The Intrinsic Value Podcast 对 $INTU 的判断变化
你有一家拥有主导市场份额的公司,营收以两位数的速度增长,营业利润率超过25%,并产生超过50亿美元的自由现金流。此外,它还在支付不断增长的股息。
You've got a company with dominant market share, growing revenues at double-digit rates, boasting operating margins north of 25%, and throwing off more than $5 billion of free cash flow. Plus, it's paying a growing dividend.
那么,当你听到这只股票是今年整个标普500指数中表现最差的,从高点下跌近23%时,你会感到惊讶吗?那家公司就是Intuit。除非这家企业未来几年注定要彻底崩溃,否则在其市盈率处于10年低点时买入股票似乎确实是一笔划算的交易。
So, would you be surprised to hear that this same stock is the single worst performer in the entire S&P 500 this year, down nearly 23 from its high? That company is into it. And unless this business is set to completely implode over the next few years, getting shares at a 10-year low in its price to earnings ratio seems like a real steal.
尽管如此多的中小型企业依赖Intuit,而且许多美国人将其作为报税的常用解决方案,但该股已从每股800多美元暴跌至远低于300美元。
Despite the fact that so many small to medium businesses run on into it and many Americans go-to solution for tax filing, the stock has dumped from over $800 per share to well below $300.
今天我们介绍一家公司,我怀疑大多数北美听众可能都与之互动过,无论他们是否意识到这一点,这家公司就是Intuit,股票代码INTU。它是TurboTax、QuickBooks、Credit Karma和Mailchimp等业务背后的公司。
Today we're covering a company that I suspect most North American listeners have probably interacted with whether they realize it or not and that company is into it. Ticker INTU. This is the company behind businesses like Turboax, QuickBooks, Credit Karma, and Mailchimp.
我认为这一集会很有趣的原因是,它正好处于我们今年似乎不断回归的两个主题的交汇点。第一个是高质量的SaaS复合增长型公司,即像Adobe或CoStar这样的主导性关键任务软件和数据业务。
第二个主题则是关于AI颠覆的大辩论,这似乎是当前科技投资面临的最大问题,即哪些现有企业会被AI赋能,哪些企业的商业模式会被AI彻底掏空。
And the reason that I think this episode is going to be a fun one is that it sits right at the intersection of two themes that we just seem to keep circling back to this year. The first is highquality SAS compounders, dominant mission critical software and data businesses like an Adobe or a co-star. And then the second theme is just the great AI disruption debate which is the single biggest question that seems to be hanging over technology investing right now which is which incumbents are going to be supercharged by AI and which ones will have their business models completely hollowed out by it.
然而,Intuit可能是我迄今为止看到的这场辩论最纯粹的例证,因为市场已经非常明确地投票认为它是输家。这是一家从2015年到2025年的十年间,股价以每年近24%的速度复合增长的企业,但现在已经下跌了60%,实际上是今年标普500指数中表现最差的股票。
Into it, though, is maybe the purest illustration of this debate that I've seen so far, because the market has very loudly voted that it's a loser. It's a business that compounded its stock at nearly 24% a year for a decade from 2015 through 2025, but has now sold off 60% and is actually the worst performer in the S&P 500 this year.
我想从进行这场对话本身有多么不寻常开始,因为正如你提到的,几十年来,Intuit一直是令人难以置信的企业的代名词,市场认可其质量,而且你很少能以任何折扣买到它。
I want to start with just how unusual it is to be having this conversation at all because, as you alluded to, for decades, in two, it was the definition of an incredible business where the market recognized that quality. And you could very rarely get that at any kind of discount.
在你提到的2015年至2025年期间,其市盈率中位数接近50倍,再说一遍,50倍市盈率,这是标普500典型市盈率的两倍多的溢价。
for that 2015 to 2025 period you mentioned and to its median price toearnings ratio was almost 50x and just to say that again 50 times earnings that is a premium of more than twice the S&P 500's typical PE ratio for context
但如果你看看今年发生的情况,股价和相应的市盈率绝对像悬崖一样下跌,我们说的是从60倍市盈率跌到16倍市盈率。
but if you look at what has happened this year the stock price and correspondingly the PE ratio have absolutely fallen off a cliff we're talking about going from 60 times earnings to 16 times earnings.
用通俗的话说,这意味着市场已经从认为Intuit是一家能够长期维持卓越增长和盈利能力的公司,转变为认为它是一家不仅可能无法加速增长,甚至未来几年盈利可能下滑的公司。
And so in layman's terms, what that means is the market has gone from seeing into it as being a business that could sustain exceptional growth and profitability for a long time to now being seen as a business at risk of probably not just accelerating growth rates, but potentially even declining earnings in the coming years.
是的,和Adobe一样,Intuit一直是广泛讨论的战场股,情况也非常相似。尽管这些企业的估值和盈利倍数大幅重估,但基础业务一直在以两位数的速度持续增长,同时管理层也继续预测这些强劲的增长数字会持续到未来。
Yeah. And like Adobe Inuit has been widely discussed battleground stock and the setup again is quite similar. Despite the massive revaluations of these businesses and their earnings multiples, the underlying businesses have kept just chugging along growing at double digit rates. While management also continues to project these strong growth numbers into the future.
因此,市场目前对Intuit前景的评估与公司的历史业绩和管理层自己的展望之间存在重大脱节。像Salesforce、Adobe和Intuit这样的企业可能提供一代人一次的买入机会,这取决于你问谁。
或者它们也可能是终极价值陷阱,基于过去的成功吸引投资者,而AI从根本上改变了它们的核心商业模式。
So there's a major disconnect here between the market's current assessment of into its prospects with the company's track record and management's own outlook. Businesses like Salesforce, Adobe, and Intuitit may be offering generational buying opportunities, depending on who you ask. Or they could also be the ultimate value trap, sucking investors in based on their past success. Well, AI fundamentally changes their core business models.
而对于Intuit,我认为担忧可能更多围绕TurboTax,Intuit利用监管复杂性为自己谋利,这推动了Intuit整体盈利能力的很大一部分。
While with Intuit the concern I would say is probably more around Turboax where Intuitit has monetized regulatory complexity to their advantage and that drives a huge chunk of Inuit's overall profitability.
TurboTax可能占公司营业收入的2/3,具体取决于你如何分配间接成本,而且有很多间接成本需要分配,但我们稍后可以详细讨论。
Turboax is potentially as much as 2/3 of the company's operating income depending on how you allocate overhead costs and there are a lot of overhead costs to allocate but we can talk about that more later.
他们通过帮助人们处理纳税申报赚了数十亿美元,同时也有些争议地游说反对免费的政府报税替代方案。现在的担忧是,促进DIY报税,甚至是由专业会计师协助的更复杂的报税,这是一项寿命有限的业务,而且有保质期,因为AI工具正以最低的成本让处理复杂性变得越来越容易。
They've made billions of dollars from helping people navigate their tax returns while also somewhat controversially lobbying against free government filing alternatives. And the concern now is that facilitating DIY tax returns or even tax returns that are more complicated and are assisted by professional accountants. That is a business with a limited lifespan. and there's a shelf life on it because AI tools just are making it easier and easier to tackle complexity at a minimal cost.
所以反驳的观点是,税收风险极高。不仅你的退税金额面临风险,而且如果你搞砸了,还有可能被审计的风险。所以我认为看涨者会说TurboTax已经建立了一个非常值得信赖的品牌。即使AI让报税变得更容易,许多人仍然希望在像TurboTax这样的生态系统中进行,而不是直接在像Claude这样的某种LLM中操作,因为在那里你无法确定一切都能正确完成。
So the counterargument being that taxes are incredibly high stakes. Not only is your refund money on the line, but you know if you mess up there's the risk that you could be audited. So I think bulls would say that Turboax has built up a really trusted brand. And even if AI makes it easier to file taxes, many people will still want to do that within an ecosystem exactly like Turboax versus doing it directly in some sort of LLM like Claude where you just don't have the same certainty that everything is going to be done correctly.
现在,由于TurboTax专注于税务软件,并且可以为此定制自己的AI工具,而不是试图使用通用LLM来处理税务,或者使用一些没有同样品牌认知度的AI驱动的新兴服务,其想法是大多数客户最终仍会在未来很多年里继续使用TurboTax。
Now, because Turboax specializes in tax software and can customize its own AI tools for this, rather than trying to use a general purpose LLM for taxes or some upstart service powered by AI that doesn't have the same brand recognition, the idea is that most customers will still end up coming back to Turboax for many, many years to come.
或者至少我认为,基于我们在开始录制之前聊过的内容,这就是你的论点所在,Jean。
Or at least I think that's where your thesis, Jean, is based on what we chatted about before we started recording.
在这三项业务中,她日常工作中都在使用Intuit的产品,此外还有其他产品。所以,我亲身了解到Intuit对簿记员和会计师来说都是一个至关重要的产品。我还和其他几位会计师聊过,他们也都在使用Intuit的产品。
而且他们似乎并不急于用LLM来取代他们从Intuit获得的服务。
And in all three of those businesses, she was using an Inuit product among many others in her day-to-day work. So, I know firsthand that Inuit is a vital product for both bookkeepers and accountants. And speaking to a couple of other accountants, they both use Intuit products as well. And they didn't seem to be in any hurry to use an LLM to replace what they service that they get from uh into it.
我认为对于Intuit也有类似的说法。但是当我看到市场关于TurboTax DIY报税渠道爆发的叙事时,我显然对此持怀疑态度。当然,对于非常简单的税务申报,确实存在这些人不再使用TurboTax的风险,但这些并不是Intuit赚钱的客户。
税务方面的所有收入都来自于提供付费AI工具和人工专业知识的组合,即他们所谓的辅助报税。所以,这些人通过TurboTax支付数百美元甚至更多的费用来获得帮助。而且,根据我自己的经验,由于高风险、涉及的信任度以及至少在许多人心目中必须有人工成分,我不认为这会被轻易颠覆。
And I think there's something similar to be said with Inuit. But when I see the market narrative about Turboax's DIY funnel for tax filings just exploding, clearly I'm skeptical of that. And for sure with really straightforward tax filings there is a real risk that those people stop coming to Turboax but these are not the customers that Intuitit makes money on anyways. All the money in tax comes from providing a mix of paid AI tools and human expertise virtually in what they call assisted tax filings. So these are people paying hundreds of dollars or sometimes more for help through Turboax. And again, I just don't see that being disrupted as easily from my own experience because of the high stakes and the amount of trust involved and the fact that there is a necessity for a human component, at least in a lot of people's minds.
