stranded at rush hour and be completely unreliable.
Uber通过实时调动数百万人类司机进出市场,独特地解决了这个问题。这就是为什么在奥斯汀,Uber自己的数据显示,其网络上的车辆比99%的人类司机更繁忙。但那是因为Uber的需求聚合让它们保持满载。
有太多人了。Uber网络几乎有一种流动性,非常非常难以替代。
And Uber uniquely solves this by flexing millions of human drivers in and out of the market in real time. Which is why in Austin, Uber's own data showed with way more vehicles on its network were busier than 99% of human drivers. But that's because Uber's demand aggregation kept them full. There were so many people. There's almost a liquidity to the Uber network that is very, very hard to replace.
我实际上听说,即使在今天,如果你在加利福尼亚打开Whimo应用,等待时间大约是18分钟,而在Uber上只需几分钟。
I've actually heard that even today if you open the Whimo app in California, rate times run something like 18 minutes versus just a few minutes on Uber.
所以,我认为需要灵活供应的现实——司机可以上线工作一两个小时来应对这些需求高峰——并没有改变,而且对于真正使用Uber和Whimo的人来说,这种需求已经感受到了。
So, I think the reality of needing to have flexible supply where drivers can come online to work for just an hour or two doing these demand spikes hasn't changed and it's already being felt for the people who actually use Uber and Whimo.
是的,我认为这些挑战对Whimo来说并不陌生。你知道,这是一家相当聪明的公司,这就是为什么从长远来看,我确实相信他们会希望继续与Uber合作,如果这被证明是变现其硬件的最佳平台。
Yeah, I don't think that these challenges are are lost on Whimo. You know, this is a pretty smart company and that's why longer term, I do believe that they will want to continue to work with Uber if that proves to be the best platform for monetizing their hardware.
所以,当然,他们想用自己的应用独立尝试,但如果效果不佳,他们最终可能会重新想要接入Uber。但基本上,如果必要,Whimo可以承受多年糟糕的车队利用率,只要这能取代Uber。
So, of course, they want to try it on their own with their own app, but if that doesn't work out as well, they may ultimately revert back to wanting to plug in to Uber. But basically, Whimo can afford to have terrible fleet utilization for years if that's what it takes to displace Uber.
你知道谁证明了如何使用这个剧本吗?Uber。Uber补贴了十年的乘车服务以获得规模。有些人认为这项业务永远不会盈利。
And you know who proved how to use that playbook? Uber. Uber subsidized rides for a decade to gain scale. And some people thought the business would never be profitable.
所以现在的问题实际上是,Whimo在与Uber的竞争中想要变得多么难看?他们是要争取大奖吗?他们想完全把Uber从地图上抹去吗?还是他们满足于在市场中扮演次要角色,或者,你知道,一个能容纳他们两者的角色?
And so the question now is really how ugly does Whimo want to get in this competition with Uber? Are they going for the grand prize? Do they want to completely wipe Uber off the map? Or are they okay with maybe a more secondary role in the market or, you know, a role where there's room enough for both of them?
所以,如果是前者,他们肯定能在未来一段时间内给Uber带来很多痛苦。那可能表现为在未来十年烧掉大量资本,并真正引发一场价格战,我认为这不会长期杀死Uber,但肯定会推迟我们预期他们产生的回报。
And so, if it's the former, they can certainly cause Uber a lot of pain for some time to come. And that could be in the form of burning lots of capital for the next decade and really triggering a race to the bottom in pricing that I don't think kills Uber long term, but would certainly set back the returns that we expect them to generate.
所以,你知道,再说一次,我不认为他们能坚持那么久,以至于不可避免地杀死Uber,但补贴战对除了消费者以外的任何人来说都不会是好事。
And so, you know, again, I I don't think that they'll be able to just grit it out for so long that they'll inevitably kill Uber, but a subsidy war is really not going to be good for anyone but consumers.
消费者会从便宜的乘车价格中受益,但对我们股东来说,前景将很黯淡。
I mean, consumers will benefit from cheap ride prices, but for us as shareholders, it'll be a bleak picture for us.
正如我所说,确实存在一种现实版本,他们选择避免这种逐底竞争,而是选择长期将Uber视为战略合作伙伴,双方通过合作都能大获成功。
And so, like I said, there is though a version of reality where they choose to avoid this race to the bottom and opt to instead treat Uber as a strategic partner long term where both sides can win big by working together.
当我一开始说我有时会质疑自己对Uber的信心时,我认为这实际上就是问题的关键所在。谷歌已经在Whimo上花费了数十亿美元,我很难理解他们这样做是为了成为Uber网络中整合的10家自动驾驶公司之一。
When I said in the beginning that I find myself sometimes, you know, questioning my conviction in Uber, I think this is what it actually comes down to. I mean, Google has spent billions of dollars on Whimo, and I just struggle to see how they did that with the goal in mind to, I don't know, become one of 10 AVs integrated into the Uber network.
