The Intrinsic Value Podcast 对 $DOMO 的判断变化

2026-08-23
《Domino's Pizza (DPZ): Is the Royalty Engine Still Running?》
达美乐的增长已显著放缓(收入复合增长率为3%,同店销售接近零),尽管股价已从历史高位回落,当前估值仍缺乏吸引力。

全球最大的披萨公司,在 90 个不同市场拥有超过 22,300 家门店。Little Caesars 是低成本外带选项的领导者,而 Domino's 主要专注于外卖。由于 Domino's 最初是作为外卖食品业务起家的,所以它至今仍保持其 DNA 是有道理的。

largest pizza company in the world with over 22,300 locations in 90 different markets. Little Caesars is kind of the leader in lowcost carry out options and then Domino's focuses mostly on delivery. And since Domino's really started as a delivery food business, it makes sense that it has stayed true to its DNA to this day.

但回到你最初的问题,Domino's 专注于特许经营模式,它作为特许经营商。所以,所有 Domino's 门店中有 99% 是由独立特许经营商拥有和经营的。

But getting back to your original question, so Domino's focuses on the franchise model where it acts as a franchiser. So 99% of all the Domino stores that are out there are owned and operated by independent franchises.

特许经营模式很有意义,因为正如我之前提到的,Domino's 为其特许经营商提供一些东西,比如培训、供应品、新鲜食材,以及营销方面。但他们不参与实际拥有门店,这显然节省了大量资金,也是 Domino's 拥有约 40% 的非常高毛利率和约 13% 的自由现金流利润率的重要原因。

The franchisee model makes a lot of sense because as I mentioned earlier, Domino's provides their franchises with a few things. things like, you know, training, supplies, fresh ingredients, and then the marketing aspect. But they don't take part in actually owning the stores, which obviously saves a ton of money and is a big reason why Domino's has these really, really big gross margins at about 40% and free cash flow margins of about 13%.

Domino's 基本上是帮助特许经营商良好运营的引擎。我认为双方都很好地保持一致。当特许经营商赚更多钱时,Domino's 赚更多钱。当特许经营商赚更少钱时,Domino's 收取更低的特许经营费。

所以,是的,Domino's 是一项特许权使用费业务,但他们与特许经营商的基本表现紧密相连。所以,他们并没有能够完全对冲这种商业模式中的所有风险。

Domino's is basically the engine in the back helping the franchises operate well. And both sides, I think, are well aligned. Domino's makes more money when their franchises make more money. And when franchises make less money, Domino's collects lower franchise fees. So yes, Domino's is a royalty business, but they are closely tied to the underlying performance of their franchises. So it's not like they've been able to completely hedge out all of the risk in this business model.

从特许经营商的角度来看,你基本上是在付费利用 Domino's 的品牌力量。是的,当然,你可以自己开一家本地披萨店,拥有 100% 的股权,但没人会听说过它,你也没有质量声誉,那将是一个相当艰难的起步方式。

或者你可以直接接受 Domino's 特许经营权,立即利用他们的全球品牌,你的门店会自动获得更多流量,仅仅因为人们知道这个名字。

And from franchises perspective, you're basically paying to tap into the brand power of Domino's. And yeah, sure, you could go out and start your own local pizza business and have 100% equity and, you know, no one will have ever heard of it and you'll have no reputation for quality and that'll be a pretty tough way to get your start. Or you could just take on a Domino's franchise and you immediately get to take advantage of their global brand and your store is going to automatically get more traffic simply because people know the name alone.

让我们回到 Domino's 如何产生收入的一些细节。我想看的第一个领域很明显,就是向特许经营商收取特许权使用费和费用。特许权使用费是总销售额的持续百分比。就大型餐饮企业而言,他们倾向于使用的词叫做系统收入或系统销售额,或者正如 Domino's 所称的零售额。

零售额是所有 Domino's 门店全球销售的总收入。但请记住,这不是 Domino's 的实际收入。

So, let's just get back to some of the details here on how Domino's generates revenue. So, the first area that I want to look at is pretty obvious and that's just, you know, collecting royalties and fees from its franchises. So, royalties are these ongoing percentage of total sales. So in terms of large restaurant businesses, the word they tend to use is called systems revenue or system sales or as Domino's puts it just retail sales. Now retail sales are the total revenue sold by all of the Domino's stores worldwide. But just remember here it's not Domino's actual revenue.

但这只是业务的一部分,还有特许经营费。Domino's 还从美国公司自营门店、供应链和广告中产生收入。在 2025 财年,他们约 33% 的收入来自美国门店,包括特许经营和公司自营门店。

仅在美国,他们就有近 7,000 家特许经营店,以及大约 260 家左右的公司自营门店。

But this is just a part of the business right with the franchise fees. So Domino's also generates revenue from its company owned stores in the US. It's supply chain and then advertising. In fiscal year 2025, they earned about 33% of their revenue from US stores, including both franchises and corporate own stores. So just in the US, they have nearly 7,000 franchises and then about 260 or so corporate own stores.