所以,每年回到那里是最容易的,而不是从头开始使用不同的税务软件或不同的会计师。尽管我个人不使用TurboTax的辅助产品,但我愿意尝试。而且我实际上仍然会以某种方式为它付费。
So, it's easiest to keep coming back there each year rather than starting from scratch with a different tax software or or with a different account. And even though I don't personally use Turboax's assisted product, I would be open to it. And I do still actually end up paying into it one way or the other.
我的意思是,这是一个常见的情况,我的会计师通过Intuit处理他所有的税务申报。所以他要求他的客户注册QuickBooks。所以,我们可以更深入地讨论QuickBooks,但我个人在QuickBooks中做我的个人簿记,我支付订阅费来使用这项服务,而且我通过会计师的推荐码获得了订阅折扣。
从我的会计师的角度来看,让所有客户的数据都记录在同一个软件系统中是很好的。这使他们的工作更加简化。而且,鼓励客户使用QuickBooks也有激励,因为会计师在这些推荐中也能获得回扣。
所以这简化了你的工作流程,Intuit知道他们需要给你一点经济激励,让你开始推动你的客户转向QuickBooks。
And what I mean by that is, and this is a common thing, my accountant runs all of his tax filings through into it. And so he asks his clients to sign up for QuickBooks. So, we can get more into the QuickBooks conversation, but I do my personal bookkeeping in QuickBooks and I pay a subscription fee to use the service and I got a discount on that subscription from a referral code from my accountant. And my accountant from his perspective, it's nice to have all of your clients financial data logged in the same software system. That keeps all of their work much more streamlined. And there is also an incentive to encourage your clients to use QuickBooks because accountants get kickbacks on those referrals too. So it simplifies your workflow and Intuitit knows that they need to give you a little bit of a financial motivation to start pushing your customers over to QuickBooks.
所以我的会计师非常热衷于让我设置QuickBooks,我也非常看到了它的价值。所以我们实际上在谈论的是会计师和他们的客户之间使用QuickBooks的网络效应,这对公司来说是一个巨大的潜在护城河来源。
So my accountant was pretty uh keen on getting me set up on QuickBooks and I've very much seen the value of it. So what we're actually talking about really is something of a network effect amongst accountants and their clients in using QuickBooks, which is a great potential moat source for the company.
但是,长话短说,即使你不亲自通过TurboTax报税,更广泛的Intuit生态系统仍然在从Sean的会计和税务中获利。
But, you know, long story short, even if you don't file your taxes personally through Turboax, the broader into it ecosystem is still profiting specifically off of Sean's accounting and taxes.
我们还没有谈到Credit Karma,对于不熟悉的人来说,这是一个一体化的个人财务平台,它是根据你的财务状况找到信用卡推荐、比较汽车保险政策的绝佳场所。我用过它来做这些。你可以查看你的信用评分,并获得改善它的建议。
比较抵押贷款,比较银行账户的利率,探索个人贷款选项,跟踪你的净资产,还有大概十几种其他我可能没想到的类似功能。
And we also haven't talked about Credit Karma, which for anyone not familiar is this all-in-one personal finance platform, and it's a great place to find credit card recommendations based on your financial situation, compare car insurance policies. I've used it for that. You can check your credit score and actually get tips on improving it. Shop mortgages, compare interest rates on bank accounts, explore personal loan options, track your net worth, and there's like a dozen of other things that I'm probably not thinking of in that vein that you can do.
问题是,如果你通过Credit Karma的网站注册信用卡或汽车保险,他们就会从使用这些产品的公司那里获得点击和注册的报酬。所以,他们通过引导流量获得自己的回扣。因此,Credit Karma不承担任何财务风险,也不自己发放贷款,但他们通过作为一个简单而有效的平台来导航大多数人的个人财务需求并提供推荐而获得报酬。
And the thing is, if you sign up for a credit card or a car insurance policy there through Credit Karma's website, they get paid for those clicks and signups by the companies using those products. So, they get their own kickbacks from that, directing that traffic. So, Credit Karma is not taking on any financial risk and making any loans on its own, but they are getting compensated for just being this really simple but effective platform for navigating the vast majority of people's personal finance needs and making recommendations.
我认为你可以说这是一个更明显受到LLM压力的领域,对吧?你可能会打开ChatGPT说:“嘿,最好的信用卡是什么?”但品牌信任仍然有其价值。Credit Karma拥有大量的品牌信任,你知道从Credit Karma获得的推荐带有大量的客户评论和审查,而LLM给你的回复可能更像一个黑匣子。
And I think you could say that that is an area that's more clearly under pressure from LLMs, right? You might open chat GBT and say, "Hey, what is the best credit card?" But there is still something to be said for brand trust. And Credit Karma has a lot of brand trust and knowing that the recommendation you're getting from Credit Karma comes with a lot of customer reviews and vetting in a way that the response you get from an LLM is maybe more of a black box.
我不想说Credit Karma的业务周围有宽阔的护城河,但它是生态系统和通往Intuit其他产品的漏斗的重要组成部分。
I don't want to say that there's a wide moat around Credit Karma's business, but it is an important part of the ecosystem and the funnel into the rest of and to its products.
所以,我有点想象Credit Karma是TurboTax和更广泛的Intuit的一种潜在客户生成器,对吧?有人进来,他们探索工具来支持他们的财务状况,然后他们看到通过Credit Karma免费报税的选择,或者甚至可能获得退税预支贷款,然后砰的一声,他们就在TurboTax生态系统内部了。
So, I'm kind of imagining that Credit Karma is kind of a type of lead generator for Turboax and into it more broadly, right? someone comes in, they explore the tools to maybe support their financial situation, and then they see the option to file taxes for free through Credit Karma or maybe even get an advanced loan on their refund, and boom, they're right there inside of the Turbo Tax ecosystem.
所以,TurboTax现在实际上直接集成在Credit Karma中。也许这个人今年采取DIY方法,但也许明年他们觉得有点太复杂,所以他们付费获得辅助税务支持。然后也许他们开始做副业,现在他们使用QuickBooks专门为此做簿记。
无论如何,你可以看到随着时间的推移,人们越来越深入地陷入Intuit生态系统。这里有很多粘性和很好的交叉销售和追加销售的机会。
So, Turboax is actually integrated directly into Credit Karma right now. And maybe this person takes a DIY approach this year, but maybe next year they decided that it was a bit too complicated, so they pay for assisted tax support. and then maybe they start a small business hustle on the side and now they're using QuickBooks to do the bookkeeping specifically for that. And anyways, you can just see how over time people get sucked deeper and deeper into the into it ecosystem. There's just a ton of stickiness and pretty good opportunity to cross-ell and upsell.
现在,另一件事是TurboTax的业务几乎是最季节性的。一切都发生在上半年,但至少有了Credit Karma,Intuit有更多经常性的、全年与人们财务需求的接触点。
Now, the other thing is that Turboax's business is pretty much as seasonal as it gets. Everything kind of happens in the first half of the year, but at least with credit karma into it has more recurring and year round touch points with people's financial needs.
这实际上也意味着Credit Karma有助于降低Intuit的客户获取成本,尤其是TurboTax。这是Intuit在2020年支付80亿美元收购Credit Karma的众多原因之一。
What that also means effectively is that Credit Karma helps lower into its customer acquisition costs, especially for Turbo Tax. And that's one reason of many why into it paid $8 billion to acquire Credit Karma in 2020.
所以,让一个现有客户尝试你的其他产品,比如让Uber的拼车用户尝试Uber Eats,比通过营销从零开始获取一个全新客户要便宜得多,Intuit也非常清楚这一点。
And so it's dramatically cheaper to get an existing customer for one of your other products like Uber with ride hailing to try Uber Eats than it is to acquire a brand new customer from scratch with marketing and Intuitit knows that very well too.
对。所以我实际上有机会与David Fagan交谈,他是Tip的常客,也是一家会计师事务所的老板。所以我们有机会详细谈论Intuit,关于Credit Karma和Mailchimp,他认为Intuit试图改善他们为客户提供的服务。
Right. So I actually got a chance to speak with David Fagan who's actually a recurring guest on tip and he's also the owner of an accounting firm. So we got a chance to speak at length specifically about in it and regarding credit karma and mailchimp he thought that in it was trying to improve their service offering to their customers.
所以,如果你真正为客户增加价值,并能向他们收取稍高的费用,这可能会非常有效;或者也可能适得其反,我们今天会进一步讨论,但我真的看到了你与Uber的联系。如果你能以合理的价格收购一家企业,降低你的客户获取成本,并能获得与在营销上花更多钱类似质量的潜在客户,只要经济性合理,我认为这可能是一个非常非常好的收购。
So this can kind of work out really well if you truly add value to your customers and can charge them a little bit more or it can backfire and we'll go over this a little more today but I really see your connection here with Uber. If you can acquire a business for a reasonable price that lowers your customer acquisition costs and can land you similar quality leads to just spending more money on marketing, as long as the economics make sense, I think that can make for a very, very good acquisition.
现在,我很高兴我们在这里很快地覆盖了这么多内容,但我确实想回到那个关于它作为这种长期复利机器以及基于传统估值指标,它从来都不是一只便宜的股票,至少近期记忆中任何时候都不是。
Now, I love that we're covering so much ground here pretty quickly, but I did actually want to return to that point about into it being kind of this perennial compounder and the fact that based on conventional valuation metrics, it was never a cheap stock, at least not at any time in recent memory.
就我个人而言,这是一家我远远欣赏的企业,因为财务状况非常好。而且增长前景一直很有意义。只是估值问题。对我来说它总是太贵了,它一直是那种我就像是在场边看戏、吃爆米花、看看会发生什么的企业之一。
Personally, it's a business that I've admired from a distance because the financials are so good. And the growth prospects have always made a lot of sense. It's just been a valuation question. It's just always been too expensive for my taste and it was just been one of those businesses where I'm like, I'm going to watch the show from the sidelines, eat some popcorn, and see what happens.