所以,他们一定有这样的目标,这也是他们目前战略所展示的,即真正主导那个市场。如果他们做到了,他们可能会投入大量资金,以至于在多年内摧毁Uber的利润率,从而也摧毁我们的投资。
So, they must have had the goal, and this is also what they're currently showing with the strategy, to actually dominate that market. And if they do, they could throw so much money at it that it just destroys Uber's margins for many, many years, and therefore also our investment.
即使他们没有杀死它,那至少在未来5到10年内,如果你考虑一下,也算是一种最坏的情况。
And even if they don't kill it, that would be sort of a worst case outcome, at least if you think about it, for the next 5 to 10 years.
不管我们喜不喜欢,至少在部分城市,地球上最优秀的自动驾驶公司刚刚审视了Uber提供的一切,即2亿用户、需求聚合、你刚才谈到的利用率逻辑,然后说:“不,谢谢。我们宁愿自己来。”
And whether we like it or not, at least in select cities, the single best autonomous vehicle company on earth just looked at everything which Uber is offering, which is, you know, 200 million users, the demand aggregation, the utilization logic that you basically just talked about, and then said, "No thanks. We'd rather build it ourselves."
我不知道,如果我在这里持悲观态度,我会说,这不正是市场的观点吗?他们说,如果技术领导者不需要Uber,那么最终的自动驾驶赢家,无论是Whimo还是其他公司,为什么还需要Uber?这是个好问题。
And I don't know, if I were to be a bear here, I would say, isn't this the market's whole point that they say, well, if the technology leader doesn't need Uber, why would the eventual winner of autonomy, whether it's Whimo or any other company, still need Uber? It's a good point.
为了把一切放在背景中,Whimo每周完成50万次乘车,而Uber每天完成4000万次行程。所以整个全球自动驾驶行业所有参与者加起来每年只完成大约5000万次行程,而Uber仅增长部分每年就增加约30亿次行程。
And just to put everything in context so far, Whimo does 500,000 rides a week, whereas Uber does 40 million trips a day. So the entire global autonomous vehicle industry all the players combined is only doing something like 50 million trips a year as Uber adds roughly 3 billion trips a year just in growth.
也许他有偏见,但Uber的首席财务官一直相当直言不讳,在未来5年内,自动驾驶汽车对Uber的业务量来说“相对不重要”。所以他甚至不认为自动驾驶汽车在不久的将来会成为重要的事情。
And you know, maybe he's biased, but Uber's CFO has been pretty blunt that over the next 5 years, AVs are quote relatively immaterial to Uber's volume. So he doesn't even see AVs as really being something significant for a while down the road.
如今增长最快的自动驾驶部署最多每年将业务量翻三倍。而在Uber早期的超高速增长年份,他们每年业务量实际上是9到10倍的增长。
And the fastest growing AV deployments today are at best tripling their volumes each year. And in Uber's early hyperrowth years, they were actually 9 to 10xing their volumes annually.
所以即使对于自动驾驶出租车的最佳扩展曲线,进展也比我们在2010年代网约车平台大战中看到的要慢。这告诉我,自动驾驶汽车的整合将在一夜之间长期进行。
So even for the best case scaling curve for robo taxis, things are progressing slower than what we saw during the ride hailing platform wars of the 2010s. And that tells me that the integration of AVs is going to play out over a long, long time overnight.
并不是路上的每辆车都会变成自动驾驶汽车。所以会有很多法规,会有抗议,客户会犹豫是否采用新技术。此外,自动驾驶汽车要在所有环境中安全运行还有很多工作要做,不仅仅是在旧金山和德克萨斯州奥斯汀的完美道路上。
所以它们需要能够应对暴雨、暴风雪、混乱的交通以及像发展中国家那样的城市,还有一系列其他非常复杂的问题。
Every car on the road is not going to become an AV. And so there's going to be lots of regulations. There's going to be protests. Customers are going to be hesitant to adopt the new technology. And then also there's just a lot of work to be done for AVs to still operate safely in all environments, not just on the pristine roads of San Francisco and Austin, Texas. So they're going to need to be able to navigate rainstorms and blizzards and chaotic traffic and cities like developing countries and a whole bunch of other really complex problems.
所以再次,我认为我们必须把一切放在正确的视角中。即使市场对Uber终值的担忧有一定道理,这肯定也不是在近期的时间表上。
And so again, I think we have to put everything in perspective. Even if there is some plausibility to the market's concerns about the terminal value of Uber, it's certainly not on any sort of immediate timeline.
尽管业务和地理区域集中,但如果你分解Uber的利润,移动出行(显然是网约车业务)大约占运营利润的60%。而美国大约占移动出行业务的60%。
Although the business and the geography are concentrated, I mean, if you decompose Uber's profits, mobility, which is obviously the right hailing business, is roughly 60% of operating profits. And then the US represents roughly 60% of the mobility business.
再进一步看,美国前20大城市是自动驾驶出租车在可预见的未来唯一可能大规模运营的地方。这包括大约四分之一的美国移动出行利润。
And then if you just look one way further looking at the top 20 cities in the US they're the only places that robo taxis currently on realistically operate at scale in the foreseeable future. And that includes about a quarter of US mobility profits.