根据我做的尽职调查,我实际上认为拥有少量公司自营门店可能是最好的策略,原因有几个,可能不是最明显的。但对于 Domino's,这不是一项新兴技术。你会认为你只需要走进公司点一份披萨就能学到你需要知道的一切,但显然不是那么简单。

And so, with some of the DD that I've done, I really actually think that having a small amount of corporate stores is probably the best strategy for a few reasons that maybe aren't the most obvious. But with Domino's, I mean, this is not an emerging technology. You'd think that you could learn everything you need to know by just walking up and ordering a pizza from the company, but obviously it's not that simple.

但问题是,当你考虑 Domino's 作为一项业务时,你必须记住涉及多个方。你有最终客户,可能是你或我,肖恩,如果我们决定吃披萨,但还有特许经营商,他们最终为我们制作披萨。然后还有 Domino's,他们确保特许经营商顺利运营并收取一定比例的收入。

作为背景,目前美国的销售费用约为 5.5%,国际上约为 3%。

but the thing is that when you're thinking about Domino's as a business, you have to remember that there's multiple parties involved with it. You have the end customer who might be me or you Sean, if we decide to eat pizza, but then you have the franchises who are ultimately making that pizza for us. And then you have Domino's who make sure the franchises are running smoothly and collecting a percent of the revenue. And just for context, the fee on sales in the US today is about 5 and a half% and internationally it's around 3%.

所以,当我们考虑 Domino's 时,由于美国部分收入如此重要,而且 Domino's 起源于美国,我想他们会把美国视为最重要的市场。对吗?完全正确。由于 Domino's 起源于美国,它绝对是最大的细分市场。

So, as we think about Domino's, with the US portion of Domino's revenues being so substantial, with Domino's having started in the US, I would imagine that they view the US as their most important market. Is that right? That's completely correct. Since Domino's started in the US, it's by far its largest segment.

关于达美乐,我喜欢的另一点是,尽管到2025年底他们大约有7000家美国特许经营店,但实际上这些店仅由754家独立特许经营商拥有和运营。所以显然这意味着,我认为这些特许经营商对他们的达美乐业务非常非常认真,因为他们中的许多人拥有多个达美乐门店。

And another thing I like about Domino's is that even though they have roughly say 7,000 US franchise stores at the end of 2025, they're actually owned and operated by only 754 independent franchises. And so obviously what this means is that the franchises, I think, are really really serious about their Domino's businesses because a lot of them own multiple Domino's locations.

达美乐显然拥有一个非常好的特许经营网络,因为我刚才提到的数字意味着美国平均每个特许经营商拥有大约9家门店,尽管他们披露大约有211家其他美国特许经营商仅运营一家门店,这实际上使得那些拥有多家门店的人的数字更高。

Domino's clearly has a really good network of franchises because the number that I just mentioned means the average franchisee in the US owns about nine locations although they disclose that about 211 other US franchises are operated by only one store which actually makes that number even higher for the people who own more than one store.

此外,大多数特许经营商在获得特许经营权之前,还必须至少管理一家门店一年。所以,你知道,许多特许经营商真的是从底层做起,比如作为送餐司机或烤披萨的人。我认为这是一个非常好的优势,因为这意味着特许经营商将非常非常熟悉业务的运作方式、成功需要什么,以及可能失败的原因,并希望尽量避免这些。

Now on top of this most franchises must also manage a store for at least a year before being granted the right to franchise. So, you know, many franchises just start off really from the ground up as like delivery drivers or as people baking the pizzas. And I think this is a really nice advantage as it means the franchises are going to be very very intimate with how the business runs, what it takes to be successful, and maybe what it takes to fail and hopefully try to avoid those things.

另一件我觉得非常有趣的事情是,达美乐倾向于限制其特许经营商参与其他业务,我认为这真的非常有助于他们保持专注,并优先考虑他们已经拥有的达美乐披萨店。

Another thing that I thought was really interesting was that Domino's tends to restrict its franchises from being involved in other businesses, which I think really, really helps them stay focused and to prioritize the Domino's pizza stores that they already own.

好的。到目前为止,我们从特许权使用费中获得了收入,然后还有公司广告费用,这些费用作为支出转嫁出去,然后还有公司自营店,达美乐直接运营这些店,并获取100%的收入,我认为这都是合理的。

我们之前也提到了供应链部分,我的理解是,基本上他们向特许经营商提供原料并出售给他们,这就是该部分产生收入的方式。所以这在某种程度上更像是一个物流业务。

All right. So, we got revenues so far from royalties and then we have corporate advertising costs that sort of get passed on as an expense and then you've got the corporate owned stores where Domino's is directly operating them and capturing 100% of the revenue generated and I think that all makes sense. We also mentioned earlier the supply chain component side of things and my understanding is that basically they provide the ingredients to their franchises and they sell them to them and that's how this segment generates revenue. And so this is almost in some ways more like a logistics business than anything.

