$CPRT

目前对 CPRT 持观望态度;鉴于增速放缓及 AV 不确定性,其估值合理、并不便宜,但日后适合作为长期持有标的。

《Copart Stock (CPRT): Is Copart now a Buy?》
The Intrinsic Value Podcast发布 2026-09-13 · 142 段内容
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142 段内容
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大约10个月前,我们介绍过Copart,它是优质复利股最常被引用的例子之一:这是一门借贷型生意,利润率很高,资本回报率很高,并且身处一个双寡头行业。而它在这个双寡头格局中长期占据主导地位。

About 10 months ago, we covered Copart and it's one of the most quoted examples for a quality compounder, which is a borrowing business with high margins, high returns on capital, and operating in a duopoly.

A duopoly that it dominated for the longest time.

话虽如此,它的竞争对手正在抢占市场份额,这对股价形成了压力。但我很欣赏管理层再次非常主动地回购股票。他们显然认为该股正以低价交易。他们上一次回购可观数量的股票还是在十多年前。

And with that said, their competitor is gaining market share, which is weighing on the stock. But I love that management has been super proactive about buying back shares again.

They clearly think the stock is trading at a bargain price. The last time they bought back meaningful amounts of share was more than a decade ago.

而现在,新任CEO——同时也是前任CEO——Jader回来了,要让Copart重回正轨。你在去年10月推荐了这只股票,当时Copart已经从历史高点下跌了30%。但正如我们今天所知,在那之后仍有进一步回调的空间。

And now the new CEO who is also the old CEO Jader is back to get Copart back on track. You pitched the stock in October of last year and at that point Copart was already down 30% from all-time highs.

But as we know today, there was still some room for even more pullbacks beyond that.

我们并不试图择时,我们卖出也不是因为猜测该股未来几个月会怎么走。但通过卖出Copart、把资金投到别处来腾出一些资金,确实感觉是个正确的决定。而该股自那以后表现艰难,这让这个决定看起来很有先见之明,即便它很大程度上只是运气。

And we don't try to time the market and we didn't sell because we speculated on where the stock was going to go in the next few months. But it did feel like the right decision to free up some capital by selling Copart who invested elsewhere.

And the stock has had a rough time since then, which makes the decision look preient even if it was mostly just random luck.

我是说,我们买入时COA是一个2%的仓位。作为背景,2%的仓位通常意味着它算是处于观察期。所以,我们基本上还没有完全认可它,要么是因为估值,要么只是因为我们对其质量有些担忧。我想我可以代表我们俩说,就Copart而言,肯定是前者。

我想我们都知道它的质量相当高。但正如你所说,当时该股的估值也许算合理,但绝对不便宜。

I mean, COA has been a 2% position back then when we bought it. And just for context, a 2% position usually means it's sort of on probation. So, we're basically not yet completely sold on it, either because of valuation or simply because we have some quality concerns.

And I think I could speak for the both of us when I say that with Copart, it was certainly the former. I think we all know the quality is quite high. But as you said, the stock was perhaps fairly valued, definitely not cheap at that point.

如果你对Copart做这样的分析,你就会发现该股为何处于当前的位置,那就是:如果看过去两三年,营收增长一直在急剧放缓。

And if you do that for Copart, you will find out why the stock is where it currently is, which is that topline growth has been slowing down dramatically if you look at the last 2 or 3 years.

那就是几周前我们那期“最大输家”节目中的主要共同点:股价往往跟随营收增长,而Copart的增速从百分之十几的中段一路放缓到基本零增长。这就是今天的故事。

That was, you know, the major common denominator in our Biggest Loser episode just a couple of weeks ago, that stock prices tend to follow topline growth and cops slow down from just mid- teens to basically no growth at all. That's the story for today.