所以我们主要讨论的是他们进入美国市场并与那里的Uber竞争的风险。如果你只看所有数字,得出的结果是,至少在中短期内,Uber利润中真正面临出租车竞争风险的部分实际上占9%。
So we're mainly talking about the risk of them getting into the US and then competing with Uber there. And what that comes out to if you just look at all the numbers that's effectively 9% of Uber's profits that are genuinely exposed to taxi competition at least in the near to medium term.
那是什么时候?大概是5到10年的时间。我会这样界定。如果你把郊区也算进去——说实话,自动驾驶汽车在很长一段时间内都不会到达郊区——那么你可能会得到18%的数字。
You know what is that? Probably like 5 to 10 years time. That's what I would label this. And if you include the suburbs, which AVs, if we're being honest, won't reach for a long time, you get to maybe 18%.
但实际上,郊区一直是Uber最大的增长领域之一,我想你上次提到过,他们的“等待与安全”计划,你可以等更长时间,然后得到更低的价格。
But actually, again, the suburbs have been one of Uber's, I think you mentioned last time, biggest growth areas with their weight and safe initiatives where you can wait longer and then you get a lower price.
而且,即使是Uber也花了很长时间才进入郊区,因为即使在正确的时间有足够的司机来接人,也需要做更多的组织工作。
And again, it took even Uber a long time until they got into the suburbs because it's just a lot more organizational things that you have to do to even there have enough drivers at the right time to actually pick up people.
与此同时,公司的另一半业务只是配送,这涉及到人步行将食物送到你家门口。我知道机器人不会在短期内大规模做到这一点。
And meanwhile, the other half of the company is just delivery and that involves a human walking food to your door. And I know that robots are not doing that at scale at any time soon.
虽然我们今天谈了很多关于无人机的事情,但我不确定,想想能做这件事的无人机,我认为至少还需要5到10年。在那之前,你不会看到任何餐厅开始与配送无人机合作,假设这对大多数餐厅来说甚至是可能的。
Although we talked a lot about drones today, but I don't know, thinking about drones that can do this, I think it will still be 5 to 10 years out at a minimum. And before that, you know, you won't see any restaurants setting up to work with delivery drones, assuming that would even be possible for most restaurants.
所以当Uber的运营利润估值倍数像过去一年那样被削减一半时,市场是在隐含地贬低整个公司,因为一个至少直接触及当前利润十分之一的风险。
So when Uber's valuation multiple of operating profits gets cut in half like it has been in the past year, the market is implicitly writing down the whole company for a risk that directly at least touches maybe a tenth of current profits.
虽然我们都知道市场不是这样运作的。他们有时至少会展望20到30年。而Uber的情况似乎就是这样。真正有趣的是,在奥斯汀和亚特兰大,这两个被认为是Waymo最大的展示市场,这些城市实际上一直是Uber在美国增长最快的市场之一。
Although we all know that's not how the market works. They look out 20 30 years at least sometimes. And this appears to be the thing here with Uber. What's really interesting is that in Austin and Atlanta, supposed to be two of Whimo's biggest showcase markets, these cities have actually been among the fastest growing Uber markets in the US.
而在旧金山,这是Waymo最成熟的市场——这么说有点好笑,对于一个这么年轻的企业来说说“成熟”,但Waymo确实拥有15%到20%的出行份额,然而Uber在旧金山的出行增长在2025年加速了。
And in San Francisco, which is Whimo's most mature market, which is funny to say, you know, mature for a business this young, but still Whimo does legitimately have a 15 to 20% share of rides, but Uber's trip growth accelerated in San Francisco in 2025.
所以如果你问他们怎么能做到,这要回到我之前提到的一点。机器人出租车正在扩大市场。他们正在把那些原本会自己开车或乘坐公共交通的人转化为拼车用户。
So if you're asking how they can be, it goes back to a point I mentioned earlier. Robo taxis are expanding the market. They are converting people who would have driven themselves or taken public transit into rid share users.
所以这个类别的增长速度超过了市场份额的转移速度。随着自动驾驶将成本降低到与拥有汽车更接近的水平,至少在城市里,这为那1%的数字增长留下了很大的空间。
And so the category is growing faster than market share is shifting. And as autonomy pulls cost down toward being on a closer parody with car ownership, at least in cities, that leaves a lot of room for that 1% number to grow.
我认为这又是一个短期与长期的问题,尤其是现在Waymo只是让更多人使用Uber和Waymo,以及整个拼车服务,然后你必须在10年、15年后质疑,他们到底会去哪里?仍然是Uber获得需求,还是他们会去一个单一的公司?
I think it's again like a short-term versus long-term thing where especially right now wayos just get more people to use Uber and way more and just ride hailing in general and then you have to question 10 years 15 years time where will they actually go? Is it still Uber that echo gets demand or is it just a single company where they will go?