但现在,鉴于价格下跌的方式,也许这是一个机会。在过去12个月里,收入同比增长了15%。营业利润率上升了超过一个百分点。相应地,营业利润比去年同期增长了近30%。这得益于企业惊人的经营杠杆,是收入增长率的两倍多。
But now, given the way the price has dropped, perhaps it's an opportunity. And in the last 12 months, revenue has grown 15% year-over-year. Operating profit margins have risen by more than a full percentage point. And then correspondingly, you've seen operating profits grow at nearly 30% from this time last year. So that's more than double their revenue growth rate thanks to the business's incredible operating leverage.
这种变动不仅仅是因为一个糟糕的季度。而在Intuit的案例中,甚至不一定有一个糟糕的季度可以指出来。然而,有某种结构性因素惊吓了市场。
And that kind of move doesn't just happen because of one bad quarter. And in into Intuit's case, there isn't necessarily even a bad quarter to point to anyways. Yet something structurally spooked the market.
所以这背后的简单叙事是,如果LLM能回答你提出的任何税务问题,那么谁还需要TurboTax?如果AI代理能为你做簿记,那么谁还需要QuickBooks?所以整个公司都是帮助你完成财务任务的软件。
当我们进入一个所有人都拥有超个性化AI助手的世界,也许具有神一般的计算能力和数字能力,那么它们可以为我们做一切。简单地说,就没有必要存在任何SaaS业务了。
So the bare narrative behind this is that if LLMs can answer any tax question you throw at them, then who needs Turboax? And if an AI agent can do your bookkeeping for you, then who needs QuickBooks? And so the whole company is software that helps you do financial tasks. And as we move into a world where we all have hyperpersonalized AI assistants, maybe with godlike computing power and digital capabilities, then they can do everything for us. And simplistically, there's just no need for any SAS business to exist.
我不一定说这是主流观点,但肯定有人会提出这种论点,并试图说Intuit已死,Adobe已死,Salesforce已死,等等。
And I'm not necessarily saying that that is the mainstream view, but there are definitely people out there that would make that argument and are trying to say that Inuit is dead and Adobe is dead and Salesforce is dead and so on.
所以我知道这种对比支撑了你对所谓SaaS末日的看法,但与此同时,像Intuit这样的企业面临的不确定性确实显著增加了。这意味着它应该反映在估值中。但今天Intuit商业模式面临的风险也比5年前任何人预期的要大。
So I know that juxaposition underpins your thoughts on the so-called SAS apocalypse but at the same time uncertainty facing businesses like Intuit has genuinely increased very significantly. So that means it should be reflected in the valuations. But there are also bigger risks to Intuit's business model today than anyone would have anticipated 5 years ago.
但你知道,我认为对于Intuit以及所有已经抛售的SaaS巨头来说,问题是市场是否走得太远了。是的,Intuit今天绝对不应该以60倍市盈率交易,但它真的应该只有16倍市盈率吗?
这是对更广泛的标普500市盈率的50%折价,这意味着标普500中的大多数企业比Intuit具有更高的质量和更好的增长前景。我只是不认为这是一个我倾向于在此时做出的逻辑跳跃。
But you know the question I think with Intuitit and all of these SAS giants that have sold off is whether the market has just gone too far. Yes, Intuit should definitely not trade at 60 times earnings today, but should it really be just 16 times earnings? That's a 50% discount to the broader S&P 500's price to earnings ratio, which implies that most of the business in the S&P 500 are higher quality and have better growth prospects than into it. And I just don't think that's a logical leap that I'm inclined to really make at this point in time.
当你看到一家拥有80%毛利率和近30%营业利润率(或接近)的公司时,这对我来说很难接受,作为背景,这与Alphabet的营业利润率相差不远,Alphabet是Mag 7的支柱,所以我这么说有点半开玩笑,但不完全是,需要明确的是,我们当然在简化如何思考正确的估值倍数,但方向上的观点仍然成立,除非Intuit的业务在未来5到10年内崩溃,或者尽管管理层实际上一直指导长期持续的双位数增长,却没有终值。
It's a hard pill for me to swallow when you look at a company with 80% gross margins and 30% operating profit margins or nearly so which for context is not all that far off from Alphabit's operating profit margins which is a pillar of the mag 7 and so I say that a little tongue and cheeky but not entirely and to be clear we are simplifying things of course in terms of how to think about what the right valuation multiple is but still directionally the point remains unless into its business is going to collapse in the next 5 to 10 years or there's just no terminal value despite the fact that management has actually guided for double-digit growth consistently longer term.
很难不认为至少Intuit会是一个好的均值回归赌注,股票可能仅仅通过回到与更广泛市场平均水平一致的市盈率倍数而翻倍。
It's hard not to think that at a minimum intuitit would be a good mean reversion bet where the stock could just simply double by simply returning to a PE multiple in line with the broader market average.
但让我在这里扮演魔鬼代言人,或者扮演一个需要被说服的人。所以,我会说空头听起来并不完全疯狂。你知道,AI确实是一种非常好的回答问题的方法,并且自动化重复的数字工作,这正是Intuit产品核心所在。所以,诚然,这有点过于简化,但并不是太离谱。
But let me just play devil's advocate here or just play the role of someone who needs to be convinced. So, I will say that the bears don't sound completely crazy. You know, AI genuinely is a very good method for answering questions and automating repetitive digital work, which is at the heart of what into its products do. So, granted, that's kind of an oversimplification, but it's not super far off.
对我来说,这归结为市场混淆了AI可以完成一项任务的一部分的想法与AI因此摧毁拥有该任务及相关任务的整个业务的概念。所以我确实认为这些是非常不同的陈述,而且在我看来,Intuit的护城河是转换成本、专有数据、分销、信任以及关键的问责制的纠缠,对吧?
如果你的税务搞砸了并且你被审计,你可以指着它说这是Intuit的错。你知道这对Intuit来说听起来很糟糕,但这实际上是客户想要坚持使用该产品的一个好理由。
To me, it comes down to the market confusing the idea that AI can do a piece of a task with the notion that AI therefore destroys the entire business that owns that task and related tasks. And so I do think those are very different statements and to its moat in my opinion is a tangle of switching costs, proprietary data, distribution, trust and crucially accountability, right? being able to point to if your taxes get messed up and you get audited, you can point to it and say it's Intuit's fault. And you know that sounds bad for Intuit, but that actually is a good reason for customers to want to stick with the product.
好的,所以回到1983年,有一个叫Scott Cook的人。他是宝洁的前营销主管。正如故事所说,一天晚上他坐在晚餐桌旁,看着妻子在厨房桌子上工作。她很沮丧。她试图手工平衡家庭支票簿。
而Cook,来自宝洁,对理解消费者痛点有非常深刻的直觉。对吧?宝洁以出色地倾听消费者所说的话并创造真正解决他们痛点(甚至是非常小的痛点)的产品而闻名。所以他看着妻子在做什么以及她的挣扎等等。
个人电脑将在家庭中变得更普遍,这是一个电脑应该能够完成的琐事。所以他与一位有编程背景的斯坦福本科生合作,他们一起构建了一个管理个人财务的软件,他们称之为Quicken,他们将母公司命名为Intuit,因为整个想法是使用它应该是直观的。它应该对一个不是会计师的普通人来说有意义。
Okay, so rewinded in 1983, there's a guy named Scott Cook. He's a former Proctor and Gamble marketing executive. And as the story goes, he's sitting there at dinner one night watching his wife work at the kitchen table. And she's frustrated. She's trying to balance the family checkbook by hand. And Cook, having come from Proctor and Gamble, has this very deep instinct for understanding consumer pain points. Right? Proctor and Gamble is sort of famous for doing an excellent job of listening to what consumers are saying and creating products that actually address their pain points and even very small ones. And so he looks at what his wife is doing and her struggles and things. Personal computers are going to become more common in homes and this is a chore that a computer should be able to do. So he teams up with a Stanford undergrad with a programming background and together they build a piece of software to manage personal finances and they call it Quicken and they name the parent company into it because the whole idea is that using it should be intuitive. It should just make sense to a regular person who is not an accountant.
这就是TurboTax、Credit Karma和QuickBooks为中小型企业做簿记、工资单和其他一堆事情的全部精神。
And that is the whole ethos behind Turboax, Credit Karma, and QuickBooks for small to mediumsiz businesses doing bookkeeping, payroll, and a bunch of other stuff.
所以,我喜欢整个公司始于看着一个人在厨房桌子上挣扎。这差不多是最草根的了,对于现在在峰值估值时已成为近2000亿美元的公司来说。
So, I love that the entire company started from watching one person struggle at a kitchen table. That's about, you know, as grassroots as it gets for what has now become nearly a $200 billion company at its peak valuation.
这听起来确实有点玄乎,但我的看法是,这种专注于让事物尽可能直观以及痴迷于优化客户痛点的思维过程,就像创始人的妻子坐在厨房桌子上挣扎着平衡支票簿一样。我认为这确实定义了公司的文化,Cook实际上让一种叫做“跟我回家”的做法出名了,Intuit会真的要求客户允许他们跟着回家或去办公室,只是看着他们使用软件,这样他们就能实时看到任何真正的摩擦点,而不是试图猜测人们可能有什么问题。
It does sound a bit woowoo, but my perception is that this thought process with a focus on things literally being as intuitive as possible and also sort of obsessing over optimizing for customer pain points like the founders's wife sitting at the kitchen table struggling with balancing the checkbook. I think that really has come to define the company's culture and cook actually made famous this practice called follow me home where intuitit would literally ask customers to be able to follow them to their homes or to their offices and just watch them use the software so they could see any real friction points as they arise in real time rather than trying to guess at what problems people might have.
