The Investor's Podcast 对 $CATL 的判断变化

2026-08-22
《CATL: The $280 Billion Company You've Never Heard Of | Bull vs. Bear w/Stig, Manish, & Ralph》
宁德时代在电池生产中的主导地位及其向AI数据中心储能领域的扩张,支撑了其长期价值显著增长的看涨论点。

成为最大使它们最便宜。最便宜使它们最赚钱。凭借CTL的规模,他们一直在向上游矿业推进,持有矿业公司的股份。因此他们控制原材料。他们还通过将销售直接设计到汽车平台来向下游延伸。

Being the biggest makes them the cheapest. Being the cheapest makes them the most profitable. And with the scale CTL has, they have been pushing upstream into mining with stakes in the mining company. So they control the raw materials. And they have gone downstream by designing their sales straight into the car platform.

我说的公司是CL,Contemporary Amprodex Technology Limited,全球最大的电池制造商。截至最近股价,其市值约为2800亿美元,这意味着它们大约相当于壳牌的规模。

The company I'm talking about is CL, Contemporary Amprodex Technology Limited, the largest battery maker in the world. And as of the most recent stock price, its market cap is about $280 billion, which means they are roughly the size of Shell.

我认为它正迅速成为能源基础设施的支柱。它为电动汽车提供动力。它存储以支持电力,现在它越来越成为AI数据中心的核心电力基础设施参与者。

I think it is fast becoming the backbone of the energy infrastructure. It powers EVs. It stores to enable power and now increasingly it's becoming the core power infrastructure player in the AI data centers.

他召集了一群由他自己和他的副手领导的中国投资者,将ATL的电动汽车电池部门剥离成一个全新的中国控制的公司,名为CL。Robin Zang和他的共同投资者持有公司85%的股权,TDK保留了剩余的15%。这就是CL的由来。

He gathers a group of Chinese investors led by himself and his deputy and spun off ATL's EV battery division into a brand new Chinese controlled company called CL. Robin Zang and his co-investors took 85% equity in the company and TDK kept the remaining 15%. And that's how CL came into existence.

CL没有进入特斯拉的供应链,大约十年后,即2020年,特斯拉进入中国并开始从CL采购电池,那时CL的增长开始垂直上升。

CL did not enter Tesla's supply chain roughly a decade later around 2020 when Tesla entered China and started sourcing batteries from CL and that's when the growth of CL went vertical.

2020年,CL的收入约为70亿美元,而2025年,仅仅5年后,他们的收入增长了超过八倍,达到超过600亿美元。

So in 2020 CL's revenue was roughly about $7 billion and in 2025 just 5 years later their revenue jumped by more than eight times to more than $60 billion.

如今,Robin Zang有时被称为全球电池供应链的隐形之王。他仍然拥有公司约22%的股份,创始团队持有超过35%。

Today, Robin Zang is sometimes called the invisible king of the global battery supply chain. He still owns about 22% of the company and the founding team holds over 35%.

一个月后,CL推出了一款竞争产品,在不到7分钟内从10%充到98%。所以,这不是一场势均力敌的竞争。CL的规模大约是紧随其后的竞争对手的两倍半。

And a month later, CL came out with a competing product that goes from 10% to 98% in under 7 minutes. So, this isn't a close race. Uh, CL is about two and a half times larger than the nearest rival.

如果你看看CL,并对照一份清单,比如他们是最便宜的生产商,拥有最大的研发预算、最好的技术,你可能会认为护城河是其中之一。但我认为护城河在于这些优势相互促进,形成一个飞轮。规模最大使他们成本最低。

成本最低使他们利润最高。这些利润支撑起庞大的研发预算,帮助他们打造最好的技术,赢得更多客户,从而变得更大,而凭借CL的规模,他们已向上游推进,进入采矿领域,持有矿业公司的股份,从而控制原材料;他们还向下游延伸,直接将销售设计到汽车平台。

