The Investor's Podcast 对 $CL 的判断变化

2026-08-22
《CATL: The $280 Billion Company You've Never Heard Of | Bull vs. Bear w/Stig, Manish, & Ralph》
宁德时代在高利润储能和许可模式上的主导地位带来上行空间,但地缘政治风险和监管审查是主要不利因素。

当然,CL 已经是全球第一的储能供应商,而且我认为有两件事让它更具吸引力。首先,由于我们之前谈到的复杂性和耐久性要求,储能业务为 CL 带来的利润率高于其核心的电动汽车电池业务。

sure and CL is already the world's number one energy storage supplier and I think that two things make it even more attractive play. First is that the storage segment carries higher margins for CL than the core EV battery business because of the complexity and the durability requirements that we talked about.

其次,我觉得更有趣的一点是,CL 不仅仅向这些数据中心销售电池。它现在正在系统地构建一个完整的储能能源生态系统,包括数据中心内部的配电。他们甚至入股电力设备制造商,并维护整个能源系统。

And the second point which I find more interesting is that CL isn't just selling batteries to these data centers. It is now systematically assembling a full stack energy ecosystem for the storage through power distribution inside the data center. They are even buying into the power equipment makers and servicing the entire energy stack.

我认为这有可能将 CL 从单纯的储能供应商转变为整个 AI 计算建设的战略基础设施合作伙伴。第二个潜在的增长引擎,我认为仍处于早期阶段,但可能为公司带来巨大上行空间,那就是名为 LRS 的许可模式,LRS 代表许可、版税和服务。

This I think uh has the potential to transform CL from just an energy storage supplier to a strategic infrastructure partner for the entire AI compute buildout. And the second potential growth engine which I think is still in the early stage that can have a huge upside for the company is the licensing model called LRS which stands for license royalty and service.

因此,由于地缘政治原因,CL 实际上无法在美国拥有工厂。所以他们没有硬碰硬,而是找到了一种变通方法,即与美国公司达成许可协议,由美国合作伙伴建造、拥有和运营制造工厂,而 CL 仅提供其技术许可并收取版税。

So CL is effectively locked out of owning a factory in the US for geopolitical reasons. So rather than fight it out, they have found a workaround where they get into a licensing deal with an American company and it's the American partner that builds, owns and runs the manufacturing plant while CL just provides the license of its technology and collects a royalty fee.

因此,CL 和福特最近就福特的密歇根电池工厂达成了这项许可协议,在该协议中,福特拥有工厂、土地和设备,并雇佣劳动力。CL 不持有股权,只提供电池化学和技术,并以此换取版税。

So CL and Ford recently did this licensing deal for the Ford's Michigan battery plant and in that Ford owns the plant land equipment and hires the workforce. CL has no equity and only offers battery chemistry and technology and gets a royalty fee in return.

CL 尚未披露许可费的经济细节。但如果按照这类交易通常的 3% 到 4% 的范围,那么这将是一项利润率极高、资本占用极少的收入,而且这种框架可以扩展到电动汽车电池之外,甚至包括我们之前谈到的 AI 数据存储计算。

CL hasn't disclosed the economics of the licensing fee. But if it is in the 3 to 4% range that these deals are typically u done at then that's a very high margin capital light income and that framework can extend beyond EV batteries to even data storage uh for the AI data storage compute that we talked about.

这里我想强调的重要一点是,这仍处于早期阶段。该模式正受到美国立法者的审查。因此,CL 显然认为这对双方都是双赢的解决方案,但地缘政治涉及多个方面,这还不是一个短期的胜利,但如果 CL 能够在美国扩大这种 LRS 框架,高利润的版税收入可能会对股价产生巨大的推动作用。

the important point here that I want to do highlight is that this is still in the early phase. The model is under scrutiny by the US lawmakers. So CL obviously feels that this is a win-win solution for both parties but the geopolitics has many dimensions and it's not yet a shortsh short win but if CL can scale this LRS framework in the US the high margin royalty revenue can provide a big boost to the stock price

我不再打断你了,只想说美国立法者的审查是一个很大的障碍。我稍后会详细讨论。现在,我们只需说,一笔相当于收入 3% 到 4% 的许可交易会很棒,但它很容易被简单的笔一挥就抹去。

I'm going to stop interrupting you except to say that the scrutiny by the US lawmakers is a big big butt. And I'll talk more about this later. For now, let's suffice it to say that a licensing deal of 3 to 4% of revenue would be wonderful, but it could easily get wiped out by the simple stroke of a pen.