我认为我们上次已经讨论过所有这些,尤其是当我们做关于Uber的演示时,他们正在与所有这些公司竞争,这些公司不仅正在进入这个领域,而且有很多钱可以烧。
And I think we discussed all of this last time and especially once when we gave a presentation on Uber that they are competing with all of these companies that not only expanding into the field but who just have a lot of money to burn.
我想说,Uber为应对这一切所采取的行动已经相当令人眼花缭乱。感觉每隔一周就会有一份新闻稿宣布Uber与新的自动驾驶合作伙伴合作。
I would say Uber's response to account for all this has been pretty dizzying. It feels like every other week there's a press release with a new self-driving partner attached to Uber.
一年前,Uber 有 14 个自动驾驶合作伙伴,而如今已超过 20 个。更重要的是,这些合作已从抽象的交易转变为具体的承诺,明确了车辆数量和城市,以及投入的美元金额。
And so a year ago Uber had 14 autonomous vehicle partners, but today it has more than 20. And more importantly, these partnerships have gone from being abstract deals to concrete commitments with vehicle counts and cities in dollars, all defined clearly.
之后希望能进入数十个市场。Uber 及其车队合作伙伴将拥有这些车辆。
and then hopefully dozens of markets after that. And Uber and its fleet partners will own those vehicles.
他们已在多家自动驾驶公司中投入了数十亿美元的股权。我认为这可能是为了在一定程度上对冲风险,但主要还是为了确保除了 Whimo 和 Tesla 之外还有更多竞争。
They've taken billions of dollars worth of ownership stakes in various self-driving companies. I think probably to hedge risk to some extent, but also mainly to invest in ensuring there's more competition than just Whimo and Tesla.
因为在一个有许多自动驾驶选项的世界里,Whimo 几乎失去了所有的议价能力,而 Uber 则通过成为人类司机和自动驾驶汽车汇聚的最佳中立平台而获胜。
Because in a world where there are many AV options, Whimo pretty much loses all of its leverage and Uber wins by being simply the best place for human drivers and AVs to all come together on one neutral platform.
这听起来有点像我们在人工智能领域看到的循环融资,只是规模小得多,我得说。而且,看到所有自动驾驶参与者都参与其中,这让我对 Uber 最为看好,因为我不喜欢他们与 Google 竞争的想法。
That sounds a bit like the circular funding that we see in AI just on a much smaller scale, I got to say. And still, I mean, seeing all of the AV players in the game is what makes me most bullish on Uber because I don't like the idea of them competing with Google.
所以,有太多参与者涌入,甚至难以想象。你只听到更多关于 Uber 的负面消息,但现在每家公司都在推出这些汽车。
So, there are just so many players coming in that it's hard to even wrap your head around it. You only hear about way more against Uber, but every company is having these cars now.
我很高兴你也提到了中国的供应商,因为就像大语言模型一样,在自动驾驶领域,美国和中国之间也存在激烈的竞争。我认为你可能会再次争辩说,这对 Uber 来说至少是件好事,因为 Uber 管理层曾表示,中国自动驾驶公司的硬件和软件成本“比他们在其他任何地方看到的都要好”。
I'm glad you also mentioned the Chinese providers because just like with LLMs, there's very much a tag rivalry in AVs between the US and China too. And I think you would probably argue that once again that this is a good thing for Uber at least because Uber's management has said that Chinese AV companies hardware and software costs are quote better than anything they are seeing anywhere else.
当全美国都在关注 Whimo 时,在中东、亚洲和欧洲,一场平行的自动驾驶竞赛正在进行。但 Uber 在这场竞赛中有利害关系,而且基本上参与了每一匹赛马。
While everyone in the US watches Whimo, there's a parallel autonomy race in the Middle East, in Asia, and in Europe. But Uber has skin in the game, and it's essentially every horse in the race.
还有一件事我认为我们应该提一下。Uber 推出了一个名为 Uber Autonomous Solutions 的产品。名字很有创意。这包括保险、客户支持、车队管理和远程协助,任何自动驾驶运营商都可以购买,而不必自己构建。
And there's one other thing I think we should mention. Uber launched something called Uber Autonomous Solutions. Creative name. And this includes insurance, customer support, fleet management, and remote assistance that any AV operator can buy instead of having to build themselves.
因此,Uber 对这部分业务感到兴奋的另一个原因是他们将获得的数据。Uber 正在普通的人类驾驶的 Uber 车辆上安装传感器套件。由于 Uber 每天完成 4000 万次行程,这些车辆每天多次看到地球上各种奇怪的边缘情况。
And so the other reason Uber is excited about this part of the business is for the data they'll get. Uber is putting sensor kits on regular human-driven Ubers. And because Uber does 40 million trips a day, those cars see every weird edge case on Earth multiple times a day.