因此,对于竞争对手来说,问题不在于试图在某一方面追赶。他们追逐的是一个每年都在加速旋转的飞轮。

if you look at CL and you see a checklist like they are the cheapest producer, they have the biggest R&D budget, the best technology and you might assume that the mo is one of those. But I think the moat is that these advantages feed each other and create a flywheel. Being the biggest makes them the cheapest. Being the cheapest makes them the most profitable. That profit funds a large R&D budget which helps them build the best technology and win more customers which makes them bigger still and with the scale CTL has they have been pushing upstream into mining with stakes in the mining companies so they control the raw materials and they have gone downstream by designing their sales straight into the car platforms. So for a competitor, it isn't about trying to catch up on one thing. They are chasing a flywheel that just keeps spinning faster every year.

CL拥有行业内最广泛的客户群。特斯拉、宝马、奔驰、大众,以及除DYD外几乎所有的中国电动汽车制造商。

And CL has the broadest set of customers in the industry. Tesla, BMW, Mercedes, Volkswagen and nearly every Chinese EV maker except DYD.

我们讨论过的竞争优势已被市场充分理解。但我认为被低估的是两个仍处于生命周期早期阶段的新增长引擎,我相信市场尚未充分为其定价。

So the competitive advantage that we have discussed are pretty well understood by the market. But what I think is underappreciated are two new growth engines that are still in the early stage of their life cycle and I believe the market hasn't fully underwritten them.

这正是CL电池填补的空白。它们位于这些尖峰计算负载和稳定的电网之间。它们吸收这些电力激增。

That's the gap that CL batteries fill in. They sit in between this spiky compute loads and the steady power grid. They absorb these surges in power in between.

是的,这确实令人难以置信,CL已经是全球第一大储能供应商,我认为有两件事使其更具吸引力。首先,由于我们谈到的复杂性和耐久性要求,储能业务为CL带来的利润率高于核心电动汽车电池业务。

Yeah, it's it's quite mindboggling for sure and CL is already the world's number one energy storage supplier and I think that two things make it even more attractive play. First is that the storage segment carries higher margins for CL than the core EV battery business because of the complexity and the durability requirements that we talked about.

第二点我觉得更有趣的是,CL不仅仅向这些数据中心销售电池。它现在正系统地构建一个完整的储能能源生态系统,通过数据中心内部的电力分配来实现。他们甚至入股电力设备制造商,并维护整个能源堆栈。

And the second point which I find more interesting is that CL isn't just selling batteries to these data centers. It is now systematically assembling a full stack energy ecosystem for the storage through power distribution inside the data center. They are even buying into the power equipment makers and servicing the entire energy stack.

我认为这有可能将CL从单纯的储能供应商转变为整个AI计算建设的战略基础设施合作伙伴。由于地缘政治原因,CL实际上无法在美国拥有工厂。因此,他们没有硬碰硬,而是找到了一种变通方法,与美国公司达成许可协议,由美国合作伙伴建造、拥有并运营制造工厂,而CL仅提供技术许可并收取特许权使用费。

This I think uh has the potential to transform CL from just an energy storage supplier to a strategic infrastructure partner for the entire AI compute buildout. So CL is effectively locked out of owning a factory in the US for geopolitical reasons. So rather than fight it out, they have found a workaround where they get into a licensing deal with an American company and it's the American partner that builds, owns and runs the manufacturing plant while CL just provides the license of its technology and collects a royalty fee.

CL尚未披露许可费的经济细节。但如果按照这类交易通常的3%至4%的费率计算,那么这是一种利润率非常高的轻资本收入,而且这种框架可以扩展到电动汽车电池之外,甚至包括我们谈到的AI数据存储计算。

CL hasn't disclosed the economics of the licensing fee. But if it is in the 3 to 4% range that these deals are typically u done at then that's a very high margin capital light income and that framework can extend beyond EV batteries to even data storage uh for the AI data storage compute that we talked about.