就像我们看利润表的最顶端,我看到收入从 2023 年到 2025 年持平。这是怎么发生的?从你提到的 2023 年到 2025 年收入持平开始。CL 最大的成本是电池中的原材料,目前主要是锂,而锂价在过去几年大幅下跌,CL 将这些节省以更低的价格转给了客户。

因此,公司销售了更多的电池量,赚了更多的利润,但总营收几乎没有变化。

like just here at the very top as we're looking at the income statement. I see the revenue was flat from 2023 to 2025. How did that happen? So starting with the revenue being flat from 2023 to 2025 that you mentioned stick. So the biggest cost for CL is the raw materials that go into the battery which currently is mostly lithium and lithium prices became dramatically cheaper over the last couple of years and CL passed those savings on as lower prices to its customers. So the company sold far more battery volume made more profits but the headline revenue barely moved.

我想在财务数据中强调的第二点是,他们的净利润和经营现金流之间存在很大的不匹配。去年,CL 赚了约 110 亿美元的利润,但产生了接近约 200 亿美元的经营现金流。所以这几乎是两倍。

And the second point that I want to highlight in the financials is that there is a big mismatch between their net income and the operating cash flows. So last year CL earned about 11 billion in profit but it generated close to about $20 billion in operating cash flows. So that's nearly double.

这种高经营现金流使公司能够进行资本支出、边际收购、通过股息和回购向股东返还现金,而且公司仍然能够在资产负债表上保持更高的现金余额。

This high operating cash flow allows the company to spend on capex, margin acquisitions, return cash to shareholders through dividends and buybacks and the company still managed to have higher cash balance on their balance sheet.

在所有这些之后,经营现金流远高于利润的原因是 CL 拥有大量的负营运资本,这意味着它在需要向供应商付款之前的几个月就销售了库存并从客户那里收回了资金。因此,实际上,其供应商是其最大的贷款人,几乎无息地为 CL 的增长提供资金。

After all of that, the reason why operating cash flow is so much higher than the profit is because CL has a large negative working capital, meaning that it sells through its inventory and collects money from customers months before it has to pay to its suppliers. So in effect its suppliers are its largest lenders funding the growth for CL almost interest free

但风险也在这里,你能延长应付账款的程度是有限的,中国当局正在要求大公司开始更快地支付供应商款项。因此,对 CL 来说,这可能意味着其部分无息浮存资金可能会减少,并进入一个调整其增长融资方式的时期。

我不认为这会破坏该模式,因为 CL 的大部分应付账款是欠大型供应商的,这些供应商不在当局推动的规则范围内。但我还是要说,这仍然是一个需要关注的实际阻力。

but this is where the risk also resides there is a limit to how much you can stretch your payables and the Chinese authorities are asking large firms to start paying theme suppliers sooner. So for CL that likely means that part of their interest free float might unwind and a period of readjustment in how it funds its growth. I don't think it will break the model because much of CL's payables are to large suppliers which are outside the theme rule that the authorities are pushing for. But I would say it's still a real headwind to watch out for.

所以基本上,风停了,CL 仍然在电动汽车电池市场保持全球领先份额,并且他们的利润率高于行业最佳水平。

So basically the wind stopped and CL still holds a leading global share in the EV battery market and they earn margins which are above the best of the industry.

所以我认为第一个,也是我认为对 CL 来说最大的风险,是地缘政治风险。CL 实际上被排除在美国市场之外,而美国是电动汽车电池的第二大市场。该公司在五角大楼的为中国军方工作的公司名单上。

这是公司极力否认的。Robin Zang 已派高管前往华盛顿进行游说,但到目前为止没有成功。

So I think the first one which I think is the biggest for CL is the geopolitical risk. So CL is effectively world out of the US market which is the second largest market for EV batteries. The company is on the Pentagon's list of companies that work for the Chinese military. This is something that the company has contested hard. Robin Zang has sent executives to Washington to make the case but so far without success.