事后看来,这听起来确实有点令人毛骨悚然,但主要是比喻性的。我的意思是,我确信他们真的去过人们的办公室和家里观察他们使用Intuit软件,但对我来说,我更多将其视为一种心态。这是一种承诺,不是设计一个精美工程且极其复杂的税务解决方案(例如,没人知道如何使用),而是通过仔细倾听用户对什么令人困惑、什么不令人困惑、什么有帮助、什么没有帮助的反馈,专注于创造人们可以轻松导航的产品。
And it uh it does sound a little bit creepy admittedly in hindsight, but it's metaphorical mostly. I mean, I'm sure they really have gone to people's offices and homes to observe them using Intuit software, but to me, I see it as more of a mindset. It's a commitment to not designing some beautifully engineered and wildly complex tax solution, for example, that no one knows how to use, but to instead focus on creating products people can easily navigate by closely listening to their feedback of what is confusing and what's not confusing and what's helpful and what's not helpful.
在与TIP合作之前,我实际上经常使用Canva来制作在Twitter和Substack上使用的图片。它非常容易使用,非常直观,我几乎不需要花时间弄清楚如何使用它。就是那么简单。
但我必须承认,我已经好几年没用Canva了。一旦我可以用AI生成图片,我使用它的可能性就越来越小了。
So before working with TIP, I actually used Canva kind of all the time to help make images for use on Twitter and Substack. And you know, it was super easy. was super intuitive and I didn't have to spend really any time trying to figure out how to use it. It was just that easy. But I must admit, I haven't used Canva in years. And once I could use AI to generate images, I was less and less likely to use it over time.
我同意这一点。这种痴迷于观察客户实际行为而非他们所说行为的做法,贯穿了整个公司,至今已有40年。库克确实说过一句很棒的话:“品牌不再是公司告诉消费者它是什么,而是消费者互相告诉彼此它是什么。”我真的很喜欢这句话。
>> I agree with that. And that obsession with watching what customers actually do rather than what they say they do is a thread that runs through the entire company and has for 40 years now. So Cook actually has this really great line. He says, "A brand is no longer what the company tells the consumer it is. It's what consumers tell each other that it is." And yeah, I I really like that.
继续讲这个故事,你可以想象,到20世纪90年代中期,Quicken凭借其会计软件赢得了大量用户,这自然引起了当时地球上最强大的软件公司——微软的注意。
And just to continue on with the story here, you can imagine that by the mid 1990s with Quicken winning a lot of users over with their accounting software, this naturally caught the attention of the most powerful software company on Earth at the time, Microsoft.
1994年,微软曾试图以约15亿美元的价格直接收购它,这在当时是一笔巨大的金额,但最终由于反垄断担忧,这笔交易被放弃了。
Well, so in 1994, Microsoft tried to acquire into it outright for about $1.5 billion, which was an enormous price at the time, but the deal ultimately was abandoned over antitrust concerns.
当时公司内部有一种说法,我相信其中有些道理,那就是“微软无法匹敌我们对消费者同理心的深度”。微软最终确实放弃了,并在开发了一款比实际需要更复杂的产品后, discontinued了Microsoft Money。
微软拥有最好的工程师,其产品背后有出色的工程技术,但它不像Quicken产品那样对日常用户直观易用。
And one of the expressions internally at the time which there I was some truth to I believe was that quote Microsoft can't match our depth of consumer empathy. And Microsoft did eventually give up and discontinued Microsoft money after having built a product that was more complex than it needed to be. It had fantastic engineering behind it because Microsoft had the best engineers, but it was not intuitive to the everyday user like Quick and Products were.
因此,我认为这确实意味着Intuit是一家坚韧不拔的公司,而且自与微软的冲突以来,业务变得更加稳健,这一点对于那些准备因为即将与AI的下一场战斗而完全否定Intuit的人来说,确实值得牢记。
And so I think that really means that INT is a kind of a scrappy company and the business has only gotten more robust since this clash with Microsoft, which is something to really keep in mind for those that are prepared to write off into it entirely due to this next battle that they're supposedly going to have with AI.
我不想过分强调这一点,因为AI风险显然不同于他们面对微软资金时的风险,但我也不认为Intuit是一个从未面临过颠覆风险的幼稚受害者,只是坐享其成,等着被AI打倒。
I don't want to lean on it too hard because AI risks are definitely not the same as what they face with Microsoft money obviously, but I just don't see into it as some naive victim either who's never faced disruption risk before and is just sitting there on its laurels waiting to get taken down by AI.
被微软、他们的工程师大军以及他们几乎无穷无尽的资金所挑战,理论上他们可以向业务投入资金,这对我来说是一个非常非常可怕的想法。但这表明,如果一个企业真正专注于让客户满意,它就能对抗那些在资源差距下本不该能对抗的对手,这正是Intuit当时所做的。
I mean, being challenged by Microsoft, their army of engineers, and their nearly endless funding, they could theoretically pump into a business is a very, very scary thought to me. But, you know, it goes to show you that if a business really focuses on delighting its customers, it can take on opponents that it probably shouldn't be able to given the gap in resources, which is exactly what in it did back then.
例如,在Quicken推出几年后,团队进行了一项调查,并在数据中注意到一些奇怪的现象:相当一部分Quicken用户并不是管理家庭预算的个人,而是使用个人理财工具来经营业务的小企业主,因为当时可用的B2B会计软件过于笨重或复杂,是为训练有素的会计师设计的。
So, for example, a couple of years after Quickn launched, the team was running surveys and noticed something strange in their data, and that was a meaningful chunk of Quickn users were not individuals managing a household budget. Instead, they were small business owners using a personal finance tool to run their businesses on because the B2B accounting software available at the time was too clunky or complex and built for trained accountants.
因此,Intuit自然专注于为这些企业主开发一个特定版本,这就是QuickBooks,它至今仍是该业务的皇冠明珠。
And so naturally, Intuitit then focused on building a version specifically for these business owners and that became QuickBooks and this is the crown jewel of the business still to this day.
在接下来的几十年里,QuickBooks真正成为美国小企业会计的标准。这并非夸张,因为作为背景,我们谈论的是在小企业中高达85%至90%的市场份额。
And over the following decades, QuickBooks became really the standard in small business accounting in the United States. And that really is not an exaggeration because for context, we're talking about a market share as high as an 85 to 90% amongst small businesses.
所以,如果你帮助个人和企业管理资金,税务显然是下一个自然的垂直领域。他们将标志性的以客户为中心的方法应用于税务准备,TurboTax迅速成为该国占主导地位的自助报税产品。
So if you're helping people and businesses manage their money, taxes are sort of a clear vertical to move into next. They took their signature customer ccentric focus to tax prep and Turboax quickly became the dominant do-it-yourself tax filing product in the country.
至今,超过4000万人通过TurboTax报税。因此,当我们审视今天的业务时,Intuit已经组装了一系列产品,这些产品都处于个人财务生活中的关键和重复时刻。这就是我的看法。或者可能是企业财务生活中的关键时刻。
例如,你的账簿必须正确,你的税款必须申报。你是一个小企业,你的员工必须得到报酬。这些都不是可选项。它们是非常非常高风险的事情。
And to this day, more than 40 million people file their taxes through Turboax. So as we look at the business today, Intuitit has assembled this collection of products that all sit at critical and recurring moments in a person's financial life. That's how I think about it. Or maybe a business's financial life. Your books have to be right. For example, your taxes have to be filed. You're a small business. Your employees have to get paid. These are not optional things. They're very, very high stakes.
而且,正如我在自己的税务中意识到的,你希望对申报的准确性有非常高的信心和把握,这对大多数人来说意味着在流程中的某个时刻联系人工会计师,或者至少使用一个像TurboTax、QuickBooks和Intuit这样值得信赖的品牌,而不是某个新的AI驱动的新贵工具。
And again, as I realized with my own taxes, you want to have very high conviction and confidence in the accuracy of your filing, which for most people means connecting with a human accountant at some point in the process or at a minimum working with a brand that is as trusted as Turboax and QuickBooks and Intuitit generally as opposed to some new upstart AI powered tool.
因此,Intuit会在财报电话会议上自豪地告诉你,他们如何将人工智能与人类智能相结合。在TurboTax Live平台上,有超过12000名持牌会计师和税务律师随时准备帮助你解决遇到的任何问题。
And so in TU it will proudly tell you on their earnings calls about how they're blending artificial intelligence with human intelligence too. So on the Turboax live platform for getting human assistance and it has more than 12,000 licensed accountants and tax attorneys that are ready to help you with really any problem you face.
所以重点是,TurboTax根据人们税务的复杂程度和所需帮助的量,提供了全方位的选择。因此,毫无疑问,TurboTax是一个用户喜爱的优秀产品。
So point being, Turboax offers a full spectrum of options for people's taxes really based on the complexity and amount of help that they need. So there's actually no doubt that Turboax is a great product that users love.
每当报税季来临,我记得看到各种百货商店在繁忙区域显著展示Intuit TurboTax产品,这特别是在加拿大,甚至不是美国,而美国基本上是一个垄断市场。所以,这是一个非常非常知名的产品。
我认为如果你问朋友或家人是否听说过TurboTax,答案很有可能会是肯定的,这说明了该业务部门的垄断特征。
Whenever tax season comes along, I remember seeing all sorts of department stores with Intuitit Turboax products prominently featured in high traffic areas and this is in Canada specifically, not even the US, which he said basically a monopoly. So, you know, this is a product that is very, very wellnown. And I think if you asked a friend or a family member if they've ever heard of Turboax, there's a very, very good chance that the answer to that is going to be yes, which speaks to the monopoly like characteristics of that business segment.
Intuit基本上将业务分为两大块。较大的一块称为全球商业解决方案。这个名字很吸引人。它大约占总收入的60%。所以当你听到全球商业解决方案或GBS时,只需想到Intuit的中小企业帝国。
其核心是QuickBooks,但它被一个日益增长的“资金业务”所包围,正如他们所称。这包括支付、工资、商业银行账户、贷款和账单支付服务。
Intuitit reports the business in essentially two big buckets. And so the larger bucket is called global business solutions. Very catchy name. And it's roughly 60% of total revenue. So when you hear global business solutions or GBS, just think about in it small and mediumsized business empire basically. And the heart of that is QuickBooks, but it's wrapped around an increasingly large money business as they refer to it. And so what that includes is payments, payroll, business checking accounts, lending, and bill pay services.