我认为Copart有意思的地方在于,尽管它享有优质复利股之一的名声,但它以前也经历过这样的增长放缓。我们现在已经习惯了软件股的走势图基本只朝一个方向——向右上方走,但Copart本质上是一门更具周期性的生意。

所以,上一次营收增长停滞是在2015年。但同样,那对股东来说绝非致命。而且平心而论,尽管营收有些波动,每股收益却持续增长,这确实有帮助。

what is interesting for Copart, I think, is that while they have the reputation as being one of these highquality compounders, they have had these growth slowdowns before. And we're used to the software charts by now that only go in basically one direction up and to the right, but Copart is fundamentally a more cyclical business.

And so, the last time revenue growth stalled out was in 2015. But again, that was not fatal to shareholders by any means. And to be fair, it does help that earnings per share grew consistently despite some revenue volatility.

所以,如果我要用一句话概括Copart的业务,那大概就是:Copart是一个全损车的交易市场。每年有数百万辆汽车走到所谓使用寿命的尽头,无论是因撞车、冰雹、洪水,还是仅仅因为车龄太老——而后者往往才是真正最常见的原因。

但这些车大多会流向保险公司,而这些保险公司基本上就是Copart的主要客户群。它们想处理掉这些车,Copart则通过把卖方(即保险公司)与潜在买方连接起来来完成这件事。买方通常包括拆解商或回收商、二手车经销商、国际出口商、汽车修理厂,也包括个人,比如业余爱好者或私人买家,基本上来自世界各地。

So, if I had to summarize Copart's business in just one sentence, it would probably be that Copart is a marketplace for total cars. So every year millions of cars reach the end of what you can call their useful life.

Whether that would be through a crash or a hailtorm, a flood or just because of old age um which is most often the actual reason. But most of those cars they go to an insurance company and those insurance companies are essentially Copart's main customer base.

So they want to get rid of the car and Copart takes care of that by connecting the seller which is the insurance company with a potential buyer. And buyers usually include dismantlers or recyclers, um, used car dealers, international exporters, auto repair shops, but also individual, you know, let's say hobbyists or private buyers from basically all around the world.

例如,许多通过Copart卖给私人买家的车最终出现在了南美的街道上。我认为新兴市场往往是Copart的车被私人买家买走的地方。所以,多米尼加共和国肯定有一些车是通不过德国TÜV检测的。

Many cars sold through Copart to private buyers actually end up on South American streets, for example. I think emerging markets tend to be where Copart's cars are being bought by private buyers.

So, there were definitely some cars in the Dominican Republic that wouldn't have passed the German tuf.

我还要补充一点,在其核心业务中,Copart并不取得任何车辆的所有权。所以它只是一个交易市场,作为其服务的一部分,它还负责物流,有点像二手车领域的Amazon。Copart拖走这些车辆,把它们停在自己的某个场地里,给它们拍照,处理文书,然后举办拍卖,真正把车卖出去。

接着,它基本上从卖方(也就是保险公司)和买方(比如可能是经销商)两边都收取费用。

And I should add that in its core business, Copart doesn't take ownership of any of the cars. So it's just a marketplace that as part of its service also handles the logistics which is kind of like Amazon but for used cars.

So Copart toast the vehicles. They, you know, park them in one of their yards. They photograph them. They handle the paperwork and then they run the auction where they actually sell those cars.

Then they basically take a fee from both the seller side, so those are the insurance companies, and the buyer side, which for example could be, you know, a dealer.

全损频率越高,对Copart越有利,因为这意味着有更多车辆进入它的平台。而过去几十年里有意思的一点是,这一直是Copart的一大顺风。

And the higher the total loss frequency, the better it is for Copart because that means they're getting more cars coming into their platform. And the interesting part in the last decades is that this has been a major tailwind for Copart.

Jay Adair既是前任CEO也是新任CEO,我们稍后会在节目中解释这一点。他最近在一次投资者电话会上说,大约35年前他刚起步时,全损频率只有8%,而如今已接近24%。

So Jay Adair who is the old and also the new CEO and we'll explain that later on in the episode. He recently said in an investor call that the total loss frequency when he started which was about 35 years ago was only 8% and today it's almost 24%.