供应链实际上是达美乐整体收入的主要部分,约占其2025年收入的60%。所以这部分确实是达美乐的主要收入驱动力。

And the supply chain is actually the dominant part of Domino's overall revenue at about 60% of its revenue in 2025. So this segment really takes the cake as Domino's primary revenue driver.

但关于达美乐,要记住的重要一点是,它作为特许经营费获得的收入将比从供应链或公司自营店获得的收入利润率高出很多。所以2025年供应链的EBIT利润率相当薄,仅为10%。相比之下,包括特许经营店和公司自营店在内的美国所有门店的EBIT利润率约为36%。

但如果你想看到特许经营模式的实际优势,利润率最高的部分实际上是国际特许经营部分,那里没有公司自营店,利润率达到85%。把这些加起来,你有一个业务,在约50亿美元的收入上实现了大约21%的EBA利润率。

But one important thing to remember about Dominoes is that the revenue it gets as franchise fees is going to be much much higher margin compared to the revenue that it's going to get from let's just say it's supply chain or even its corporate owned stores. So EBIT margins on the supply chain for 2025 were pretty thin at just 10%. Contrast that with the total US stores which includes both franchises as well as corporate owned stores and those have edit margins about 36%. But then if you want to see the actual strength of the franchise model, well, the highest margin segment is actually the international franchise segment where they have zero corporateowned locations and the margins there run at 85%. Add that all up and you have a business doing approximately 21% EBA margins on about $5 billion in revenue.

对吧?所以首先,要理解为什么我认为达美乐想要垂直整合,你必须记住,特许经营业务只有在一切真正同步时才能发挥最佳效果。对吧?所以对于一个品牌要在全美运作良好,无论你在阿拉斯加、夏威夷还是纽约,披萨的味道都应该真正相同。

我认为这就是他们首先拥有供应链运营的原因,只是为了确保他们特许经营店之间的一致性。

Right? So for starters to understand why I think Domino's wants to be vertically integrated you have to remember that a franchise business works best when everything is really in sync. Right? So for a brand to work well across America, the pizza should really taste the same whether you're in Alaska, Hawaii or New York. And I think this is why they have the supply chain operations in the first place, just to really ensure consistency across their franchises.

所以你知道,达美乐实际上经历了一个时期,它的披萨在顾客中不太受欢迎,他们不得不对原始配方进行大幅调整,以便顾客再次真正喜欢披萨。

So you know, Domino's actually went through a period where its pizza just kind of got out of favor with their customers and they had to make large adjustments to the original recipe just so that customers would actually enjoy the pizza again.

所以我认为供应链,它不被视为一个利润中心。显然,它有这些较低的利润率,但它是达美乐内部一个非常重要的功能。这真的只是保证他们的整体产品中有适当的质量和正确的一致性,消费者最终会消费这些产品。

So I think the supply chain, it's not seen as a profit center. Obviously, it has these kind of lower margin profiles, but it's a very important function inside of Domino's. And that's really just guarantee that there's the right amount of quality and the right consistency in their overall product that the consumer will ultimately consume.

所以,当你审视达美乐时,另一个有趣的事情是供应链不是全球性的。所以供应链实际上只在北美。所以,截至2025年,他们在美国大约有22个面团制造和供应链中心,两个薄脆饼皮设施,和一个蔬菜加工中心。然后在加拿大,他们有五个面团制造和供应链中心。

So, the interesting thing also to consider when you look at Domino's is that the supply chain isn't global. So, the supply chain is only really in North America. So, as of 2025, they have about 22 dough manufacturing and supply chain centers, two thin crust facilities, and one vegetable processing center in the US. And then in Canada they have five dough manufacturing and supply chain centers.

为了给听众提供背景信息,我读到在这些供应链中心,他们运营着超过00辆牵引式挂车,为超过7,800家门店提供面团和所有其他维持达美乐质量所需的配套产品。

And just for context for the listeners I read that in those supply chain centers they're operating over,00 tractor trailers that supply more than 7,800 stores with dough and all the other complimentary products needed to maintain Dominoes quality.

所以我的问题是,达美乐是否已经制定了某种策略,能够避免给他们的特许经营商施加过多不当压力,并更好地平衡这种关系?

And so my question for you is, has Domino's instituted some sort of strategy where they're able to avoid putting too much undue pressure on their franchises and better balance that relationship?

所以从我读到的内容来看,特许经营商似乎没有被要求从达美乐供应中心购买,但看起来他们中的大多数人最终还是这样做了,而且有一个非常非常好的理由。所以他们与从供应中心购买食品的特许经营商有一个利润分享计划。

所以他们的披露说,他们向特许经营商提供大约其供应链运营营业收入的50%。

So from what I read, it doesn't appear that franchises are required to buy from the Domino supply centers, but it looks like most of them end up doing it anyways, and there's a really, really good reason for that. So they have a profit sharing plan with their franchises who purchase their food from the supply centers. So their disclosures say that they offer franchises approximately 50% of the operating income from their supply chain operations.

如果有什么新的和令人兴奋的东西,或者有特别折扣的披萨,即使是大多数达美乐的粉丝也不会只吃达美乐。回头客可以随时改变主意。所以从高层次来看,我仍然在试图理解,是什么真正让顾客回到达美乐?