这些不仅是QuickBooks各种订阅产品中非常粘性的部分,而且它们建立在Intuit的底层数据优势之上。例如,Intuit可以看到你的现金流和工资历史,然后他们可以承销一笔短期贷款,帮助你的公司在现金流紧张的月份支付工资。
And so not only are these very sticky parts of QuickBooks various subscription offerings, but they're built on Intuit's underlying data advantage. And so, for example, Intuit can see your cash flow and your payroll history, and then they can underwrite a short-term loan to help your company cover payroll in a month when cash is low.
这让我想起 MercadoLibre,人们喜欢把它视为拉丁美洲的亚马逊,如果你不熟悉这家公司的话。我之所以做这个比较,是因为他们拥有关于消费者购物习惯的所有这些数据点,并且他们实际上利用这些信息向未获得银行服务的人群发行信用卡。
因此,那些原本没有信用评分的人,他们使用这种替代数据源来确定其信用worthiness。所以在我看来,Intuit 正在用他们的客户数据做类似的事情,但他们用它来建立一个更专注于 B2B 产品的金融科技部门,对吧?为中小企业提供的产品。
It sort of reminds me of Marcatoa Libre, which people like to think of as the Amazon of Latin America for anybody not familiar with the company. And the reason I make the comparison is because they have all these data points on consumer shopping habits and they actually use that information to issue credit cards to underbanked population. So people that wouldn't otherwise have credit scores, they use this sort of alternative data source to determine their creditworthiness. And so in my opinion, Intuit is doing something similar with their customer data, but they're using it to build a fintech arm that's more focused on B2B offerings, right? Products for small and medium businesses.
因此,他们现在实际上承担了近 20 亿美元的净贷款敞口,这些贷款是他们自己承销的。这个细分市场中我应该提到的最后一部分也是 Mailchimp,那是他们在 2021 年以 120 亿美元收购的电子邮件和营销平台。
And so they now actually carry almost $2 billion in net loan exposure from the loans that they've underwritten themselves. And the last part of this segment that I should mention is also Mailchimp. and that is the email and marketing platform they acquired for $12 billion in 2021.
然后,全球业务解决方案细分市场的最新部分被称为 Intuit Enterprise Suite。那么等一下,他们在疫情期间经历了一次相当好奇的收购狂潮,不是吗?在 12 个月左右的时间里进行了 200 亿美元的收购。
And then the newest piece to the global business solution segment is something known as Intuitit Enterprise Suite. So wait a minute, they went through quite an inquisitive spree during the pandemic though, didn't they? 20 billions on acquisitions in 12 months or so.
确实如此。鉴于 Mailchimp 的收购至少并不完全成功,你可以理解为什么同样的并购步伐没有完全继续。Mailchimp 还可以,但电子邮件营销平台竞争激烈,我不会说它有什么特别独特之处,使其明显适合 Intuit 的生态系统。所以实际上,那次收购对我来说有点奇怪,说实话。
It's true. And given that the Mailchimp acquisition at least hasn't exactly been a home run, you can see why that same pace of M&A has not exactly continued. Mailchimp is okay, but there's a lot of competition in email marketing platforms and I would not say there's anything particularly unique about it that makes the business an obvious fit inside of into its ecosystem. And so really the acquisition there was a little bizarre to me honestly.
我认为值得注意的是,当你听到管理层报告增长数字并做出增长预测时,他们实际上是通过给出考虑和不考虑 Mailchimp 的数字来做到的。所以这绝对不是偶然的。我也不认为 Mailchimp 的表现很大程度上被 QuickBooks 的出色表现所掩盖,因为他们将两者合并到同一个报告细分市场中,这不是偶然的。
And I think it's telling that when you hear management report growth figures and make growth projections, they literally do so by giving the numbers with and without accounting for Mailchimp. And so that is absolutely not an accident. And I don't think it's an accident either that Mailchimp's performance has largely been offiscated by QuickBooks outperformance by clumping them together in the same reporting segment.
所以 Mailchimp 的例子让我想到 Peter Lynch 的多元化原则之一,我相信你以前听说过。他的想法是,当一家企业现金充裕时,他们不会做简单的事情,比如支付股息或回购股票,而是决定变得有点花哨。
在这个过程中,他们可以用现金购买那些被美化为多元化业务的企业,但实际上只会让业务变得更糟。所以在我看来,Mailchimp 就是那样。
So the Mailchimp example kind of makes me think of one of Peter Lynch's principles of diversification, which I'm sure you've heard of before. You know, his idea was that when a business gets flushed with cash, instead of doing simple things like just paying a dividend or buying back shares, they decide to get a little bit fancy. And in that process, they can use the cash to buy businesses which are veiled as diversifying the business, but really just make the business worse. So in my view, Mailchimp was kind of just that.
另一个部分显然更偏向消费者方面,包括 TurboTax 和 Credit Karma。没错。他们实际上合并了消费者税务和 Credit Karma,但也包括他们的专业税务集团,该集团向专业会计师销售软件。
所以就像与我合作的会计师一样,截至 2025 年,这也包含在这个报告结构中。
The other bucket is obviously more on the consumer side of things with Turboax and Credit Karma. >> That's right. Yeah. They actually combined Consumer Taxes and Credit Karma, but also their professional tax group that sells software to professional accountants. So like the accountant I work with, that is also included in this reporting structure as of 2025.
但我想回到你的评论,QuickBooks 在小型企业中拥有大约 80% 或更多的市场份额,因为这是一个天文数字般高的数字。当你拥有这样的渗透率时,增长究竟来自哪里?你知道,如果你已经拥有几乎整个市场,你不能永远不断地增加客户。
But I want to get back to your comment that QuickBooks has something like 80% or more market share among small businesses cuz that's an astronomically high number. Where exactly is that growth coming from when you have that degree of penetration? You know, if you already own almost the entire market, you can't just continue adding customers on and on forever.
所以 QuickBooks 的增长可以来自三个杠杆。杠杆一是价格。当你所有的财务历史、对账交易、工资单、税务记录都存在于 QuickBooks 中时,每月几美元的价格上涨不值得迁移的巨大痛苦。
因此,Intuit 在这方面可能仍然拥有大量未开发定价权。
>> So growth in QuickBooks can come from three levers. Lever one is price. when your entire financial history and your reconciled transactions, your payroll, your tax records, if you have all of that living inside of QuickBooks, a price bump of a few dollars a month is not going to be worth the enormous pain of migrating. And so into it probably has a lot of untapped pricing power on that front still.
杠杆二归结为交叉销售,这意味着向每个客户销售更多服务。所以将他们从仅仅会计服务转移到可能附加订阅,比如能够处理支付、工资单等等。这样结合价格上涨,你可以持续增长每位客户的平均收入,这是这家公司的关键指标。
而且他们可能能够以两位数的百分比长期做到这一点。这是作为公司多头我的希望。
And lever two boils down to cross-selling, which means selling each customer more services. So moving them from just accounting to maybe add-on subscriptions like being able to process payments, payroll, and all that kind of stuff. And this is how combined with price hikes, you consistently grow average revenue per customer, which is a key metric for this company. And they may potentially be able to do so at double-digit percentages for a long time to come. That's my hope as a bull on the company.
这再次是他们所谓的“货币业务”的一部分。即使没有被单独划分和报告,它似乎也增长非常快。Intuit 促成的支付量同比增长近 30%。
And this again is part of what they call the money business. Even if that doesn't get carved out and reported separately, it does appear to be growing very fast. Payment volumes facilitated by Intuitit are up nearly 30% year-over-year.
所以这些服务中的每一项都加深了关系并提高了每位客户的收入。当我说 Intuit 处理的支付时,这意味着企业主能够生成发票。想象你是一个在本地农贸市场工作的农民。从一个银行账户到另一个银行账户获得付款并不像你想象的那么容易。
而仅仅通过拥有 Intuit 订阅,他们就能让你创建发票,从而处理支付。所以这对许多小企业来说是一个巨大的增值。
So each one of those services deepens the relationship and raises the revenue per customer. And when I say payments processed by Intuit, this means the ability for a business owner to generate invoices. So imagine you're a farmer working at the local farmers market. It's not as easy as you'd think it is to get the money from one bank account to another to get paid. And by just having an Intuit subscription, they give you the ability to create invoices that allow you to process payments. And so that is a huge value ad for a lot of small businesses.
然后是第三个杠杆,我认为这是华尔街最关注的,即向上市场进军,接触更大的公司。这就是我提到的 Intuit Enterprise Suite 或 IES。
And then the third lever, which I would say is the one Wall Street is most focused on, is moving up market into reaching bigger companies. And so that's what the Intuit Enterprise suite or IEES is that I mentioned a minute ago.
我的看法是,Intuit 更多是针对市场中间的一个空白,而不是试图一路向上提供全球最大公司的商业软件。那根本不是他们能够竞争的领域。
The way I think about it is Intuitit is more targeting a gap in the middle of the market than they are trying to go all the way up to providing business software for the largest corporations in the world. That's just not an area where they can compete.
然后在这个中间有一个巨大的服务不足的中端市场。Intuit 注意到,当然许多中型企业曾经是小企业,这意味着他们可能曾经是 Intuit 的客户,然后出于某种原因他们发展超出了 QuickBooks 软件,也许他们的财务需求变得太复杂,无法在 QuickBooks 中跟踪。
然而,这些公司中的许多无法证明或负担得起完整的 ERP 系统,如 Oracle NetSuite 类型的系统,但他们喜欢他们的 QuickBooks 订阅,他们真的只是希望他们能从中获得更多。
所以,Intuit Enterprise Suite 确实寻求纠正这种动态。
Then there's this enormous underserved middle market in between. And so what Intuitit noticed was that of course many medium-sized businesses were once small businesses which means that they were probably customers of Intuitit at one point and then for whatever reason they grew out of the QuickBooks software and maybe their financial needs became too complicated for what could be tracked in QuickBooks. And so many of these companies though could not justify or afford the cost of full ERP systems, Oracle Netswuite type systems, but they loved their QuickBooks subscriptions and they really were just wishing that they could get more out of them. So, the Intuit Enterprise suite really seeks to rectify that dynamic.