但前CEO Jeff Leo在他最近一次财报电话会上提出的另一个有意思的观点是,Copart不仅是全损频率上升的被动受益者,实际上它还帮助推动这一频率上升。基本上,Copart在拍卖中为一辆车多拿到的每一美元,都会让保险公司更倾向于直接把车定为全损,然后送到Copart拍卖。

他大致把这描述为基本上是在与修理厂竞争,对吧?每一辆流向Copart而没有进修理厂的车,对他们来说都是一次胜利。所以Copart创造的回报越高,它就越经常赢得处理那笔理赔的权利,而不是让那辆车去车身修理厂。

But another interesting point that the XCO Jeff Leo made in one of his late earnings calls is that Copart is not only a passive beneficiary of, you know, an increase in the total loss frequency, but they actually help drive it upward.

So basically every additional dollar that Copart gets for a car at an auction makes it more attractive for interests to just total the car and then send it to Copart for auction.

And he sort of framed it as basically competing with the repair shops, right? Every car that goes to Copart and doesn't get into a repair shop is a win for them. So the higher the returns Copart generates, the more often it wins the right to resolve that claim instead of that car going to the body shop.

这是一个很棒的系统,因为它也让Copart和保险公司的利益更加一致。所以,把车和业务量交给Copart不仅对保险业务更有利可图,而且Copart的费用还会随更高的售价而增加。在卖方这边,他们常用——我想我上次提到过——一种叫做百分比激励计划的东西。

基本上这意味着Copart的费用是车辆售价的一个百分比,而买方费用通常在7%到13%之间,取决于车辆和买方的业务量。正如我们上次提到的,大约80%的费用来自买方,而不是保险公司。

其背后的原因是,有规模的保险公司只有大约十几家。所以这是一个非常集中的供应商群体,拥有相当高的议价能力。而在买方这边,有成千上万的拆解商、经销商和出口商。所以这是一个高度分散的车辆买方群体,相应地几乎没有议价能力。

It's a great system because it also aligns Copart and the insurance companies much better. So, not only is it more profitable for the insurance business to give Copart the cars and the volume, but Copart's fees also scale with higher sales prices.

Then on the seller side, they often use, and I think I mentioned that last time, something that is called percentage incentive program. So basically that means that copot's fees is a percentage of the car sale price and buyer fees typically range from 7 to 13% depending on the car and the buyers volume.

And as we mentioned last time roughly 80% of the fees come on the buyer side not with the insurance companies. And the reason behind that is there are only about a dozen insurance companies of size.

So it's a very concentrated group of suppliers with pretty high negotiating leverage. And then on the buyer side, you have thousands of dismantlers and dealers and exporters. So it's highly fragmented set of vehicle buyers and there's little to no negotiating leverage correspondingly.

但除了与保险公司合作的核心业务之外,还有第二项业务,叫做车辆销售。是的。正如你所说,绝大部分收入基本上来自服务收入,也就是我们刚刚讨论的那块业务,它之所以叫服务,是因为Copart承担了大量物流工作,基本上接手了原本需要保险公司去做的事情,所以他们才把它叫做服务。

另外大约15%的业务来自他们所称的车辆销售。这部分业务是Copart自己买下车辆所有权,然后通过自己的渠道出售。这种模式在Copart的国际业务中更为常见,我们上次也谈过,主要是因为服务模式在美国已经成熟,但在大多数国际市场尚未被广泛采用。

为了向国际客户展示在Copart上出售的优势——这主要来自拍卖所提供的流动性——他们基本上直接买下车辆,然后通过自己的拍卖出售,以此作为该模式的证明。目标基本上是随着时间推移,能把这些客户转化为收费或服务模式,这对Copart来说是利润率更高的业务,而且这套做法效果相当不错。

国际服务收入增长了近20%,而车辆收入下降了近20%。你显然可能会问,车辆收入下降为什么是好事,原因是这意味着国际市场实际上正在采用利润率更高的服务模式,而这正是你想看到的。

But besides the core business with insurance companies, there's also a second business called vehicle sales. Yeah. So as you said basically the vast majority of revenue comes from service revenue which is the business that we just discussed and it's called service because again you know copot is doing a lot of the logistics and they basically take on what otherwise insurance companies would need to do.