到今年年底,他们预计每月将收集多达 200 万英里的训练数据,然后实际将这些数据出售给自动驾驶合作伙伴。所以 Uber 基本上是在利用其人类驾驶网络的数据来帮助自动驾驶竞争对手和他们投资的公司赶上 Whimo,这是一个相当聪明的策略,我得说。
And by the end of the year, they're expected to be collecting up to 2 million miles of training data per month and then actually selling that data to AV partners. So Uber is basically monetizing data from its human driving network to help AV competitors and companies that they've invested in catch up to Whimo, which is a pretty smart strategy, I got to say.
我想谈谈你在我们上一期关于 Uber 的节目中提到的其中一件事,那就是你认为会出现类似于酒店和办公楼 REITs 的金融公司,但取而代之的是,基本上由自动驾驶车队组成,这些车队将作为业务通过 Uber 运营。
And I want to touch on one of the things you mentioned in our last episode on Uber, which is that you think there will be financial companies that arise similar to REITs for hotels and office buildings, but instead four fleets of basically AVs that will be run as businesses through Uber.
在这方面或那个方面有什么新进展吗?这可能是思考这个问题的一个好方法。这是我从 Uber 首席执行官 Dara Khosrowshahi 那里得到的见解。说实话,当我们第一次讨论时,这听起来有点像科幻小说。但这就是 Uber 现在字面上的官方企业战略。
Is there anything new on that end or that front? It's a probably a good way to think about it. And that's an insight I got from Uber's CEO, Dar Koser Shahi. And to be honest, it sounded a little like science fiction when we first discussed it. But this is now Uber's literal official corporate strategy.
据 Uber 首席财务官称,自动驾驶生态系统有五个层次。首先是面向消费者的市场,那就是 Uber。其次是自动驾驶软件开发商,即 Neuro 和 Whimo。然后是制造汽车的汽车制造商。
还有运营停车场和充电站的车队运营商,比如 Hertz。第五,将会有第三方融资来实现这一切。
Per Uber's CFO, the autonomy ecosystem has five layers. So there's the marketplace facing the consumers, and that is Uber. There's the AV software developers. So that's Neuro and Whimo. Then you have the automakers who are building the cars. You've got the fleet operators that are running depots and charging stations. So, think Hertz. And then fifth, you'll have third-party financing to make this all happen.
这些机构将实际拥有构成这些自动驾驶车队的车辆,并承担这些资产负债表风险。所以,Uber 运营网络,其他人拥有汽车,这就是 Uber 保持轻资产运营的方式。
These are the institutions that will actually own the vehicles that comprise these AV fleets and take on those balance sheet risks. So, Uber runs the network, someone else owns the cars, and that is how Uber stays a capital light business.
但今天,Uber 签署了收购协议,保证购买从装配线上下线的汽车,这类似于我们看到的超大规模企业为保证数据中心建设的计算需求而签署的协议。
But still I mean today we have Uber signing oftake agreements guaranteeing it will buy cars rolling off assembly lines kind of like the deals that we also see from hyperscalers guaranteeing compute demand to support data center construction
Uber 基本上在休斯顿租赁了一个仓库,并投资了 Vern、Rivian 和 Nuro,如果把这些加起来,大约有 100 亿美元已承诺给自动驾驶汽车制造商。
and Uber is basically leasing depot in I think it's Houston and investing in Vern and Rivian and Nuro and if you would add it all up it's something like $10 billion that has been committed to the AV builder
这在几年前听起来会是一笔大得多的钱,但如今,与尤其是 Max 7 在人工智能上的投资相比,这听起来就相形见绌了。
and and that would have sound like a lot more money just a few years ago but gosh nowadays that sound modest compared to the investments that especially the Max 7 are making into AI
而且,如果你愿意这么称呼的话,自动驾驶汽车的金融化——养老基金和类似工具将这些资产从 Uber 的资产负债表中剥离——是我们上次得到的第二阶段承诺,对吧?
and still I mean the financialization if you want to call it that of AVs where you know pension funds and readlike vehicles take these assets off Uber's balance sheet is the promise phase 2 that we got last time right
目前,Uber 通过将这些资产保留在其资产负债表上,增加了其资本密集度,而相比之下,他们的常规模式——众所周知——是人类司机拥有车辆,这些车辆不在 Uber 的资产负债表上。
I mean for the time being Uber's increasing its capital intensity by owning these assets on its balance sheet compared with their normal model where of course as we all know human drivers own the vehicles and they aren't on Uber's balance sheet
当市场对 Uber 和 Waymo 之间某种程度的不和做出反应时,Uber 正试图进行其历史上最大规模的收购,即收购 Delivery Hero 公司。
while the market was reacting to the news about Uber and Whimo having sort of a fallout, Uber was attempting the largest acquisition in its history, which is the company Delivery Hero.
所以发生的事情是,Uber 悄悄积累了 Delivery Hero 约 25% 的股份。然后在 7 月 16 日,它发起了正式要约,对 Delivery Hero 的估值约为 148 亿欧元,扣除 Uber 已持有的股份后净额约为 137 亿欧元。
And so what happened was Uber quietly built up a stake of about 25% in Delivery Hero. And then on July 16th, it launched a formal offer valuing Delivery Hero at about 14.8 billion or 13.7 billion net of the stake that Uber already owned.