是的,你知道,从别人那里订披萨绝对没有转换成本。然而达美乐,不管出于什么原因,继续卖出越来越多的披萨。

And if there's something new and exciting out there or a pizza available at a special discount, even most fans of Domino's aren't going to exclusively eat at Domino's. Recurring customers can change on a whim. So at a high level, I I still am trying to understand, you know, what is it that really keeps customers coming back to Domino's? Yeah, there's, you know, definitely zero switching cost to ordering a pizza from somebody else. And yet Domino's, for whatever reason, keep selling more and more pizza.

所以根据一些数据,再说一次,这是达美乐从他们最新的投资者演示中提供的数据,他们声称又获得了1.6%的市场份额,而其他全国性品牌实际上失去了份额,还有一些更区域性的品牌。

So based on some of the data, again, this is data that Domino's provided from their latest investor presentation, they claim to have captured another 1.6% 6% of the market, whereas other national brands have actually lost share along with some of these kind of more regional brands.

所以,我认为达美乐在简单性上,可能在一定程度上在心理份额上。如果你不想在漫长而忙碌的一周后的周五晚上考虑晚餐,打开达美乐应用程序,在应用程序上订购任何你想要的东西是很容易的。你知道你会得到什么,你会知道它会准时新鲜地送到。

So, I think Domino's in simplicity and probably to some degree in mind share. If you don't want to think about dinner on a Friday night after a long busy week, it's kind of easy to just open up the Domino's app and just go to town ordering whatever you want on the app. You know what you'll get and you'll know that it'll be delivered on time and fresh.

我确实认为品牌认知度是一个真正的优势,但你确实必须在营销上花很多钱来维持这种优势,达美乐当然这样做,这只是经常性的业务成本,而且在所有营销背后有一个像样的产品确实有帮助。对于达美乐,他们在过去几年里在改善披萨的感知质量方面做得非常好。

我只说我自己个人的经验,我认为披萨的味道比大约十年前好多了。

I do think brand recognition is a real advantage for sure, but you do have to spend a lot on marketing to maintain that advantage and Domino's certainly does do that as just a recurring cost of business and it does help to have a decent product behind all that marketing. And with Domino's, they have done a really good job improving the perceived quality of their pizza in the last few years. I would say just my own experience, I think the pizza tastes a lot better than it did maybe a decade or so ago.

我的假设是,像达美乐这样的企业的资本效率相当好,仅仅因为特许经营模式不需要公司方面的大量投资,对吧?特许经营商是出钱的人,利润率超高,特别是在特许经营部分。

my assumption is that the capital efficiency of a business like Domino's is pretty good simply because the franchise model doesn't require a lot of investment from the corporate perspective, right? The franchises are the ones putting up the money and the margins are super high specifically on the franchise part of the business.

是的,你说得完全正确。关于广告,特许经营商基本上把所有的资金集中在一起,这也解决了很多广告问题,这显然也提高了达美乐的资本效率。所以,是的,我的意思是,特许经营业务确实是尽可能轻资本的,尤其是在国际市场上,达美乐只是将供应链留给其主特许经营商。

但是,你知道,整体业务会在一定程度上受到供应链业务的拖累,供应链业务虽然不需要大量的再投资,但肯定比仅特许经营部分需要更多的资本。

Yeah, you're absolutely correct. And then to your point there on advertising, the franchises basically aggregate all their money together and that also takes care of a lot of the advertising as well, which obviously boosts the capital efficiency of Dominoes as well. So yes, I mean the franchise part of the business is really about as capital light as you can possibly get, especially internationally where Domino's just leaves a supply chain to their master franchises. But, you know, the overall business is going to be somewhat dragged down by the supply chain part of the business, which obviously doesn't require a ton of reinvestment, but definitely requires more capital than the franchise only part.

但是,你知道,即使有供应链业务,并且达美乐拥有自己的公司自营店,过去5年左右ROIC一直保持在约100%,这简直令人难以置信,尤其是对于一家销售12美元披萨的企业来说。

But, you know, even with the supply chain business and with Domino's having their own corporate owned stores, ROIC has been running at about 100% over the last 5 years or so, which is frankly mind-boggling, especially for a business selling $12 pizzas.

但我们必须记住,达美乐在投入资本回报率公式中的投入资本部分(分母)具有一些独特的优势。因此,税后净营业利润(即NOPAT,公式的顶部)在2021年至2025年间仅以4.2%的速度复合增长。

所以,这个投入资本回报率是由其投入资本基础的其他变化支撑起来的。

But we do have to keep in mind that Domino's has some unique advantages specifically on the denominator on the invested capital part of the return on invested capital equation. So net operating profits after tax or nat which is the top of the equation has been compounding at only 4.2% between 2021 and 2025. So this return on invested capital is being propped up by other changes in its invested capital base.