That's why they call it service. The other 15 or so% of the business come from what they call vehicle sales. So that's the part of the business where Copot actually takes ownership of a car and then sells it through its own channel.

So that model is a lot more common in Copart's international businesses and again we talked about that last time mostly that's the case because the service model is established in the US but it's not yet widely adopted in most international markets and to show international customers the advantages of selling on Copart which again primarily comes from the liquidity that the auction offers they basically buy cars outright and then sell them as proof of the model in their own auction.

And basically the goal is that over time they can convert them into the fee or the service model which is a much higher margin business for Copart and this works quite well. International service revenue is up almost 20% while vehicle revenue is dropping close to 20%.

Now obviously you might ask yourself why is it good to see revenue drop in this case vehicle revenue but the reason is that that means international markets are in fact adopting the higher margin service model which is what you want to see.

实际上,在最近的一次财报电话会议上,他们以德国为例,因为德国的模式与美国的模式完全不同。在德国,当一辆车被判定为全损时,保险公司传统上会向保单持有人支付重置价值减去残值。然后保单持有人基本上保留这辆车,必须自己去卖。

这是一个相当糟糕的模式,因为到最后你手里仍然压着那辆全损车,还得自己处理出售的事。

Actually, in one of the latest earnings calls, they point out Germany as an example because Germany's model is completely different from the US model. So, when a car is deemed a total loss here, the insurer traditionally pays the policy holder the replacement value minus the Rex residual value.

Then the policy holder keeps the act basically and has to sell it themselves. And that's a pretty bad model because, you know, at the end you're still sitting on your total car and you have to deal with selling it yourself.

但不管怎样,Copart现在已经说服了德国一些最大的保险公司改用它的服务模式。由于Copart的市场份额不到10%,而且在欧洲实际上没有真正的竞争对手,这可能是一个巨大的机会,因为不存在美国那种双寡头格局——在美国,保险公司基本上总会把业务量分给两家。

而在这种情况下,未来所有的业务量和所有的增长都只会流向Copart。

But anyway, Copat has now convinced some of the biggest insurance companies in Germany to switch to its service model. And since Copat has less than 10% market share and actually no real competitor in Europe, this could be a huge opportunity because you don't have a duopoly which will get to in the US where basically insurers will always split the volume.

In this case, all the volume and all the growth is only going to copot in the future.

国际业务的利润率已经大幅上升,而美国EBIT——也就是息税前利润,只是营业利润的一个花哨说法——增长不到4%,并不特别令人振奋,而国际EBIT同比增长了50%,所以我们看到Copart国际业务的营业利润正在爆发式增长。

margins are already up significantly for the international business while US EBIT which is uh you know earnings before interest in taxes just a fancy term for operating profit it's up less than 4% which is not particularly inspiring while international EBIT was up 50% year-over-year so we're seeing an explosion in the operating profits from Copart's international business

接下来,我们不如继续这个话题,谈谈Copart的护城河。我认为我们之所以喜欢这家公司、以至于把它纳入投资组合,是有原因的,哪怕它只在组合里待了很短一段时间。另外,关于我们今天可能再次把Copart加回投资组合的决定,我认为对我们来说最重要的一点是要弄清楚它的护城河是否依然完好。

moving on here how about we go ahead and continue the conversation and talk about Copart's Moes. I think there's a reason we liked the business enough to include it in the portfolio even if it was only there for a short while.

And also regarding our decision to potentially add Copart again today back to the portfolio, I think the most important thing for us to know is whether the moat is still intact.