这里我想强调的重要一点是,这仍处于早期阶段。该模式正受到美国立法者的审查。因此,CL显然认为这对双方都是双赢的解决方案,但地缘政治涉及多个维度,这还不是一个短期的胜利,但如果CL能够在美国扩大这一LRS框架,高利润的特许权使用费收入将为股价带来巨大提振。

So the important point here that I want to do highlight is that this is still in the early phase. The model is under scrutiny by the US lawmakers. So CL obviously feels that this is a win-win solution for both parties but the geopolitics has many dimensions and it's not yet a shortsh short win but if CL can scale this LRS framework in the US the high margin royalty revenue can provide a big boost to the stock price

回想一下,我是一名法务会计师,我故意用这个双关语。在最近一个财季,CATL报告了21.8%的增长,并出货了吉瓦时级别的电池容量。然而,营收却收缩了9.7%。这种价格通缩对增长造成了130%的巨大拖累。

这是因为CATL的长期协议采用了原材料指数化。公司有合同义务将制造效率提升和商品成本节约直接传递给其原始设备制造商。

Recall I'm a forensic accountant in that pun I intended. Uh, in a recent fiscal period, CATL reported a 21.8% 8% growth and shipped gigawatt v hour volume. Yet the topline revenue contracted by 9.7%. This price deflation acted as a massive 130% drag on growth. This happened because CATL's long-term agreements utilize raw material indexation. The company is contractually obligated to pass manufacturing efficiency gains and commodity savings directly to their OEMs.

去年,CATL报告的现金流几乎是利润的两倍。这个两倍的差异之所以存在,是因为CAT利用其主导地位,通过延长应付账款来挤压供应商。本质上,这是来自其供应链的无息贷款,就像你提到的亚马逊一样。

然而,中国当局现在已要求大企业加快付款。随着这笔无息贷款被收回,CATL的融资模式将面临痛苦的调整,剥离用于回购和分红的现金。

Last year, CATL reported almost two times as much cash flow as profit. This two times delta exists because CAT uses its dominant position to squeeze suppliers by holidays payable outstanding. Essentially, it's an interest free loan from its supply chain like you said at Amazon. However, the Chinese authorities have already now demanding mandating that large firms paymemes faster. As this interestf free loan is called in, CATL's CL's funding model will face a painful readjustment, stripping away the cash used for buybacks and dividends.

尽管本人认为储能系统是电动汽车销售放缓的周期性缓冲,但储能系统对公用事业资本预算、全球利率和AI支出都很敏感。

Although yours truly believes that the energy storage system is a cyclical buffer to slowing EV sales, the ESS, the energy storage system, is sensitive to utility capital budgets, to global interest rates, and to AI spend.

这种储能缓冲可以被视为全球微观环境的高贝塔。无争议的扩张可能会放缓。作为最大的企业,他们是所有竞争对手的最大目标。他们可能是向固态电池颠覆性技术转型最慢的。而且他们从下一代化学技术中失去的最多,除非他们发明了它。

This ESS buffer can be viewed as a high beta on the global micro environment. uncontested expansion may slow. Being the largest, they're the biggest target for all the competitors. They may be the slowest mover towards solid state disruption. And they have the most to lose from the next generation chemistry, unless of course they invent it.

随着中国政府补贴的消失,回想一下“猪在风中”,CO面临着自2011年以来从未见过的引力。

With subsidies from the Chinese government gone, recall the pig in the win, CO faces a gravitational pull not seen since 2011.

其中一些引力包括:一是匈牙利和德国新工厂的利用率风险。CL有巨大的固定开销。欧洲电动汽车采用率因补贴悬崖而出现的任何轻微放缓都将使这些产能无法被吸收,将增长资产变成利润率拖累。

Some of those gravitational pulls include one a utilization risk with new plants in Hungary and Germany. CL has a massive fixed overhead. Any minor slowdown in European EV adoption due to subsidy cliffs will leave this capacity unabsorbed turning growth assets into margin anchors.

尽管进行了垂直整合,CAT仍然是一家影子大宗商品贸易公司。其股价可能被空头视为锂和镍波动的代理指标,而非研发实力的体现。

Despite the vertical integration, CAT remains a shadow commodity trading house. Its stock price may be viewed by bears as a proxy for lithium and nickel volatility, not a reflection of R&D prowess.