接下来发生的事情是,Prosus——一家大型荷兰投资公司,在价值投资圈中相当知名——不可撤销地承诺要约收购其股份,其中要约收购仅指同意出售给该要约。因此,相应地,这将使 Uber 的持股比例超过 50%,并且确实保证了交易将成功,因为他们拥有投票权来实现这一点,除非有任何监管方面的担忧。
And so what happened next is you had Process, which is a a big Dutch investment firm that's pretty well known in value investing circles. they irrevocably committed to tender their shares where tendering just means agreeing to sell into the offer. And so correspondingly that takes Uber past 50% ownership and really it guarantees that the deal will succeed because they have the voting power to make it happen barring any regulatory concerns
为了观众的利益,您认为这笔交易背后的逻辑是什么?我的意思是,他们不一定是在以最低价购买这里的配送业务,而且叫车和送餐行业并不会为用户创造规模经济的好处。我的意思是,Uber 在中东有更多业务,对我来说在德国基本上没什么用。
您的 Uber 体验完全取决于 Uber 在您实际居住城市的密度。
Just for the sake of the audience, what would you say is the logic behind this deal? I mean, they're not necessarily buying delivery here at, you know, bottom bin price and right hailing and food delivery are industries that don't exactly create economies of scale benefits for users. I mean, the fact that Uber has more operations in the Middle East does basically nothing for me here in Germany. your experience with Uber is entirely contingent on the density of their presence in the city that you actually live in.
这是一个非常好的问题,简短的回答是,这一切都是为了扩大 Uber 可以提供其全系列产品的地方数量。因此,Uber 目前在 34 个市场同时运营叫车和配送业务,但在这笔交易之后,这个数字将跃升至 58。
这为他们向更多人销售 Uber One 打开了大门。
It's a really good question and the short answer is that it's all about expanding the number of places where Uber can make its full range of products available. So Uber operates both rides and delivery in 34 markets, but after this deal, that number will jump to 58. And that opens the door to them selling Uber one more.
我们在节目开头谈到过,在其出行和叫车应用之间进行交叉销售——他们鼓励 Uber 乘客尝试在 Uber Eats 上点餐,反之亦然——这是 Uber 拥有的最可靠的价值创造杠杆之一。
And you know, we talked about at the beginning of the episode how cross-selling between its mobility and ride apps, where they encourage Uber riders to try to order food on Uber Eats and vice versa, that is one of the most reliable value creation levers Uber has at its disposal.
因此,Delivery Hero 为他们带来了 5000 万新消费者和二十四个新市场来运行这一策略,再加上 Uber One 扩展到所有这些地方的可能性。
And so, Delivery Hero brings them 50 million new consumers and two dozen new markets to run that playbook in, plus again the extension of Uber 1 into all of those places or the possibility to do so.
因此,当我们第一次研究 Uber 时,我们谈到 Uber 认识到他们在全球哪些市场正在失利是非常务实的。他们没有在那里竞相压价,而是选择投资于当地的赢家。他们通过在中国投资滴滴、在东南亚投资 Grab 来做到这一点。
但 Delivery Hero 的交易在这里有点颠覆了这一点,并表明他们可以从被动持股转变为全面收购并将该公司整合到 Uber 中。
And so the first time we looked at Uber, we talked about how it was very pragmatic for Uber to recognize which markets they were losing in globally. And instead of racing to the bottom there, they chose instead to invest in the local winners. And so they did that by taking passive stakes in DD and China and Grab in Southeast Asia. But the delivery hero deal here flips that upside down a bit and shows that they can go from taking a passive stake to making a full acquisition and integrating that company into Uber.
在企业并购中,您经常听到很多协同效应。这些所谓的协同效应多年来被用来证明许多糟糕交易的合理性,但在这种情况下,Delivery Hero 的利润率与 Uber 相比确实存在很大差距,尽管实际上它的技术费率更高。
这是因为他们大量的技术成本。我认为 Delivery Hero 在技术上的支出占预订量的比例要高得多,因为它基本上缺乏 Uber 的规模。因此,Uber 在一个技术平台上运行其整个全球配送业务。
而对于 Delivery Hero,我确实认为这很可能会真正帮助业务,只需接入 Uber 的后端,而不是自己构建。
You often hear about a lot of synergies in corporate M&A. And these so-called synergies have been used to justify many bad deals over the years, but in this case, Delivery Hero does have a big disparity in margins compared to Uber despite actually having a higher tech rate. And that's because of their substantial technology costs. I think delivery hero spends far more on tech as a percentage of bookings because it basically lacks Uber's scale. So Uber runs its entire global delivery business on one tech platform. And for delivery hero, I do think it's quite plausible that this will really help the business, but just tying into Uber's back end instead of building out their own.
这笔交易还有一个非常有趣的广告角度,因为 Delivery Hero 通过广告将其总商品价值的约 3% 货币化,这比 Uber 高出不少。
And there's also a really interesting ads angle to the deal too because Delivery Hero monetizes about 3% of its gross merchandise value through advertising which is a good bit ahead of Uber.