是的。我想说第一条护城河依然完好。我觉得这是现在人人都知道的Copart特点之一。这实际上就是Copart的土地,也就是他们拥有的所有场地。我确实听人说过,他们从没看过Copart,从没研究过这家公司,也完全不知道它拥有自己的土地,这有点好笑,因为我觉得几乎每一份Copart的推介一开始都会说,嘿,最棒的一点、最大的护城河就是他们拥有自己的土地,而竞争对手没有。

但你就是不能跳过这一部分,哪怕它听起来重复,因为Copart在美国与IAA形成双寡头格局,IAA是主要竞争对手,而IAA并不拥有自己的土地,它是租地的。等我们后面更详细地谈财务数据时就会看到,这是一个重要因素。

而且,还能被改造成大型报废车场的土地数量是有限的,由于Copart在全球拥有250个这样的场地,其中大多数显然在美国,任何竞争对手想要获得同等规模的扩张都越来越难。

Yeah. And I would say that the first one is still intact. And I feel like it's one of the things that everyone knows about Copart right now. And it's actually Copart's land. So, it's all the yards that they own.

I've literally heard people say they've never looked at Copart. They never looked at the company and they don't know anything about the fact that they own their land, which is kind of funny because I think like every copot pitch is initially starting with, hey, the one great thing, the one mode is they own their land and their competitors don't.

But you just can't skip that part even though it seems repetitive because again, Copart operates in the US in a duopoly with IAA. That's the main competitor and IAA doesn't own its land.

It's renting the land and as we will see later when we talk about the financials a bit more that is a major factor and there's also a limited amount of land that still can be turned into a massive salvage yard and since Copa owns 250 of such locations globally the majority of them obviously in the US it's increasingly hard to you know get the same sort of expansion in terms of yachts for any competitor.

所以在某种程度上,这又是一种IAA再也无法攻击的竞争优势,今天如此,5年后会更加如此。我还要提一点,在我看来这算是利好:Jada在他重新担任CEO后的第一次电话会议上——那大约是一个半月前——说Copart现在拥有的土地已经足够,不再需要花掉目前用于收购更多土地的那至少5亿美元。

我认为这是个相当好的信号,因为如果只看财务数据,5亿美元对Copart这样规模的公司来说也是相当可观的一笔钱。举个例子,去年Copart产生的自由现金流为12亿到13亿美元。所以即使这笔支出只是减半,也就是节省2.5亿美元,对Copart来说也是相当可观的一块。

So to some extent again this is a competitive advantage that IIEA can no longer attack and that's true today but it will also be even more true in 5 years time. And I should mention and this is kind of bullish in my opinion that Jada said in his first call back as a CEO which has happened about a month and a half ago that Copart now has enough land and no longer needs to spend at least this half a billion which it currently are spending to acquire more land.

So I think that's a pretty good sign because if you just look at the financials, $500 million is quite a significant amount even for a company the size of Copart. So for example, last year Copa generated free cash flow of 1.2 to 1.3 billion.

So even if you know the spend is just cut in half, which means $250 million of savings, that's quite a meaningful chunk for Copart.

第二条护城河是我们在研究过的许多企业中都见过的,就是市场平台的动态。他们在90年代中期推出了网站和拍卖,那是在eBay之后仅仅几年。在那个时候,可以说大多数报废车场还在线下进行拍卖,大概是一个拿着写字板的人在现场监督。

这就是为什么Copart在获取客户方面拥有巨大优势。它算是数字化的先行者。

And the second mode is something that we've seen in many businesses that we looked at and it's just about the marketplace dynamic. They launched a website and auctions in the mid '9s and just a couple years after eBay is when they did that.

And at that point, it's safe to say that most salvage yards were still running auctions in person with a guy on a clipboard probably overseeing things. And that's why Copart had a major advantage in onboarding customers. It was sort of a digital first mover.