欧洲的保护主义壁垒,即欧盟碳边境调节机制(CBAM),是对中国电池征收的一种针对性关税,也是关键创始人和关键人物。

The European protectionist wall, the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism, CBAMP, acts as a targeted tax on Chinese cells and a key founder, key man.

CL与Robert Zing的个人地位密不可分,他持有22%的股份,与北京关系深厚。他政治地位的任何变动,对股东而言都代表着一种无法对冲的生存风险。

CL is inextricably tied to Robert Zing's personal standing with a 22% ownership, deep ties to Beijing. Any shift in his political standing represents an existential unhedable risk for shareholders.

我认为这些风险是真实存在的,尤其是与欧洲保护主义相关的地缘政治风险。任何投资中国的人都必须接受这种地缘政治风险,它始终存在。

I think these are valid risk especially the geopolitical risk linked to European protection and anybody investing in China has to be comfortable with taking on the geopolitical risk that's something which is always there

首先是利用率风险,这与匈牙利和德国海外工厂的固定开销有关。确实,欧洲电动汽车行业的放缓会对CL产生一定影响。但我也要说,作为成本最低的生产商,CL在应对低迷时期可能比竞争对手更有优势。

so the first one is the utilization risk linked to the fixed overheads at these overseas plants in Hungary and Germany so it is true that a slowdown put on in the European EV industry will have some impact on CL. But I would also say that being the lowest cost producer, CL might be better placed in managing the downturn compared to the competition.

我们看到中国取消补贴导致电动汽车整体放缓,但CL在中国的统治地位仍在持续。关于你提到的与锂价相关的商品价格波动问题,公司正在积极开发新的电池化学体系,如钠离子电池,以应对这一风险。

I mean we have seen subsidies getting removed in China resulting in overall EV slowdown but the dominance of CL in China has continued. Now with regards to your point about commodity price volatility linked to the lithium prices basically so the company is actively developing new battery chemistries such as the sodium ion batteries as a response to this very risk.

钠与锂相比,来源广泛。目前钠电池的问题是能量密度低于锂电池。但随着技术改进,这可能是CL对冲商品价格波动的良好工具。

So sodium as opposed to lithium is widely available. The issue currently with sodium batteries today is that the energy density is lower compared to the lithium based batteries. But again as that technology improves this could be a good hedge for CL against the commodity price volatility

最后关于关键人物风险,这确实是一个真实的风险。Robin Zen一直是公司背后的关键驱动力,也是最大的股东。我不太担心政治地位的变动,因为首先,CL运营的行业是中国希望发展的行业,他们在这方面有很强的共同利益;其次,Robin Zang保持低调,很少公开讲话,因此他惹恼监管机构或国家当局的可能性很低。

and uh finally on your point about keyman risk that again is a very real risk. Robin Zen has been the key driver behind the company and is the largest shareholder. I am less worried about a shift in the political standing because um first of all CL operates in a sector that China wants to grow. So they have a strong mutual alignment on that and secondly Robin Zang maintains a low profile and really speaks in public. So the chances of him rubbing the regulators or the state authorities the wrong way is quite low.

但同样,这是一个有效的风险,我会将其归类为低概率但潜在影响大且难以对冲的风险。以目前深圳股价计算,CL的市值约为2800亿美元。加上资产负债表上的现金,企业价值(即你实际为运营业务支付的价格)接近2500亿美元。

But again, it's a valid risk and something I would categorize as low probability but with potentially high impact and very difficult to hedge. Today with the current stock price for shares trading in Shenzhen, CL's market cap is around $280 billion. And with the cash sitting on the balance sheet, the enterprise value, which is what you actually pay for the operating business, is close to $250 billion.

过去四个季度的营业利润为140亿美元,对应约18倍的EV/EBITDA倍数;如果看市盈率,大约在21倍左右,我认为对于像CL这样的全球领导者来说,这个估值既不昂贵也不便宜。

Now against a $14 billion of operating profit over the last four quarters that's about 18 times multiple EB2 bit and if you look at the P multiple that's roughly trading at about 21 times which I think for a global leader like CL is neither demanding nor cheap.