嗯,说这些数字是财务工程的结果可能不太公平,但在看ROIC时,确实重要的是要分解各个部分。所以,你不能总是只看ROIC就得出结论说你的回报会接近历史数字,因为涉及很多变量。

Well, it's probably not fair to say that these numbers are the result of financial engineering, but it is important when looking at ROIC to really break down the individual parts. And so, you can't always look at ROIC and and take away conclusions that your returns will come close to the historical number because there are a whole lot of variables involved.

如果你在现有投资上获得极高的回报,但没有能力进一步投资,比如说达美乐所有好的位置都被占了,那么再投资率就会崩溃,增量资本回报率将会下降,而这最终将推动未来股东的回报。

If you earn incredibly high returns on your existing investments but have no capacity to further invest money, let's say every good spot for dominoes has been taken, then well the reinvestment rate collapses and the incremental returns on capital are going to fall off and that is what ultimately drives returns for shareholders in the future.

完全同意。所以我看到达美乐的投入资本并没有在收缩,而是在非常非常缓慢地上升,类似于其税后净营业利润的增长,而且未来有理由相信投入资本可能会继续下降,原因是达美乐一直在缩减其公司自营店。

如果你回到2022年,他们大约有375家门店,而今天他们减少到186家。所以,你知道,他们正在剥离这些门店,这应该会让业务更加轻资本,甚至可能改善营运资本。尽管对他们来说这已经是一个相当低的数字了。

Totally. So what I'm seeing with Domino's invested capital is that it's not shrinking but it's rising very very slowly similar to the growth in their net operating profits after tax and going forward there's reason to believe that invested capital may continue to actually decline and the reason being that Domino's has continued to unwind its company owned stores. So if you go back to 2022 they had about 375 stores versus today where they're down to 186. So, you know, they're getting rid of those stores and this should make the business even more capital light and could even improve working capital. Although it's already quite a low number for them.

我确实认为达美乐作为一家公司需要自己运营一些门店,以便与特许经营商的需求保持联系,这就是我们之前谈到的,并且拥有直接运营达美乐门店的经验。你不能完全成为一个被动的旁观者,只是授权你的品牌。

我们也不需要300家门店来拥有一些运营上的参与感。

I definitely think that Domino's as a corporation needs to run a number of stores themselves so that they stay in touch with the needs of franchises, which is what we were talking about earlier, and having that experience of directly running Domino stores themselves. You can't just totally be a passive player on the sidelines licensing out your brand. We also don't need maybe 300 stores to have some operational skin in the game either.

所以,我相信他们可以通过有效出售其中一些门店来产生大量现金。但同样,你需要有办法再投资这些资本,否则你只会得到一个现金沉重的资产负债表,这是一个高级问题。但对股东来说,这将拖累未来的回报,因为现金的利率很低。

而成为股权投资者的全部意义在于拥有一个能够以高于债券或你自己能够获得的回报率来部署现金的企业股份。所以,你不希望一个企业无限期地坐拥大量现金。

So, I'm sure they can generate a ton of cash by selling off some of these locations effectively. But again, you need to have ways to reinvest that capital and otherwise you just get a cash heavy balance sheet, which is sort of a high class problem to have. But for shareholders, it's going to weigh on returns going forward because the interest rate on cash is low. And the whole point of being an equity investor is to own shares in a business that can deploy cash at higher rates of return than bonds or what you would be able to do yourself. So you don't want to have a business just sitting on a bunch of cash indefinitely.

当我查看达美乐的资产负债表时,我确实看到了一些有点奇怪且令人困惑的东西。那就是当你查看资产负债表的权益部分时。例如,如果你试图找到这家公司的净资产收益率,实际上是不可能的。它会显示为负数。这是因为该公司目前的报告权益为-40亿美元。

And when I was looking at Domino's balance sheet, I did see something kind of funky that was a little confusing. And that's when you look at the equity section of the balance sheet. And so for instance, if you're trying to find this company's return on equity, it's actually not possible. It's going to come back as a negative number. And that's because the company's reported equity is -4 billion today.

是的,这对达美乐来说是一个非常奇怪的怪事。这种情况你通常只在初创公司中看到,它们可能会经历非常非常长的亏损期,以至于权益可能为负值。但我可以向你保证,你知道,达美乐确实赚很多钱。所以在2025年,他们赚了6亿美元的利润。

Yeah, this is a pretty strange wrinkle for Dominoes. And it's something that you kind of only see a lot in startups that might go these really, really long periods of just losing so much money that the equity might have a negative value. But I can assure you, you know, Domino's does make a lot of money. So in 2025, they made $600 million in profits.

现在,一般来说,你会期望一家赚这么多钱的公司将其部分利润再投资到业务中,这反过来会增加权益。但这并不是达美乐资本配置策略的一部分。因此,在达美乐当前的策略下,鉴于业务运营不需要那么多资本,他们将约2.3%的收入用于资本支出,这对于一家零售餐厅来说是一个令人惊讶的低数字。

但我认为这是他们商业模式吸引力的一部分。他们没有再投资于业务,而是专注于股东分配,无论是回购还是股息。

Now, generally speaking, you'd expect a company making that much money in profits to reinvest part of it into its business, which then increases the equity. But this isn't part of Domino's's capital allocation strategy. So under Domino's's current strategy, given the fact the business doesn't require that much capital to run the business, they spend about 2.3% of the revenue on capex, which is a surprisingly low number for a retail restaurant. But I think that's part of the attraction of their business model. Instead of reinvesting into the business, they are laser focused on shareholder distributions, both in terms of buybacks and in dividends.