我还记得我第一次研究Copart时,心里问自己,为什么甚至没有人尝试复制他们,连IAA——也就是他们的主要竞争对手——也是直到疫情期间才真正开始做在线拍卖,那几乎是25年、快30年之后了。

我觉得这很好地说明了那家公司长期以来管理得多么糟糕。

I still remember when I first looked at Copart and I kind of asked myself why no one even tried copying them even IA um which again is their main competitor only started really getting into online auctions during the pandemic so we're literally talking 25 almost 30 years later and I think that's just a pretty good example of how mismanaged that company has been for a very long time

总之,网站以及虚拟竞拍系统,这项创新被Copart变成了巨大的优势,因为竞拍者更多了,这就是你刚才描述的那种动态。竞拍者越多,中标价就比竞拍者少时更高,而更高的价格意味着保险公司能收回更多钱,也就意味着Copart成为保险公司处置车辆最赚钱的地方,这正是我们之前谈到的,而这又会带来更多保险公司,进而带来更多、更好的车源。

and anyway you know the website and also the virtual bidding system which has sort of been this innovation that Copart had turned into a massive advantage Because more biders and that's sort of the dynamic that you just described.

More bidders mean the winning bid goes higher than you know if you have fewer people bidding on an auction and higher prices mean the insurance company recovers more money which means Copart becomes the most profitable place for an insurer to dispose of a car which is what we talked about earlier and that brings in more insurers which in turn brings in more and better inventory for

最后但同样重要的是,当我们思考Copart的护城河,以及那些让它免受竞争冲击的优势时,我们还要考虑规模经济,尤其是得益于其场地网络的密度。基本上,网络越密集,当你需要拖走一辆车时,到下一个场地的距离就越短。

Well, and and last but not least, as we think about Coparts, Moes, and you know, the advantages that insulate them from competition, we have economies of scale to consider, especially thanks to the density of their yard network.

Basically, the denser the network, the shorter the distance to the next yard when you have to pick up and tow a car.

这有点像Domino's的模式,尽量在人口密集地区开设尽可能多的门店,以便尽可能靠近客户。配送时间不到几分钟。这种可达性本身就是一种优势。

And it's sort of like the Domino's model of trying to have as many locations as possible in population dense areas so that it's as close as you can possibly be. The delivery time is, you know, less than a few minutes. That sort of accessibility is an advantage.

是的。而在这个案例中,实际上两者兼有:既是成本优势,也关乎可靠性。我的意思是,上次我们谈到了卡特里娜飓风,那对 Copart 来说是一个改变游戏规则的事件。它基本上让数十万辆汽车处于报废状态。

虽然报废车辆通常对 Copart 来说是好事,但一次性涌入过多数量——在这类灾难事件中往往如此——对他们来说并不太好,因为你必须处理这些车辆。这意味着你必须租用额外的场地,必须雇用第三方服务,还要大量加班。

而显然,这一切发生的时候,场地、第三方服务等成本都比平时高得多。然后在短期内,这意味着所有这些车辆对 Copart 来说都是无利可图的业务量。

Yeah. And in this case, it's actually both it's a cost advantage, but it's also about reliability. I mean, last time I think we talked about Hurricane Katrina, which was a gamecher for Copart.

It basically left hundreds of thousands of vehicles in salvage condition. And while salvage vehicles are usually a good thing for copot, too much volume at once, which tends to happen in these catastrophe events, is not that good for them because you have to handle it.

And that means you have to lease extra yards, you have to hire third party services and work many overtime hours. And obviously all of that comes at a time when the costs for yards for third party services and so on are much higher than usual.

And then in the short term that means that you know all of these vehicles they're unprofitable volume for Copart

这就是为什么竞争对手,尤其是 IAA,当时不愿意多费力气去帮忙,而 Copart 选择承担损失,尽可能多、尽可能快地去帮忙。实际上我找到了 Copart 创始人 Willis Johnson 的一句话,他说他们想证明自己不仅是最好的运营商,也是最可靠的合作伙伴。

and that's why competitors and especially IAA didn't want to go the extra mile to help back then and Copart they chose to absorb the losses and help as much as they could and as fast as they could and actually I found a quote by Willis Johnson who is the founder of Copart and he said that they wanted to prove they're not only the best operator but also the most reliable partner

而且我实际上认为,如果你看看 Copart 现在还有多少客户,以及他们如何坚持选择 Copart,你仍然能看到 20 年后它当年积累的信誉,因为那场飓风发生在 2005 年。这也恰好是在 Copart 将整个业务转向线上拍卖之后的一两年。