希望是也许他们可以赢得一些新的中型客户。但从长远来看,如果他们能够简单地停止失去那么多随着企业成熟到中等规模而流失的订阅者,那实际上可以大幅扩大他们的收益,假设他们继续主导小企业的漏斗顶部。
And the hope is that maybe they can win over some new midsize clients. But long term, if they can just simply stop losing as many subscribers as businesses mature to a more medium size, that actually can dramatically expand their earnings, assuming they continue to dominate the top of the funnel with small businesses.
正如我们之前所说,保留现有客户比获取新客户便宜得多。因此,如果他们能够在小企业成长为中型企业的过程中更长时间地保留他们作为客户,这对整个公司来说是一个巨大的福音。
And as we said earlier, it's far more cheaper to keep an existing customer than it is to acquire a new one. And so if they can keep small businesses as customers for longer as they progress into being medium-sized businesses, that is a huge boon for the overall company.
我喜欢这个。我真的很喜欢他们延长当前跑道的策略。你知道,随着 Intuit 提高其满足这些越来越成熟企业的能力,并减少那些企业不一定想切换但别无选择基本上被迫离开的不必要流失,平均客户的终身价值可以持续增长。
I like this. I I really like their strategy for lengthening the runway that they currently have. you know, the lifetime value of the average customer can keep growing as in it improves its ability to cater to these kind of more and more mature businesses and reduce these unwanted churn where businesses didn't necessarily want to switch, but with no other option, they basically were forced to do so.
是的,而且他们已经在这方面取得了成功。因此,Intuit Enterprise Suite 在第一年就推动了约 40% 的中端市场收入增长,而升级到 IEES 的 QuickBooks 客户在其中的支出增加了一倍多。
>> Yeah. And they're already having success with it. So, Intuit Enterprise Suite in its first year drove something like 40% mid-market revenue growth and QuickBook customers who upgraded to IEES more than doubled their spending with into it.
因此,从历史上看,一家企业平均使用 QuickBooks 的时间可能在 7 到 15 年,但现在正如你所说,这个跑道可能会长得多得多。
So, historically, a business would use QuickBooks for maybe 7 to 15 years on average, but now as you said, that runway can potentially be much much longer.
我认为 Intuit Enterprise Suite 是 Intuit 内部开发的合理选择。他们希望避免那种 Match.com 的问题,即其产品的成功用户不再有任何实际用途。所以对于 Intuit 来说,你不会……
I think intuitive executive suite was kind of the logical choice for intuitit to develop internally. They wanted to avoid kind of that match.com issue where successful users of their product no longer have any actual use for it. So in in it's case, you don't
这确实是如今华尔街大部分看空情绪的主要驱动力,在我看来。因此,DIY 税务大约是一个 50 亿美元的可寻址市场,而 Intuit 实际上认为这只是 TurboTax 总机会的约 12%。
This really is what's driving most of the bearish sentiment on Wall Street today as I see it. And so with DIY taxes being a roughly $5 billion addressable market, Intuitit actually only sees that as being about 12% of Turboax's total opportunity.
TurboTax 的 DIY 交易量实际上已经连续几年略有下降,这无助于改善市场情绪。如果进入 TurboTax 生态系统漏斗顶部的用户越来越少,那么该业务的终值将受到影响,因为当客户停止从漏斗顶部流入,而你用更复杂的税务协助在漏斗下游变现的客户耗尽时,最终会赶上你。
it's not helping sentiment that these DIY volumes on Turboax have actually been declining slightly for a few years now. if fewer and fewer people are entering the top of the funnel of the Turboax ecosystem, then the terminal value of that business is going to suffer because eventually it catches up with you when customers stop flowing through the top of the funnel and you run out of customers to monetize lower down with more complicated tax assistance.
自那以来,TurboTax 的联邦 DIY 交易量累计下降了 9%。因此,申报量在 2023 年下降了约 5%,随后几年每年下降不到 2%。
since then Turboax's federal DIY volumes are down 9% cumulatively. So filings dropped about 5% in 2023 and then less than 2% in each of the next few years.
然而,美国国税局确实尝试过这个,但并没有真正流行起来。但这正是 Intuit 真正擅长的,比任何人都擅长。此外,TurboTax Live 实际上一直是消费者业务中增长最快的部分,遥遥领先。
这甚至没有可比性。它已经以每年约 38% 的速度复合增长超过 5 年,现在占 TurboTax 总收入的多数。
And yet the IRS did actually try this and it did not exactly catch on. But that is what Intuitit is really good at, better than anyone at. Plus, Turboax Live has actually been the fastest growing part of the consumer business by a mile. It's not even close. It's compounded at something like 38% a year for over 5 years now and now represents a majority of Turboax's total revenue.
在我看来,空头们过度关注那个以每年 1% 的速度萎缩的小型成熟部分,然后宣布胜利,因为股价下跌了,而公司实际上在一个更大的市场中获得了份额,而这个市场它以前几乎不碰。
The bears to me are hyperfixating on the small mature slice that's shrinking at 1% a year and then declaring victory as the stock has fallen while the company is actually taking share in a bigger market it barely used to touch.
在人工智能能力日益增强的世界里,这些真的能站得住脚吗?那么,为 Intuit 辩护吧。你知道,为什么没有一些初创公司,甚至可能是 Anthropic 或 OpenAI 进来试图颠覆他们?
Is any of this actually defensible in a world of increasingly capable AI? So make the case for intuitive mode. You know, why hasn't some startup or maybe even anthropic or open AI come in and tried to disrupt them?
当你谈论迁移你的财务账簿和交易记录时,我真的不想低估转换成本的重要性。但 TurboTax 已经拥有你所有前一年的信息,并且会自动填充,这可以为你节省数小时。
I really don't want to underestimate the importance of switching costs when you're talking about migrating your financial books and transaction records. but still Turboax already has all of your prior year information and just autofills it and that can save you hours.
看空者会说,人工智能代理可以为你完成痛苦的企业迁移,并且它肯定可以通过阅读你的文件自动重新输入你所有的税务信息。
a bear would say that an AI agent could do the painful migration for you as a business and it could definitely re-enter all your tax info automatically just by reading your documents.
如果 TurboTax 业务在未来十年内像 Blockbuster 一样走向衰落,那么该业务总收益的一半理论上可能面临风险。
Half of the business's total earnings could theoretically be at risk if say the Turboax business goes the way it blockbuster over the next decade.
而且我确实认为专有数据是 QuickBooks 和 TurboTax 护城河的重要组成部分,再加上已经到位的分销渠道。
And I do also think that proprietary data is a big part of the QuickBooks and Turboax moat along with already having distribution in place.
Intuit 知道数千万份真实纳税申报单上实际发生了什么,也知道数百万家公司的中小企业账簿上发生了什么。因此,其运作方式大致是,由于 Intuit 并非银行,他们实际上有银行合作伙伴来发放贷款,但 Intuit 同意随后立即从合作银行回购全部或一定比例的贷款。所以我们谈论的是购买数十亿美元的商业贷款。
in it knows what actually happened on tens of millions of real tax returns and on the small business ledgers of millions of companies. And so the way this broadly works is that they do actually have banking partners that make the loans for them technically since Intuit is not a bank, but Intuit agrees to then immediately repurchase all or a percentage of those loans from their partner banks. And so we're talking about purchasing billions of dollars in business loans.
即使市场上出现了更好的记账工具,也许是基于人工智能的,问题是,如果你依赖 Intuit 来获得融资以支付账单,你真的会转而使用它吗?我的回答可能是不会。
even if a better bookkeeping tool comes along to the market, maybe an AI based one, question is are you really going to switch to it if you rely on intuitit for getting financing to pay your bills? And my answer to that would be probably not.
Intuit 一直在构建他们所谓的 Gen OS,本质上这是他们自己的生成式人工智能操作系统,并且在此基础上,他们正在推出 AI 代理。
Intuit has been building what they call Gen OS and essentially that's their own generative AI operating system and on top of they're rolling out AI agents.
他们的会计 AI 代理实际上已经在规模化地工作。这就是 Intuit 在这个后 AI 世界中继续创造价值并可能带来超额回报的愿景,因为他们拥有分销渠道和数据,能够最好地构建那些将彻底改变这些工作流程的代理。
their accounting AI agents are actually already doing work at scale. that's the vision for how Intuit is going to continue to create value and potentially drive excess returns in this post AI world because they have the distribution and the data to do the best job building the agents that are going to revolutionize these workflows.
你需要专有数据来保证数据准确性,这一点我们已经讨论过。你需要能够将代理部署给数千万客户的分销渠道,而 Intuit 拥有这些。此外,你需要一个值得信赖的品牌,而且我主观上认为还需要人工支持,这样人们才会真正让 AI 接触他们的资金。
你能想象要让 AI 代理访问你的银行账户,你需要感到多么舒适吗?我不知道实现这一点有多容易,但如果有人拥有品牌、资源、数据和专业团队来填补人们所需的信心缺口,让他们放心允许 AI 代理获得这种访问权限,我认为这完全属于 Intuit。
you need proprietary data for data accuracy. We've talked about that already. You need distribution to tens of millions of customers that you can deploy the agents to and to it has that and so you need a trusted brand and I would subjectively argue a human backs stop so people will actually let the AI touch their money right can you imagine what it takes for you to feel comfortable allowing an AI agent to access your bank account and I don't know how easy it will be to accomplish that but if anybody has the brand and the resources and the data and the team of human expertise to sort of fill in the confidence gap that people need to feel comfortable allowing AI agents to have that kind of access. I would say that exclusively belongs to intuit
根据我的研究,一旦中小企业客户嵌入到其产品中,他们离开的可能性非常非常低。举个例子,在 QuickBooks Online 上,你可以直接关联你的银行账户。因此,当你从银行账户进行交易时,QuickBooks Online 会自动为你分类交易,专门用于记账和税务目的。
from my research, once a customer of an SMB are embedded into into its products, the chances of them leaving are very, very low. So just to kind of give an example on QuickBooks online you can actually directly link your bank account. So when you make a transaction from the bank account QuickBooks online will automatically sort the transactions out for you specifically for bookkeeping and tax purposes.