嗯,>> 这只是你必须小心的事情。我的意思是,理论上,如果你的股票交易价格远低于内在价值,那么加杠杆尽可能多地回购股票实际上是一个极好的资本配置策略。但显然,回购超过你产生的现金流也是不可持续的。

而且通过举债,你是在借用你未来的盈利能力。你将来必须支付利息,这会减少你未来的收益。所以这就是为什么我说这必须谨慎而有意识地去做。

Absolutely. And at this stage of Domino's growth cycle, I think returning cash to shareholders does make a lot of sense. I do have a small gripe here though. Okay, let's hear it. So I like buybacks and dividends when a company doesn't require adding debt to pay them out. And if you look back, there have been multiple periods in Domino's history when they repurchased more shares than they actually generated in free cash flow. In order to fund these share repurchases and dividends, they had to come up with that money from somewhere and they came up with an interesting strategy to do it. So they have actually recapitalized multiple times over the last decade, which has helped them fund large buybacks and dividends. For instance, if you go back to 2022, they repurchase shares worth $1.32 billion while generating $650 million in operating cash flow. And then you factor in $139 million paid in dividends and you can see where I get a little uneasy here.

而且[清嗓子]公平地说,看起来自2022年以来他们确实没有进行过大规模的一次性股票回购,这也许是正确的做法,但回购和股息仍在继续增加。即使现在,达美乐似乎也没有足够的现金来覆盖他们分配给股东的资本。

Well, >> it's just something you have to be careful about. I mean, in theory, if your stock is trading massively below intrinsic value, then levering up to buy back as much stock as possible is actually an excellent maneuver in capital allocation. But it's also not sustainable evidently to buy back more than you generate in cash flow. And by taking out debt, you're borrowing against your future earnings power. you'll have to pay interest going forward that reduces your earnings down the road. So that's why I say it's just something that has to be done carefully and intentionally.

而这让我们回到了我之前提到的观点,即达美乐披萨能够在收入仅以中个位数增长的情况下,多年来真正提高其每股收益。所以,在过去的几十年里,就像我提到的,每股收益以15%的速度复合增长,而收入以大约7%的速度复合增长。

现在,这显然是回购的真正力量。所以,虽然我赞赏他们大幅且有意义地减少了股票数量,但我确实认为要获得完整的图景,我们必须更多地关注他们的债务状况。

And [clears throat] to be fair, it does look like they haven't done a massive one-off repurchase of shares since going back to 2022, which is is maybe the right move, but buybacks and dividends are still continuing to increase. And even now, it doesn't appear that Domino's has the cash to cover the amount of capital that they're distributing to shareholders.

而且一开始,这并非我最喜欢的设置。如今,长期债务约为48亿美元。他们正在产生约10亿美元的EBIDA。他们的契约规定,债务与调整后EBITDA的比率必须保持在5.5倍以下,在我看来这是一个相当高的数字。

而希望在于,他们能够继续以其收入流为担保发行债务,仅仅是因为这些收入流非常非常持久。但这仍然不是有保证的,对吧?我的意思是,我们谈论的是一家披萨公司,而不是公用事业企业。

And this brings us back to the point I made earlier about Domino's Pizza being able to really increase its earnings per share over the years while only growing revenues in the mid- single digits. So over the last decades, like I mentioned, earnings per share has compounded at 15% while revenue has compounded somewhere around 7%. Now, this is obviously the true power of buybacks. So, while I do commend them for drastically and meaningfully reducing their share count, I do think to get a complete picture, we have to look more at their debt situation. And kind of right off the bat, it's just not my favorite setup. So, today long-term debt is about $4.8 billion. And they are generating approximately a billion in EBIDA. Their covenants state they must stay below 5.5 times debt to adjusted EBITDA, which is a pretty high number in my books. And the hope is that they can continue to issue debt against their revenue streams simply because those revenue streams are very very durable. But still that's not guaranteed, right? I mean, we're talking about a pizza company, not a utility business.

确实如此。所以,你知道,Domino's显然没有运行一个正常的企业资产负债表。它是通过整个业务证券化来融资的。因此,与典型的循环信贷和定期贷款结构不同,Domino's利用其自身的特许权使用费流、知识产权和供应链分销收入。

这些被作为资产支持票据的抵押品,类似于我在节目开头提到的与自然资源合作伙伴的特许权使用费结构,只是应用于债务而非股权。

Exactly. So, you know, Donald's obviously doesn't run a normal corporate balance sheet. It's financed through these whole business securitization. So instead of a typical, you know, just a revolver and term loan structure, Domino's leverages its own royalty streams, intellectual property, and supply chain distribution income. These are then pledged as collateral for asset back notes, similar in spirit to the royalty structure that I mentioned with natural resource partners at the top of the show, just applied to debt instead of equity.