所以我很惊讶地了解到,如果 Uber 的广告业务在交易后超过 1000 亿美元的预订量的配送业务中趋向于这些渗透水平,那么在未来四五年内,你将获得数十亿美元的增量高利润率收入。
So I was surprised to learn that and if Uber's ads business were to converge toward those penetration levels across a delivery business that post deal exceeds a hundred billion dollars of bookings, you get several billion dollars of incremental very high margin revenue over four or five years.
还有一个我认为我们应该提到的更具战略意义的点,而且我相信市场低估了这一点,那就是这笔交易在某种程度上也是一种中期自主对冲。因此,如果机器人出租车最终对 Uber 美国业务的经济性造成压力,那么现在他们将在自主性成为更遥远问题的市场中拥有一个更大的全球配送和本地商务机器。
There is one other more strategic point that I think we should mention too and that I'm sure the market is underappreciating which is that the deal is also sort of an autonomy hedge in the intermediate term to some extent. So if robo taxis do eventually pressure the economics of Uber's US business, well now they'll have a bigger global delivery and local commerce machine in markets where autonomy is going to be a more distant concern.
我们已经讨论了一段时间,我仍然觉得当我们谈论 Uber 时,我们还有很多要讨论和涵盖的内容。但是当你真正对一家公司感到兴奋,并且你知道我们的一项投资前景时,就很容易整天谈论它。
We've been going for a while now and I still feel there's so much for us to discuss and to cover when we talk about Uber. But when you're truly excited about a company and you know one of our investments prospects, it's just so easy to talk all day about it.
为了快速列出 Uber 在过去一年中推出的其他几项东西,我想我应该提到 Uber 与 Expedia 合作,在 Uber 应用内销售酒店预订,超过 70 万个房源,为 Uber One 会员提供赚取 10% 积分返还的机会。
And to just quickly list a handful of other things that Uber has unveiled in the last year, I think I should mention that Uber partnered with Expedia to sell hotel bookings inside the Uber app, 700,000 plus properties that offers Uber 1 members a chance to earn 10% back in credits.
他们还收购了另一家德国公司 Black Lane,这是一家高端司机服务公司,业务覆盖 500 多个城市,规模相当大。这很好地补充了 Uber 的高端服务,我们今天没有涉及这部分,但我想上次我们讨论 Uber 时至少在一定程度上提到过。
And they also acquired, going back to where I live, another German company called Black Lane, which is a premium chauffeur service operating in 500 plus cities. So, it's quite big. And that very much complements the luxury end of Uber's offerings that we haven't touched on at all today, but I think we covered it last time we talked about Uber, at least to some extent.
他们还增加了一项他们称之为“女性偏好”的功能,基本上允许女性乘客只匹配女性司机。可以想象,出于安全考虑,这对许多女性很有吸引力,并且更有可能让人们在边缘情况下使用 Uber。
And they also added in a feature they refer to as woman preferences. So it basically allows women riders to match only with woman drivers. So you can imagine that's pretty attractive to many women for safety purposes and just makes it all the more likely that people will use Uber on the margins.
我的意思是,如果你在聚会,在外面,你只想叫个 Uber 回家,如果你是女性,能有女性司机比男性司机好得多。我认为这是我们通常会详细讨论估值的地方。但我们已经持有 Uber,正如我们今天分享的,我们对其增长空间可以说变得更加乐观,而估值在过去一年中变得越来越合理。
所以我认为我们不需要模型来告诉我们,我们非常乐意持有 Uber,甚至可能继续增持。
I mean, if you're partying and you're out and you know, you just want to have an Uber and get home, it's way better if you know, if you're a woman, you can also have a woman driver compared to a man. And I think this is where we would normally go through the valuation in detail. But we already own Uber and as we've shared today, we've arguably gotten more optimistic about its growth runway. while the valuation has become more and more reasonable over the last year. So I don't think we need a model to tell us that we are very happy owning Uber and may even continue to add to the position.
但我确实想播放我们上一集节目中的另一段片段,那是 Uber 首席执行官达拉对《金融时报》一篇批评 Uber 回购而非将资本用于投资增长的专栏文章的回应。
But I did want to play another clip from our last episode together which was a response from Darra the CEO of Uber to a Financial Times column criticizing Uber's buybacks instead of using you know that capital to just invest in growth.
我相信 Uber 最好的日子还在后头。我们有一个类似公用事业的大型业务,仍处于渗透市场的早期阶段。这让我们得出结论,持续的回购计划对 Uber 来说是正确的答案。我们采取谦逊的投资方式,在我们希望是多年的时间内进行美元成本平均。
I believe Uber's best days are ahead. We have a large utility-like business that is still in the early days of penetrating its market. This has led us to conclude that a consistent buyback program is the right answer for Uber. We are taking the humble investment route of dollar cost averaging over what we hope will be multiple years.