那么,如果管理层对自己的定位如此有信心,为什么他们最近宣布裁员 17%?是 AI 已经在内部创造了如此巨大的效率,还是为了向华尔街传递成本纪律的信号?
So, if management is so confident in their positioning, why do they just recently announce a 17% workforce layoff? Is AI already creating these massive efficiencies internally or is it about signaling cost discipline to Wall Street?
我认为现实是,当你经营一家股价刚刚暴跌 60% 的公司时,员工和管理层在心理上确实会觉得脚下有地板很重要。而做到这一点的一种方式是承诺裁员,以及花费 80 亿美元进行股票回购,这是这里的另一个背景。
I think the reality is that when you're running a company that has seen its stock just get wiped out by 60%. It does feel psychologically important to employees and management to feel like there's a floor beneath your feet. And one way that you can do that is by promising to trim the workforce and to also spend $8 billion on share buybacks, which is the other piece of context here.
让我印象深刻的是,自 2017 年以来,其人均收入从每人 633,000 美元上升到这些削减后的估计每人 120 万美元。所以这真是一个极其盈利的业务。他们展示了用更少的资源创造更多收入的能力。你也可以将其视为运营杠杆。
So what is really impressive to me is that in its revenue per employee since 2017 has risen from 633,000 633,000 per employee to an estimated $1. 2 million per employee after these cuts. So just an incredibly profitable business. And they've shown an ability to generate dramatically more revenue with less. And you could also think of this as being like operating leverage.
据说这些削减是为了剔除不必要的中间管理层,使公司成为一个更精简、更快速的组织,这是相当标准的企业说辞。我确实认为,如果该股没有承受如此巨大的压力,你可能不会在其他一切看似顺利的情况下做出这些举动。这是我的猜测。
And supposedly the cuts are being done to weed out unnecessary middle management and to make into it a leaner and faster organization which is it's pretty standard corporate speak. I do think that if the stock had not come under such remarkable pressure, you probably don't make these moves while everything else is seemingly going well. That's my speculation.
如果这是真的,那将是一个轻微的警示信号,因为你不想让管理层以短期股价为重心来经营业务,而不是以长期业务最佳利益为重。
to the extent that this is true, it would be a bit of a a modest yellow flag because you don't want management to be running the business with a focus on the short-term stock price over what's best for the business long term.
所以,在我们继续关注它的时候,这是我们需要记住的事情。我不会说这是一个不合格的担忧,但这是你需要从字里行间去理解并真正想了解为什么做出那个决定的事情。
So, that's something for us to keep in mind as we continue to keep an eye on it. I wouldn't say it's a disqualifying concern in my book, but it is something to, you know, where you're reading between the lines and really want to understand why that decision was made.
是的,同样从积极的角度来看,如果你从字里行间解读,这意味着他们有望继续产生相同甚至更多的收入,而现在他们的运营费用下降了,这意味着你甚至可能会看到一些运营杠杆,这显然是一件很棒的事情,也是他们过去一直非常擅长的。
Yeah. And doing the same thing, reading between the lines there, if you look at it from a positive aspect, it just means that they're hopefully going to continue making the same amount of revenue, if not more. and now their operating expenses have gone down, meaning you should even maybe even see some operating leverage, which is obviously a great thing to see and something that they've been very good at developing in their past.
话虽如此,我认为这是一个很好的过渡,来更多地讨论经营这家公司的人以及他们如何使用公司资金,因为显然像 Intuit 这样的现金机器,其生死存亡取决于他们能否盈利地配置资本。
With all that said, I think it's a great segue here to talk more about the people running this company and how they spend the corporate treasury because obviously a cash machine like into it lives and dies really on their ability to allocate capital profit.
首席执行官是 Sazam Gdarzi,他自 2019 年以来一直经营这家公司,并且是从业务中成长起来的。在担任最高职位之前,他实际上负责小企业集团和消费者集团。所以我喜欢他对所有产品都非常熟悉。
创始人 Scott Cook 仍然担任执行委员会主席。所以仍然有创始人的 DNA 在徘徊。
The CEO is Sazam Gdarzi who has been running the company since 2019 and came up through the business. He actually ran the small business group and the consumer group before taking the top job. So I like that he knows all the products intimately. Scott Cook, the founder, is still around as chairman of the executive committee. So there is still that founder DNA that's kind of lingering around.
然后我通常会将管理层描述为有能力、以使命为导向,并且明显积极推动公司进入 AI 工具和高端市场。因此,他们设定的长期目标是到 2030 年将收入增长加速回每年 20%,这很雄心勃勃,但我喜欢。这当然与市场所见的情况完全不一致。
And then I would generally characterize management as competent, missiondriven, and clearly aggressive about pushing the company into AI tools and up market. And so their slated long-term target is to accelerate revenue growth back toward 20% a year by 2030, which is ambitious, but I love it. It's certainly completely at odds with the narrative that you're seeing from the market.
你可能会觉得这很有趣,Kyle。CEO薪酬的95%是基于绩效的,我认为这是好事,但其中年度奖金分为收入和non-GAAP营业收入指标,这些就不那么好了。
And you actually might find this interesting, Kyle. 95% of the CEO's comp is performance-based, which is, I think, a good thing, but it comes with an annual bonus split between revenue and non-GAAP operating income metrics, which are less of a good thing.
是的,这个薪酬结构中有些部分我确实喜欢,有些我不喜欢。我非常喜欢95%的薪酬是基于绩效的。这意味着Cassan Gdardi不能坐享其成,他必须表现才能获得激励。但收入和non-GAAP营业收入指标,正如你所料,并不是我认为最能将管理层与股东利益对齐的指标。
Yeah, there's parts of that comp structure that I definitely like and something that I dislike. You know, I really like that 95% composition waiting as being performance-based. Love that this means that Cassan Gdardi cannot just sit on his laurels and expect to be paid. He literally has to perform in order to earn his incentive. But the revenue and non-GAAP operating income metrics are, as you'd assume, not the ones that I think best align management with shareholders.
长期股权激励主要基于36个月的总股东回报,相对于一组啤酒公司。所以这很好,这是一个优点。但我总是怀疑在这种设置下同行比较组是如何定义的,以及管理层是否被给予了一个轻松的目标,通过一些任意的同行定义来赚取股票薪酬,他们被设定为与较弱的公司竞争。
And then longerterm equity incentives are largely paid out based on total shareholder returns over 36 months relative to a set of beer companies. So that's good. That's a check. That's a pro. But I'm always dubious though of how the peer comp sets are defined when you have this kind of setup and whether management is being given a layup to earn their stockbased comp against some arbitrary definition of companies that are peers and aren't peers where they're being set to compete against inferior companies.
我也不一定会说36个月是我认为的长期,但有时候你只能接受你能得到的。总的来说,这不是一个不可接受的薪酬方案。它有好的方面,也有坏的方面。但对我来说,它不一定会让我不想投资这家公司。
它可能不会激发我的热情,但不一定是一个排除因素。
And I also wouldn't necessarily say that 36 months is what I would consider longer term, but you got to get what you can take sometimes. And all in all, it's not a non-starter comp package. It has good things about it. It has bad things about it. But again, for me, it's not necessarily something that would disqualify me from wanting to invest in the business. It probably doesn't rev up my enthusiasm, but not necessarily a disqualifying factor.
另一个细节是,Intuit的CEO被要求持有其基本工资10倍的股票。这听起来不错。但当你记得这是一个非常适中的基本工资,因为他的薪酬95%来自奖金,那么这看起来就有点可笑了。
And so, one other detail here is that Inuit CEO is required to hold 10 times his base salary in stock. That sounds good. But when you remember that it's a very modest base salary to judge against since it's 95% of his comp is coming from bonuses, well then that sort of just makes it feel silly.
这实际上意味着Gdarzi在担任CEO七年后只拥有约500万美元的股票。我觉得这非常令人失望,而且不是最鼓舞人心的部分。这不是糟糕,但也不鼓舞人心。
And what that actually means is Gdarzi only owns about $5 million worth of shares after seven years as CEO. And I find that really disappointing and really not one of the most inspiring parts of the thesis. It's not terrible, but it's not it's not inspiring.
另一方面,管理层合计拥有约2.5%的流通股,对于这种规模的公司来说相当不错。而且作为公司创始人的Scott Cook仍然拥有价值15亿美元的股票。所以,作为董事会主席,他肯定有利益相关,并确保公司文化不会朝着错误的方向发展。
On the other hand, management does combine to own about 2 and a half% of all shares outstanding, which is pretty good for a company of this size. And with Scott Cook as founder of the company, he still owns 1.5 billion worth of stock. So, he definitely has skin in the game as chairman of the board and is making sure that the culture of the company is not moving in the wrong direction.
现在,这里有一个红色或黄色的旗帜,我需要问你,那就是大约10%的收入是以股票薪酬支付的,如果我读得没错的话。所以,我不会说这里的股票薪酬是适中的。老实说,我有点担心我们看到股票薪酬占收入的比例随时间增加。
这不应该发生。自2020年以来,它占收入的比例实际上翻了一番。
Now, there's kind of a red or yellow flag here that I need to uh ask you about here, and that's that about 10% of revenue is paid in stockbased comp, if I'm reading this correctly. So, I wouldn't say that stockbased comp here is modest here at all within it. Honestly, it's kind of a bit concerning to me that we've seen SBC as a share of revenue increasing over time. That's not supposed to happen. It's actually doubled as a share of revenue since 2020.
结果,加上收购,我们看到自2020年以来股票数量每年复合增长约1%,这不算过分,但仍然是一个非常真实的稀释成本。
And the result of that and also the acquisitions is that we've seen the share count compound at about 1% per year since 2020, which isn't egregious, but that's still a very real dilution cost.
随着股票下跌以及他们承诺更多回购,我们看到回购收益率飙升,我认为这不仅仅是信号强度。你确实需要回购数十亿美元的股票来抵消你发行的股票。
And as we've seen the buyback yield spike as the stock has declined and as they've committed more and more to buybacks, I'd say this isn't entirely just a signal strength. You very much need to be buying back billions of stock just to offset the shares that you've been issuing.