而且因为他们可以以资产发行这些票据,他们实际上获得了一些非常稳固的利率。加权平均票息仅为3.82%,我认为这正好在美联储的利率附近。他们不必像通常的债务那样支付溢价。但当前的策略实际上是滚动债务。

他们去年刚刚再融资,只是为了偿还2015年和2018年的本金和票据。值得注意的是,今天的利率高于之前的时期。因此,即使他们在滚动债务,今天的票息实际上比那时更高,这意味着他们以越来越高的成本滚动债务。

And because they can issue these notes on their assets, they actually are getting some very solid interest rates. The blended average coupon is just 3.82%, 82% which I think is right around the Federal Reserve's interest rate. They just don't have to pay a premium on top of that like they would normally with normal debt. But the current strategy is really to just roll the debt over. They refinanced just last year just to pay back the principal and notes from 2015 and 2018. It's worth noting that rates today are higher than they were in those previous periods. So even though they are rolling the debt over, the coupons today are actually higher than they were back then, meaning they're rolling the debt over at a higher and higher cost.

你可能会把这看作既是负面也是正面。在负面方面,对于一家表面上没有最强竞争优势的企业来说,这是大量的债务。但如果贷款人愿意以这些利率放贷,即使是以资产为支持,他们可能不同意Domino's作为一家企业的持久性。

他们必须对业务有很强的信心。这给了Domino's一个低成本的融资优势,超过大多数其他公司,他们可以利用这一点来基本上降低其资本成本,并将更多现金投入股票回购,并且使用债务这样做。这正是我们所看到的。

You could probably look at this as both a negative or a positive. On the negative side, that is a lot of debt for a business that optically does not have the strongest competitive advantages necessarily. But if lenders are willing to lend at these interest rates, even if they're assetbacked, they probably disagree about Domino's durability as a concern. They have to have a lot of faith in the business. It gives Domino's a lowcost financing advantage over most other companies that they can exploit to basically reduce their cost of capital and plow more cash into share repurchases and do so using debt. And that's exactly what we've seen.

没错。所以,我在今天的节目开头提到了Tom Monahan,但我还没有真正讨论太多当前的管理团队。Domino's很有趣,因为它在整个存在期间经历了五位不同的CEO。当你考虑到这家企业已经存在了多久,这实际上是一个相当不错的平均任期,这通常表明一种良好的文化。

所以今天的CEO是Russell Weiner,他在公司已经近18年了。他并不是一个白手起家的故事,因为他不是以送餐员之类的身份开始Domino's的,但他在这个生态系统中待了这么久,对我来说是一个加分项。

他从首席营销官开始,一步一步地晋升到CEO职位,自2022年以来一直担任该职位。

That's right. So, I mentioned Tom Monahan at the beginning of today's episode, but I haven't really discussed too much about the current management team. Domino's is interesting because it has been through five different CEOs in its entire existence. And when you think about how long the business has been around for, that's actually a pretty decent average tenure, which generally notes a good culture. So today's CEO is Russell Weiner, who has been in the business for nearly 18 years. He's not really a rags riches story as he didn't start with Domino's as just say a delivery boy or anything, but the fact that he's been inside the ecosystem for so long to me is a thumbs up. So he started as the chief marketing officer and step by step just worked his way into the CEO position, which he's now held since 2022.

现在看看内部人持股,对于一家市值仅为115亿美元的公司来说,这肯定有很多不足之处。高管和董事的持股比例不到1%,对我来说真的非常非常低。

Now looking at insider ownership, I mean it definitely leaves a lot to be desired for a company with a market cap of just 11.5 billion. Having less than 1% of ownership from both executives and directors to me is really really low.

当然。所以,看看CEO的薪酬结构,他的基本工资约占其总薪酬的9%。这非常棒,因为他的总薪酬如此严重地依赖于业绩,但他的基本工资是92.5万美元。所以,你知道,如果他最终达到所有目标,总薪酬将达到约1000万美元。

他的薪酬其余部分是长期和短期激励的组合。这些目标基于调整后EBITDA等指标,这些指标需要达到指定的目标。我想我可以肯定地说,我对这个指标不太热衷,但另一方面,这个目标在过去5年中每年增长约10%。

所以,你知道,至少他们给了他一个目标,应该有望创造某种增长并与股东保持一致。其余激励基于零售销售增长和相对股东总回报等。值得注意的是,基准不是标普500指数,而是标普的餐饮子指数。

Absolutely. So, looking at the paymix for the CEO, he makes about 9% of his total compensation as base salary. This is pretty great to see as his total comp relies so heavily on performance, but his base salary was $925,000. So, you know, total comp goes up to about $10 million if he ends up meeting all of his hurdles. The remainder of his comp is in a mixture of long-term and short-term incentives. And these hurdles are based on things like adjusted EBITDA, which require reaching a specified target. I think I can safely say I'm not crazy about this metric, but you know, on the other hand, this target has grown by about 10% per year over the last 5 years. So, you know, at least they're giving him a target that should create hopefully some sort of growth and alignment with shareholders. The remainder of the incentives are based on things like retail sales growth and relative total shareholder return. It's worth noting that the benchmark is not the S&P 500, but it's actually a restaurant subindex of the S&P.