因此,CL 针对这一限制的对策就是我之前提到的许可模式,例如与福特在密歇根州的合作,CL 许可其技术而不是拥有制造设施,并以此收取费用。我认为这是规避限制的聪明方法,也是 CL 可以与其他合作伙伴复制的模板,但话虽如此,正如我提到的,这仍处于早期阶段,尚未成定局,因此风险仍然非常真实,投资者需要关注。

So CL counter to this restriction is the licensing model that I talked about and as an example that the Ford partnership in Michigan where CL licenses its technology rather than owning a manufacturing facility and in return collects a fees on that license. I think it's a clever way to circumvent the restriction and it's a template that CL could repeat with other partners but having said that as I mentioned it's still in the early stage and it's not a done deal yet so the risk is still very real and something investors need to watch out for

LRS 经常被描述为一种资产般的增长。实际上,它可能更好地被描述为一种防御性的投降。通过放弃对福特和通用汽车的直接所有权和客户关系,CL 承认在美国《通胀削减法案》下,中国的直接所有权在政治上是毒药。

接受仅仅 3% 到 4% 的版税,就把你提到的那个隐形国王变成了一个低租金的 IP 房东。这种模式使 CL 成为我所说的机器中的幽灵,容易受到笔一挥的影响,美国监管机构可以随时切断 IP,让 CL 没有任何实物资产可以收回。

LRS is often been spun as an asset like growth. In reality, it may be better spun as a defensive capitulation. By surrendering direct ownership and customer relations to Ford and GM, CL is admitting that direct Chinese ownership is politically toxic under the US Inflation Reduction Act. Accepting a mere 3 to 4% royalty fee turns that invisible king you mentioned into a low rent IP landlord. This model makes CL what I would call a ghost in the machine vulnerable to a stroke of the pen where the US regulators can sever the IP at any time and leave CL with zero physical assets to reclaim.

这不仅是将高密度电池包的蓝图交给福特和通用汽车,导致利润流失,而且CL还在培训那些试图将其排除在外的竞争对手。我们称之为LRS泄漏。

Not only a stroke of the pin loss by handing over the blueprint for highdensity packs to Ford and GM, not only are you handing over the blueprint, CL is training the very competitors who seek to exclude it. Let's call it LRS leakage.

因此,我们制造商确实有可能从CL学习。尽管CL高度重视研发,不断推动技术曲线上升,但培训竞争对手仍然是一个需要警惕的威胁。

So, it's definitely possible for us manufacturers to learn from CL. Although uh with the high R&D focus that CL has, they are constantly moving up the technology curve, but then training competition can still be a threat to watch out for.

我想提出的第二个风险是国内的价格战。中国的电池和电动汽车行业经历了残酷的价格战,以至于Robin Zang本人公开要求行业停止纯粹基于价格的竞争。

I would say the second risk that I want to put on the table is the price war at home. So, China's battery and EV sector has seen a brutal brutal price war. So much so that Robin Zang himself has publicly asked the industry to stop computing purely on price.

对此的反驳是,储能领域的增长,尤其是我们讨论过的人工智能数据中心需求,是一个新的、利润率更高、增长更快的细分市场,CL在其中排名第一,并且公司正在转向竞争不那么激烈的全栈电力存储解决方案。

The counter here is that the growth in the energy storage segment especially the AI data center demand that we discussed. It is a new higher margin faster growing segment where CL is number one and the company is moving into a full stack power storage solution where the competition is less intense.

同样,储能也不能免受价格压力,其单位价格也在下降,但它的利润率高于电动汽车电池业务,并且仍处于增长曲线的早期阶段。

Again, storage is not immune to price pressure and it's per unit prices are falling too, but it's a higher margin than the EV batteries business and it's still in the early stage of the growth curve.

我要谈的第三个风险是技术颠覆风险。电池技术正在以非常高的速度改进。粗略估计,每两年电池组的能量密度就会提高约20%。此外,还有更快的充电、更长的电池寿命、更好的低温性能,创新涵盖电池化学材料、电芯设计等。

And the third risk that I would talk about is the technology disruption risk. Now, battery technology is improving at a very high rate. As a rough rule, u every two years the energy density in the battery packs climbs by about 20%. And to add to that, there is faster charging, longer battery life, better cold weather performance, and the innovation spans battery chemistry materials, cell designs, etc.

这里的危险在于,固态电池或钠离子电池等新化学体系可能会超越CL目前主导的LFP和NMC电池。

So the danger here is that the new chemistry such as the solid state or the sodium ion batteries or something else leaprogs the existing LFP and the NMC batteries that CL is dominant today.