公司的投入资本回报率约为17%,净资产收益率约为25%。因此,运营业务在未来5年内价值翻倍的可能性很大。如果倍数保持不变,在加上1-2个百分点的股息收益率之前,你可以预期约15%的年回报率。

The company has a high return on invested capital of around 17%. And a return on equity of about 25%. So there is a good enough chance that the operating business roughly doubles in value over the next 5 years. And if the multiples remain where they are, you can expect about 15% annual return before you add a dividend yield of another point or two.

总而言之,这是一个具有高资本回报率的主导性现金生成业务,有可能在5年内使业务价值翻倍。显然,既有上行也有下行的情况。我们讨论了围绕AI数据中心和许可模式的增长引擎。如果它们带来意外惊喜,那么回报可能会更加可观。

So to summarize, it's a dominant cash generative bondled business with high returns on capital that can potentially double the value of the business in 5 years. There are obviously both upside and downside cases. We discuss about the growth engines around AI data centers and the licensing model. If they surprise on the upside, then the returns can be even more meaningful.

下行情况是国内价格战加剧,以及由于地缘政治紧张,LRS模式在美国无法扩展。

And the downside case is that the domestic price war intensifies and the LRS model doesn't scale in the US due to geopolitical tension.

是的,Roth,你说得对。CL是双重上市的。A股在中国交易,代码为3000750,H股在香港交易,代码为3750。同一家公司,同股同权,每股股息相同。

Yeah, that's correct Roth. So CL is dual listed. The A shares trade in China with the ticker 3000750 and the edge shares trade in Hong Kong with the ticker 3750. So same company, same one share, one vote, same dividend per share.

但如果你看股价,在调整汇率后,你会发现香港股票比中国大陆股票溢价约30%至35%,这实际上与常态相反。通常,对于双重上市的中国公司,内地A股会以溢价交易,因为中国国内投资者面临资本管制,无法真正在香港购买。

因此,他们的需求集中在本地上市。但对于CL来说,情况相反,原因纯粹是供需关系。

But if you look at the stock price and after adjusting for the FX rate, you will notice that the Hong Kong shares trade at a big premium of roughly 30 to 35%. to the mainline China shares and that's actually opposite to the norm. Normally for a dual listed Chinese company is the mainland Asia that trade at a premium because Chinese domestic investors face capital controls and they cannot really buy in Hong Kong. So their demand gets concentrated into the local listing. But for CL it's the opposite case and the reason is pure supply and demand.

因此,香港的流通股相对较小,而全球投资者的需求相当高。香港和中国内地的股票不可互换,这意味着你不能在一个市场买入,然后真正转换并在另一个市场卖出。

So the Hong Kong float is relatively small and the demand from global investors is quite high. The Hong Kong and Chinese shares are not funible meaning that you can't buy in one market and really convert and sell it in the other market.

因此,如果国际投资者能够接触到中国内地股票,那么这是获取该业务更便宜的方式。一些经纪商通过所谓的北向股票互联互通机制提供内地上市股票的访问,但这通常仅限于机构投资者。对于较小的散户投资者,香港股票是唯一的选择。

这些股票对所有人开放,但你需要支付溢价才能持有。

So if an international investor if you have access to the Chinese shares then that is a cheaper way to get access to this business. Some brokers provide access to domestic Chinese listings using something called the northbound stock connect but this is usually limited to the institutional investors. For smaller retail investors, Hong Kong shares are the only option. These are freely accessible to everyone, but you will have to pay a premium to own them.

现在,CL一直在扩大香港的流通股。因此,在2025年香港IPO之后,他们在2026年进行了后续配售。然而,全球需求如此之高,以至于溢价并未大幅压缩。

Now, CL has been widening the Hong Kong float. So, after the Hong Kong IPO in 2025, they did a follow on placement in 2026. And yet, the global demand was so high that the premium hasn't compressed much.