>> 我认为我喜欢超过70%的潜在薪酬包与长期业绩指标挂钩,但你当然更希望看到这些指标与每股收益挂钩,而不是调整后的IBITA,在那里你人为地创建一个非GAAP指标来衡量收益,而不是使用更客观的会计标准。

>> I think I like that more than 70% of the potential comp package is tied to long-term performance metrics, but you'd certainly rather see those metrics being connected to earnings per share and not adjusted IBITA where you're artificially creating a non-GAAP metric to measure earnings rather than using a more objective accounting standard.

我完全同意你的看法,Sean。所以,总的来说,从业绩来看,管理层相当不错,但如果我说我被震撼了,那是在撒谎。如果我们看看自Russell Weiner接手以来的一些KPI,收入复合增长率约为3%,每股收益和EBIT约为5%。

I couldn't agree more with you, Sean. So, overall, you know, management in terms of looking at their performance, it's pretty decent, but I would be lying if I said I was blown away. If we look at a few KPIs since Russell Weiner has taken over, you got compounding of revenues of about 3% and then earnings per share and EBIT about 5%.

另一个我认为必须提到的黄旗是,过去2年中的大多数内部人交易都是卖出,而且其中很多是行使期权。所以,在过去2年中,实际上没有我能找到的公开市场买入。当你考虑到该业务经历了多次30%的回撤,并且现在正从39%的回撤中恢复时,这也相当令人失望。

如果内部人能够与其他股东一起利用这个机会,那将是非常好的。

Another yellow flag that I think I have to mention here is that the majority of insider transactions over the last 2 years have been sales and a lot of these have been in the exercising of options. So, in the last 2 years, there actually hasn't been an open market buy that I could find. This is also pretty disappointing when you consider that the business has had multiple 30% draw downs and right now is coming off a 39% draw down. It would be really great to see insiders taking advantage of this alongside other shareholders.

>> 是的,我认为我们应该更详细地讨论这个话题。我知道Domino's引起你兴趣的全部原因是因为股价下跌。那么,你能带我了解一下过去几年发生了什么导致了这种下跌吗?

>> It would, and I think we should get into this topic in a little more detail. I know the whole reason Domino's became interesting for you was because of this drop in its share price. So, how about you take me through what happened over the past few years that have caused this decline?

所以,真正让我印象深刻的一个是典型的增长率下降障碍,我认为许多企业在存在更长时间后往往会面临这种情况。所以,自22年以来,收入仅以3%的复合增长率增长。但在此之前的十年里,这是一个更健康的11%。

所以,这在我看来完全证明了市盈率从2020年的40多倍下降到今天的约20倍是合理的。

So, the one that really kind of sticks out to me is a classic reduced growth rate hurdle that I think a lot of businesses tend to face just as they exist for a longer longer period of time. So, since 22, revenue has compounded at just 3%. For the decade before that though, it was a much healthier 11%. So this to me fully justifies the PE really dropping from over 40 times in 2020 down to around 20 times today.

但当我们谈论投资时,我们必须向前看,而不仅仅是向后看。让我对Domino's感兴趣的部分原因是,当前的增长率现在是新常态,还是只是他们面临的某种中期逆风,也许以前的增长率在未来的某个时候是可以实现的。

But when we're talking about investing, we do have to look forward and not just backward. Part of what got me interested in dominoes was asking whether the current growth rates are now the new normal or if they're just kind of some sort of medium-term headwind they're facing and maybe previous growth rates are achievable at some point in the future.

另一个主要问题是同店销售增长。在2026年第二季度,美国同店销售增长仅为0.1%,而国际(不包括外汇)实际上略微下降了0.1%。所以,你知道,市场目前看到这些下降的数字,并且目前没有考虑任何未来的增长。

The other major issue is in the same store sales growth. So in Q2 2026 it came in at just.1% in the US and it actually slightly declined by.1% internationally excluding foreign currency. So you know the market is currently seeing these declining numbers and not really taking into account any future growth at this time.

>> 这确实解释了市盈率的下降。但我的意思是,哇,Domino's Pizza当时40倍的市盈率对我来说似乎极其昂贵。

>> It definitely explains the drop in the multiple. But I mean wow 40 times earnings for Domino's Pizza at the time that that seems insanely rich to me.

所以,如果我们更仔细地检查风险,我也认为债务是你必须考虑的一个风险。Domino's可以高达5.5倍的杠杆率,这对我来说相当令人担忧,因为

So, if we examine risks a little more closely, I also think debt is one risk you certainly have to take into account. The fact Dominoes can go up to 5.5 times leverage is pretty concerning to me given the fact that

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