对此的反驳是,CL在研发上的投入超过业内任何一家公司。公司并不依赖任何一种化学体系。它已经在并行开发和扩大钠离子电池的规模。因此,这里的赌注是,无论下一个创新是什么,CL很可能也在研究它。

所以风险是真实存在的。但我的观点是,颠覆者和现有者可能最终是同一家公司。

And the counter here is that CL spends more on R&D than anyone in the industry. The company isn't relying on any single chemistry. It is already developing and scaling sodium ion batteries in parallel. So the bet here is that whatever the next innovation is, CL is likely working on it too. So the risk is real. But my view is that the disruptor and the incumbent may just turn out to be the same company here.

CL正在以指数级的速度奔跑,以在财务上保持原地不动。因此,它正在放弃定价权以维持利用率。此外,最近在收入萎缩的情况下实现的15%至12%的利润率扩张是数学上的暂时性意外之财。这不是新的基线。

它并不表明技术优势。相反,称之为成本楔形盈利流感。投资者可能会看到15%至12%的净利润回归到11%至12%的历史区间。

CL is running exponentially faster to stay in the same place financially. So it's surrendering its pricing power to maintain utilization. Also, the recent 15 12% profit margin expansion achieved while the revenue was shrinking is a mathematically temporary windfall. It's not a new baseline. It doesn't indicate technological superiority. Rather, call it a cost wedge profitability flu. What an investor will likely see is that 15 12% net profit will regress to a tighter 11 to 12% historical bands.

尽管本人认为储能系统是电动汽车销售放缓的周期性缓冲,但储能系统对公用事业资本预算、全球利率和人工智能支出敏感。这种储能缓冲可以被视为全球微观环境的高贝塔。

Although yours truly believes that the energy storage system is a cyclical buffer to slowing EV sales, the ESS, the energy storage system, is sensitive to utility capital budgets, to global interest rates, and to AI spend. This ESS buffer can be viewed as a high beta on the global micro environment.

无争议的扩张可能会放缓。作为最大的参与者,他们是所有竞争对手的最大目标。他们可能是向固态颠覆移动最慢的。而且他们从下一代化学体系中损失最多,除非他们发明了它。

uncontested expansion may slow. Being the largest, they're the biggest target for all the competitors. They may be the slowest mover towards solid state disruption. And they have the most to lose from the next generation chemistry, unless of course they invent it.

随着中国政府补贴的消失,回想一下“猪在风中”,CO面临着自2011年以来从未见过的引力。其中一些引力包括:一是匈牙利和德国新工厂的利用率风险。CL有巨大的固定开销。欧洲电动汽车采用率因补贴悬崖而出现的任何轻微放缓都将使这些产能无法被吸收,将增长资产变成利润率锚点。

With subsidies from the Chinese government gone, recall the pig in the win, CO faces a gravitational pull not seen since 2011. Some of those gravitational pulls include one a utilization risk with new plants in Hungary and Germany. CL has a massive fixed overhead. Any minor slowdown in European EV adoption due to subsidy cliffs will leave this capacity unabsorbed turning growth assets into margin anchors.

大宗商品集中度。尽管进行了垂直整合,CAT仍然是一个影子大宗商品交易公司。其股价可能被空头视为锂和镍波动的代理,而不是研发实力的反映。

commodity concentration. Despite the vertical integration, CAT remains a shadow commodity trading house. Its stock price may be viewed by bears as a proxy for lithium and nickel volatility, not a reflection of R&D prowess.

欧洲的保护主义壁垒,欧盟碳边境调节机制(CBAM),是对中国电芯的定向税收,也是关键创始人、关键人物。CL与Robert Zing的个人地位密不可分,他拥有22%的所有权,与北京有深厚联系。

他政治地位的任何变化都对股东构成无法对冲的生存风险。

The European protectionist wall, the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism, CBAMP, acts as a targeted tax on Chinese cells and a key founder, key man. CL is inextricably tied to Robert Zing's personal standing with a 22% ownership, deep ties to Beijing. Any shift in his political standing represents an existential unhedable risk for shareholders.

第一个是与匈牙利和德国海外工厂的固定开销相关的利用率风险。确实,欧洲电动汽车行业的放缓会对CL产生一些影响。但我还要说,作为成本最低的生产商,CL可能比竞争对手更能应对低迷。我们看到中国取消补贴导致整体电动汽车放缓,但CL在中国的统治地位仍在继续。

so the first one is the utilization risk linked to the fixed overheads at these overseas plants in Hungary and Germany so it is true that a slowdown put on in the European EV industry will have some impact on CL. But I would also say that being the lowest cost producer, CL might be better placed in managing the downturn compared to the competition. I mean we have seen subsidies getting removed in China resulting in overall EV slowdown but the dominance of CL in China has continued.