所以当时回购是一个 70 亿美元的计划,人们真正担心 Uber 要么向华尔街高估了其增长前景,要么错误地分配资本进行回购,而这些资本本可以更好地用于增长投资。
So at that time the buyback was a $7 billion program and there was real concern that Uber was either overestimating its growth prospects to Wall Street or misallocating capital to conduct buybacks when it would be better spent on growth investments.
得益于 Uber 利润率的拐点,当盈利能力同比翻倍时,他们找到了资金来轻松地同时做到这两点。实际上发生的是,董事会批准了一项 200 亿美元的回购计划,同时进行了我们在过去一个小时里谈到的所有投资和合作,而且没有因此拉伸他们的资产负债表。所以我认为这非常非常令人印象深刻。
And well thanks to the inflection in Uber's margins when you're profitability doubles year-over-year they have found the cash to comfortably do both. And so actually what has happened is the board authorized a $20 billion repurchase program while making all the investments and partnerships that we've talked about for the last hour and not stretching their balance sheet either in doing so. So I think that's incredibly incredibly impressive.
但我们何不把它带回家呢?我认为这一集对我的永恒教训是,无论 Uber 发生什么,市场可以看着一家企业一个季度接一个季度地客观改善,同时决定为它支付更少的钱。在许多情况下,这是有充分理由的,因为他们对未来的增长减速或业务下滑的预期是正确的,尽管目前可能取得成功。
但这就是我们与市场对 Uber 的看法不同的地方。
But how about we bring it all home? I I think the evergreen lesson of this episode for me is whatever happens to Uber, the thing is markets can watch a business get objectively better quarter after quarter and simultaneously decide to pay less for it. And in many cases that is for good reason because they're right about anticipating future growth decelerations or decline in the business in light of maybe current success. But that is where we see things differently than the market with Uber.
尽管如此,我必须说,我现在比以前更加自信,因为很多新闻都是关于 Waymo 的。所以看起来是 Waymo 对 Uber,谁在赢,在这种情况下只是非黑即白。但实际上,Waymo 正在与所有其他自动驾驶汽车参与者竞争。
如果 Waymo 在任何其他参与者扩张之前无法达到全球规模,那么 Uber 的市场将有待争夺。
And all of that said, I must say that I feel even more confident now than I did prior because a lot of news is about Whimo. So it seems like it's Whimo against Uber and who's winning and it's just pretty white or black in this case. But in reality, Whimo is competing with all other AV players. And if Whimo can't reach global scale before any of them expand, it will be Uber's markets to win.
虽然 Waymo 取得了巨大进步,而且我认为技术本身令人惊叹,对吧?但我认为他们没有机会垄断全球自动驾驶需求,而这可能是他们真正消灭 Uber 所需要的。
And while has made tremendous progress, and I think the technology itself is just astonishing, right? But I don't think they have a chance at monopolizing AV demand globally, which is probably what they would need to do to actually kill off Uber.
所以我想这意味着在这一集之后,我必须登录我的个人账户,再买一些 Uber。好了,就这样。在过去一年里,我成功地让 Daniel 对 Uber 越来越看好,希望这不会反过来咬我们一口。
So I guess that means that after this episode, I have to log into my personal account and buy some more Uber. Well, there you go. Uh, I've successfully made Daniel more and more bullish on Uber over the last year and hopefully that doesn't come back to bite us.
所以我认为市场会随着时间的推移正确地评估 Uber,那将意味着大幅推高股价。
And so I think the market will weigh Uber properly over time, and that would mean dramatically pushing the stock price higher.
Uber 模式的美妙之处在于,车辆不在他们的资产负债表上,司机可以选择实时响应需求来提供服务。因此,Uber 司机在响应乘车请求或缺乏请求方面可以非常灵活。另一种说法是,Uber 平台上的供应自然适应需求。
The beauty of Uber's model is that the vehicles are not on their balance sheet and drivers can opt to make themselves available in response to demand in real time. Thus, Uber drivers can be incredibly flexible about responding to ride requests and a lack thereof. Another way to maybe say that is that supply on Uber's platform naturally adjusts to demand.
比如说 Waymo 试图在城市中分配 XYZ 数量的汽车来取代 Uber。现实是,他们在任何给定时刻要么分配不足,要么分配过多。没有办法用固定的车辆供应来完美匹配需求,这就是为什么最好部署更有限的车队,并与 Uber 合作,利用他们的网络进行预订。
然后车辆可以用于其他目的,或者只是作为常规 Uber 的偶尔替代品。
and for say Whimo to try and allocate XYZ number of cars through a city that will displace Uber. Well, the reality is that they're either going to underallocate vehicles or overallocate them at any given moment in time. There's just no way to perfectly match demand with a fixed supply of vehicles driving around, which is why it's better to deploy a more limited fleet and just partner with Uber, tapping into their network for bookings. And then the vehicles could be used for other purposes or as just an occasional alternative to a regular Uber.
这个频道对 $UBER 的历次判断
The Intrinsic Value Podcast 在这只股票上共 3 条判断,这里只列相邻的几条。