我个人认为,从长远来看,以台积电为参考,香港股票应该以约10%至20%的溢价交易。台积电的平均溢价约为15%,但这一差距如何以及何时会压缩,很难说。

My personal view is that in the long run, Hong Kong shares should trade at a premium of about 10 to 20% range using TSMC as the reference. So TSMC has averaged at around 15% premium, but how and when that gap will compress is hard to say.

CL不仅仅是一个电动汽车电池的标的。它有潜力成为未来能源基础设施的支柱,并越来越多地用于AI数据中心。这并非没有风险。你必须接受地缘政治摩擦。如果AI存储增长持续,并且LRS许可模式被证明是可扩展的,那么这个业务确实有一个非常引人注目的故事。

CL is not just an EV battery play. It has the potential to become the backbone of the future energy infrastructure and increasingly for the AI data centers. It is not without risks. You have to be comfortable with the geopolitical friction. And if the AI storage growth continues and the LRS licensing model proves scalable, then there is a very real compelling story for this business.

我不想在这里过多地纠结于看涨和看跌之间。我不得不说,在阅读CSL时,我更兴奋的是那些不是用于车辆的电池,而是用于稳定电网和AI数据中心的电池。

I don't want to get here too much up between a bull and a bear. I have to say still like reading up on CSL, I was more excited about batteries that were not for vehicles, but really for stabilizing power grids and AI data centers.

所以你看到像CL这样的公司将从潜在的顺风中受益,无意双关。

So you're looking at a company like CL that would benefit from the underlying tailwind, no pun intended.

CL电池的惊人之处在于它们位于数据中心和电网之间,它吸收那些波动,而AI数据中心,你可以说它甚至比足球场更糟糕,因为你可能在90分钟内进几个球,但每当你训练一个模型,可能需要数周时间,然后你有这种欢呼声和持续的嗡嗡声,每两秒发生一次,所以对电网来说非常累人。

what is amazing about the CL batteries is that they sit between the data center and the grid and it absorbs those thoughts and an AI data center is to you could say it's even worse than a football stadium because you might get a few goals throughout those like 90 minutes but then whenever you train a model it will take you weeks to train a model and then you have this cheering and then steady hum like and it happens every second or two so it's incredible tiresome for the grit to work with

这并不能证明CL一定会成为赢家。现在存储市场的增长速度超过了CTL的存储出货量。因此,竞争对手目前正在抢占市场份额。

It doesn't prove that it's going to be CL necessarily is going to be the winner. Now the storage market is growing faster than CTL's storage shipment. So competitors are taking their share right now.

尽管CL是储能领域的头号玩家,该细分市场去年的安装量增长了约30%,但这低于整个行业约80%的增长率,如果我没记错的话。

Even though CL is the number one player in energy storage space and the segment grew installations by roughly 30% last year, but that was below the overall industry growth rate of close to about 80% if I'm not wrong.

我相信去年CL该细分市场未能以更快速度增长的一个关键原因是产能限制。因此,CL去年的利用率约为97%。这意味着他们几乎卖出了所有能生产的产品。

I believe one key reason why this segment did not grow at a faster rate for CL last year was because of capacity constraints. So CL's utilization rate last year was around 97%. Meaning that they sold pretty much what they could produce.

今年,随着新制造产能上线,其中一些限制应该会缓解。因此,重要的是看CL能否开始在该细分市场重新获得市场份额。

Now this year some of those constraints should ease up as new manufacturing capacity comes online. So it will be important to see if CL can start regaining market share in this segment.

事实上,如果你看最新的季度业绩,CL在2026年上半年的储能销售额同比增长约88%,存储量几乎同比翻了一番。这为CL在储能领域的潜在市场份额地位提供了一些数据点。

In fact, if you look at the latest quarterly result, CL's energy storage sales for the first half of 2026 grew by about 88% year on year and the storage volume nearly doubled year on year. So this gives some data point around the CL's potential market share position in the energy storage space.

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