关于你提到的与锂价相关的大宗商品价格波动,公司正在积极开发新的电池化学体系,如钠离子电池,以应对这一风险。钠与锂相比,来源广泛。目前钠电池的问题是能量密度……

Now with regards to your point about commodity price volatility linked to the lithium prices basically so the company is actively developing new battery chemistries such as the sodium ion batteries as a response to this very risk. So sodium as opposed to lithium is widely available. The issue currently with sodium batteries today is that the energy density is

关于你提到的储能市场增长快于CL储能出货量的观点,这是事实。尽管CL是储能领域的头号玩家,去年该细分市场的安装量增长了约30%,但这低于行业整体增长率,如果我没记错的话,接近80%。

Well, with regards to your point about storage market growing faster than CL's storage shipment, that is true. Even though CL is the number one player in energy storage space and the segment grew installations by roughly 30% last year, but that was below the overall industry growth rate of close to about 80% if I'm not wrong.

我认为去年CL该细分市场增长不够快的一个关键原因是产能限制。CL去年的利用率约为97%。这意味着他们几乎卖掉了所有能生产的产品。

I believe one key reason why this segment did not grow at a faster rate for CL last year was because of capacity constraints. So CL's utilization rate last year was around 97%. Meaning that they sold pretty much what they could produce.

今年,随着新制造产能上线,其中一些限制应该会有所缓解。因此,重要的是要看CL能否开始在该细分市场重新获得市场份额。

Now this year some of those constraints should ease up as new manufacturing capacity comes online. So it will be important to see if CL can start regaining market share in this segment.

事实上,如果你看最新的季度业绩,CL在2026年上半年的储能销售额同比增长约88%,储能容量几乎同比翻倍。这为CL在储能领域的潜在市场份额地位提供了一些数据点。

In fact, if you look at the latest quarterly result, CL's energy storage sales for the first half of 2026 grew by about 88% year on year and the storage volume nearly doubled year on year. So this gives some data point around the CL's potential market share position in the energy storage space.

作为投资者,我觉得有趣的是,这可能会如何改变CL的商业模式。他们不再是一家只卖一次电池的公司,而是电池留在池中,由CL及其合作伙伴拥有和运营,他们永远不会失去电池。它会回来,被检查,被重复使用,最终被回收,因此CL拥有资产的整个生命周期。

And I guess what I found interesting as an investor is how this could potentially change CL's business model. They stop being a company that sells your battery once and instead the battery stays in the pool at CL and his partners own and operate and they never lose the battery. It comes back. It gets checked, get reused and eventually recycled and so CL owns the whole lifetime of the asset

换电在中国很受欢迎,CL拥有近2000个换电站,并且还在增长。该公司制造模块化电池组,这些电池组是与主要中国汽车制造商共同开发的。这基本上锁定了客户,网络建设成本由各方合作伙伴分担。因此,并非CL独自承担全部前期成本。

So battery swapping is popular in China and CL has close to 2,000 stations and growing. The company builds modular battery packs that are co-developed with major Chinese automakers. So it basically locks in the customers and the cost of setting up the network is shared with various partners. So it is not CL alone taking the entire cost up front.

我认为,CL在电池组和充电网络方面的规模可以帮助他们为这些换电站提供更快的回报。

And I think this is where the scale of CL both in battery packs and charging network can help them to provide a faster payoff for these stations.

你告诉我们CTL的交易价格约为营业利润的18倍。你如何处理这150多个股权?你给它们任何价值了吗?投资者应该将CL视为一家拥有副业投资组合的电池制造商,还是该投资组合甚至是模式的一部分?

Now man, you talked to us about CTL trading at around 18 times operating profit. How do you treat these 150 plus stakes? Did you give them any value and should investors see CL as a battery maker with a side portfolio or is the portfolio even a part of the mode?

进入像CL这样的公司,谈论它并了解它,真的让我很兴奋。

getting into something like CL and speaking about this and learning about it just really excites me.

就像CL的Robin,他在回馈他的社区。他希望他社区里的人能够茁壮成长。

which like Robin at CL I mean he's giving back to his community. He wants his the people in his community to to thrive and grow.

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