但与此同时,除了之前计划的回购之外,没有任何迹象表明管理层在认为股票被严重低估时投入自己的资金购买股票。这也是事实。当我们把所有因素放在一起时,我应该提到有一个适度的股息需要考虑进我们的预期回报。他们支付大约20%的收益作为股息。
But at the same time, beside previously scheduled repurchases, there's not really any indication that management is putting their own money to work buying shares if they believe that they're materially undervalued. >> That's also true. And as we bring it all together, I should mention there's a modest dividend for us to factor into our expected returns. They pay out about 20% of earnings as a dividend.
好消息是,当你的业务像这样产生大量现金且利润率很高时,你可以同时做三件事:充分再投资于业务,回购股票以减少股票数量,以及支付股息。这些是股东回报的三大支柱。
And the good thing is when you gush cash the way this business does with really high margins, you can afford to do three things simultaneously and that is adequately reinvest in your business, repurchase shares to shrink the share account and also to pay dividends. Those are sort of the three pillars of shareholder returns.
好吧,这就是我们的提示。让我们更多地讨论估值。我想让你坚持你自己的标准,因为你总是说一家伟大的企业只有在合适的价格下才是伟大的投资。现在,我认为其中的部分让我有点矛盾。QuickBooks是一个伟大的业务。
TurboTax是一个不错的业务。Credit Karma是整个飞轮中坚实的一部分。但然后是Mailchimp,它绝对是薄弱环节。所以,这里的质量有点参差不齐,但总体相当不错。所以,问题是,价格是多少?合适吗?
Well, that's our cue. Let's talk more about valuation. And I want to hold you to your own standard here because you're the one who's always saying that a great business is only a great investment at the right price. Now, I would say that the parts of in it kind of have me at a little bit of odds. QuickBooks is a great business. Turboax is a decent business. Credit Karma is a solid part, I think, of the entire flywheel. But then you get to Mailchimp, which most definitely is the weak link. So, the quality here is kind of mixed, but overall it's pretty good. And so, the question is, what's the price? Is it right?
从基本的市盈率角度来看,大约每股270美元,这是我们录制时的价格,Intuit的市盈率大约是报告基础上的15到16倍。所以对我来说,这非常有吸引力。当你看到前瞻市盈率预测约为10倍时,这甚至更有吸引力。
所以,随着业务持续增长,如果股票持平,折现的内在价值当然只会扩大。老实说,从60倍市盈率下降,我觉得这是一个相当足够的安全边际。这并不是说Intuit不能更低,但这绝对不是一个糟糕的入场点。
Starting with a uh basic just price to earnings lens at around $270 a share, which is where we're at at the time of recording, Intuitit trades at roughly 15 to 16 times trailing earnings on a reported basis. And so to me, that's very attractive. And it's even more attractive when you look at the forward PE projections that put it at about 10 times earnings. So, as the business keeps growing, if the stock is flat, the discounted intrinsic value of course will only widen. And honestly, coming down from 60 times earnings, I do feel as though that's a pretty sufficient margin of safety. And it's not to say that into it can't go lower, but it's definitely not a half bad entry point.
好的。但市场认为完全受损的公司的低市盈率并不自动是便宜货。它也可能是一个价值陷阱。那么,你对公司实际价值的估计是多少?
Okay. But a cheap multiple on a company the market thinks is completely impaired isn't automatically a bargain. It could also be a value trap. So, what's your estimate of what the company is actually worth?
带着通常的财务建模警告,我确实运行了三个情景:在熊市情况下,TurboTax基本持平;在基准情况下,事情按管理层的预期继续发展;在牛市情况下,AI真正帮助推动增长和利润率进一步扩大,因为他们能够从每个员工身上获得更多收入。
这是一个很好的例子。如果这种趋势继续,那将是牛市情况的一个很好的说明。
With the usual caveats about financial modeling, I I do run through three scenarios where the business sees Turboax basically flatline in a bare case. Things keep chugging along as management expects in the base case. And then in the bull case, you have a scenario where AI it really helps drive growth and further profit margin expansion because they're able to get more revenue out of each employee they have on their team. That's a great example of that. And if that trend continues, that would be a great illustration of what the bullc case looks like.
所以,无论如何,用相当粗略的建模方法,考虑股息,我认为Intuit的公允价值约为每股400美元。再加上一个额外的任意数字,额外的20%安全边际,表明股票在约320美元或更低时具有吸引力。
And so anyways, with a pretty crude approach to that modeling, accounting for dividends, I see into its fair value as being about $400 per share. And so stacking on an additional just arbitrary number here, but an additional 20% margin of safety suggests that shares are attractive to buy at around $320 or lower.
顺便提一下,如果你想看我的模型,你可以点击节目说明中的链接。它将完全免费下载,你可以查看我的模型和假设。所以,在当前价格下,模型预期的回报是未来5年每年18%。这只是一个数学计算,但我实际上认为很多回报将提前实现。
And just to quickly mention it, if you want to see my model, you can click down into the show notes for the episode into the description. It's going to be available to download entirely for free and you can look through my model and my assumptions. And so at current prices, the expected return from the model is 18% a year per year over the next 5 years. And that is just sort of a mathematical calculation, but I actually think a lot of those returns will be front-loaded.
所以,在某个时候,我猜测,也许今年晚些时候或明年,如果叙事再次转变,Intuit大幅反弹,我不会感到惊讶,就像去年Alphabet在ChatGPT是竞争对手与否的叙事转变时反弹一样。所以,再次,这是我的猜测。
And so at some point, me speculating here, maybe later this year or next, I would not be surprised if the narrative switches again and into it rallies significantly in the same way that Alphabet rallied last year when the narrative flipped with chat GBT being a competitor or not. And so again, that's my speculation.
因此,标普500指数中某一年表现最差的股票,在接下来一年成为表现较好甚至最好的股票之一,这种情况也并不少见。这是一个众所周知的模式。综上所述,出于多种原因,我对以每股300美元以下的价格买入它感到非常兴奋。
对我来说,这感觉像是一个真正的便宜货,我很想把它加入内在价值投资组合。就我个人而言,我可能会放心地将其作为投资组合中5%的仓位。但如果你有疑虑,Kyle,也许我们可以暂时将其视为2%的跟踪仓位。
然后我们显然也应该听听Daniel的意见。我知道他无意中听到了我们关于它的对话,我很想听听他的看法。
And so it's also not uncommon to see the S&P's worst performer in one year become one of the better, if not the best performers the following year. That's a well-known pattern. So, with all that said, I am pretty excited for a variety of reasons about buying into it below $300 per share. To me, it feels like a real bargain and I would love to add it to the intrinsic value portfolio. And personally, I would probably be comfortable making it as a 5% position in the portfolio. But if you have hesitencies, Kyle, maybe we can treat it as a 2% tracker position for now. And then we should obviously get Daniel's input, too. I know he's overheard our conversations about into it and I would love to hear where he lands on it.
那么,你的看法是什么,Kyle?>> 是的,我认为你肯定比我之前研究这个之前以及听到更多你的论点之前更让我信服。我认为它显然是一个高质量的业务。但对我来说,我认为问题真正归结于该业务的护城河是在扩大还是在缩小。
在我看来,QuickBooks Online,我认为我们在这里已经非常清楚地表明了,是皇冠上的明珠。但我对其他三个细分市场确实有一些疑问,我不认为它们一定是零,但我想在希望这成为一个完整的5%仓位之前,花更多时间真正理解它们。
So yeah, what's your take, Kyle? >> Yeah, I mean I think you've definitely sold me on into it more so than what I used to think about it before kind of researching this and before hearing more about your thesis. I think in it is very clearly a high quality business. But for me, I think the question really comes down to whether the business's moat is widening or shrinking. To me, QuickBooks Online, which I think we've made really apparent here, is the crown jewel. But I do have some questions on the other three segments that I don't think they're necessarily a zero by any means, but I think I'd want to spend some more time really understanding them before wanting this to be a completely full 5% position.
所以,我要说的是,这个业务非常便宜。我完全同意你的看法。我认为它,类似于我们报道过的其他一些SAS名称,例如Constellation Software,只是被完全不公平地惩罚了。
它有一些真正的转换成本,我认为这将使它们保持竞争力的时间比市场目前对它们的估值所反映的要长得多。
So, I will say this, the business is super cheap. I'm right there with you. I think in it, similar to some of the other SAS names that we've covered, Constellation Software for instance, have just been completely unfairly punished. into it has some real switching costs and I think that's going to keep them competitive a lot longer than the market is currently valuing them for.
所以我认为我们也许坚持这个2%的跟踪仓位,然后在信心增强或价格继续下跌时增加。>> 好的。好吧。所以我们将把它加入我们的投资组合。
So I think we kind of maybe stick with this 2% track position and then add on increased conviction or if the price continues to drop. >> Okay. All right. So we'll be adding into it to our portfolio.
一如既往,如果你想关注投资组合并查看其外观,你可以订阅我们的内在价值通讯。只需访问investorspodcast.com。这完全是免费的。就这样,各位,让我用Intuit创始人Scott Cook的一句话来结束,我认为这句话抓住了为什么我愿意在这里介入并投资,而其他很多人正在逃离。
库克说:“不要专注于竞争,要专注于客户。”而市场现在正在告诉自己一个故事,即AI使Intuit过时。但每天实际使用Intuit和QuickBooks的人们正在互相讲述完全不同的东西,包括我作为用户。
而且Intuit已经表明,在文化上,他们对客户至上有一种狂热的关注。有点像Amazon,它在这方面很出名。所以我认为这使它成为一个非常难以击败的业务。
And as always if you want to follow along with the portfolio and see what it looks like you can sign up for our intrinsic value newsletter. Just head over to the investorspodcast.com. That's completely for free. And with that folks, let me leave everyone with a quote from Inuit's founder Scott Cook that I think captures why I'm willing to step in here and invest while a lot of other people are running for the exit. So Cook said, "Instead of focusing on the competition, focus on the customer. " And the market right now is telling itself a story that AI makes in it obsolete. But the people who actually use Intuit and QuickBooks every day are telling each other something completely different, including me as a user. And Intuitit has shown that culturally there is a maniacal focus on the customer first. Sort of like Amazon, which is famous for that. And so I think that makes it a very hard business to beat.