所以这也是对新系统的一次巨大考验,而结果很好:数万辆水淹受损的汽车涌入市场,Copart 的数字基础设施让全球买家能够对这些汽车出价,正如你之前所说,这基本上原本是一个全国性的业务,而现在突然间你有了整个世界,国际上有买家来买这些车,所有这些都帮助绕过了实体拍卖场地的物流瓶颈。

在那之后,Copart 建立了他们所谓的灾难响应团队。基本上就是一个灾难团队,可以在这些飓风来临时提供更深入、更快速的帮助。

and I actually think if you look at how many customers Copart still has and how they stick with them. You can still see that credit that it gave to them 20 years later because again the hurricane happened in 2005.

This was also just a year or two after Copa shifted the entire business to online auctions. So it was also a huge test for the new system and it worked out well with tens of thousands of flood damaged cars pouring into the market and Copat's digital infrastructure allowed buyers globally to bid on cars which as you said before was basically a national operation right now suddenly you have the entire world internationally you have buyers for those cars and all of that helped bypassing the logistical bottleneck of physical auction lots and after that cop established what they call a cat respon on Steam.

So, a catastrophe team basically that can help further and faster when these hurricanes come up.

所以,这是 Copart 在此后近二十年里能够赢得市场份额的主要原因之一。保险公司信任 Copart,知道它不仅是出售业务量的最佳场所,也是在危机时刻可靠的公司。

And so, this was a major part of why Copart was able to win market share for almost two decades after that. Insurers trusted Copart and knew it was not only the best place to sell volume, but also a reliable company in times of crisis.

Copart 现在有什么不同?因为市场上有一种说法,认为市场份额的动态已经改变,而 Copart 的主要竞争对手 IAA 现在正在赢得市场份额。

What is different now about Copart? Because there is the market narrative that the market share dynamics have changed and IAA which is Copart's chief competitor is now gaining market share.

大约 5 年前,Copart 的土地容量还比 IAA 多 70%。现在这个数字接近 25%。我还要补充一点,如果你问自己,Daniel 5 分钟前刚说过土地容量即使在未来也会是 Copart 的一大优势。

显然,通过租赁来扩大土地与通过购买来扩大土地或场地之间是有区别的,对吧?尽管如此,我得说,显然他们在过去几年做得相当不错。

About 5 years ago, Copart still had 70% more land capacity than IAA. Now that number is close to 25%. And I should add, if you ask yourself, well, Daniel just said 5 minutes ago that the land capacity will be a major mode for Copart even in the future.

Obviously, there's a difference between scaling land because you lease it compared to scaling land or yards because you buy them, right? Nevertheless, I got to say apparently they did a quite good job for the last few years.

但我认为市场现在害怕的是 Copart 在美国保险业务量上的放缓。基本上就是业务的核心。其中一部分可以庆幸地得到解释,因为今年没有重大飓风,这对社会来说是好事。对 Copart 来说就没那么好了。

我的意思是,说到激励问题。但即使排除自然灾害,整体同比降幅也会在 3 到 5 个百分点左右。

But I think what the market is scared about right now is Cobat's slowdown in the US insurance volume. So basically the core of the business. Part of that can be explained fortunately because there were no major hurricans this year, which is good for society.

It's not that good for Copart. I mean talk about incentives. But even if you exclude natural disasters, the overall decline year-over-year would be about 3 to 5 percentage points.

而且当 Copart 的业务量在下降时,IAA 的业务量实际上增长了 10%。所以不仅仅是报废的汽车变少了,还在于 IAA 正在从 Copart 手中夺取份额,正如你提到的,这种情况可以说在 20 到 25 年里都没有发生过。

And while Copart's volumes are declining, IA's volumes have actually been up 10%. So it's not only that fewer cars are being totaled, it's also that IAA is taking share from Copart, which as you mentioned didn't happen for, let's say, 20 to 25 years.

那么那里发生了什么变化,让保险公司突然转向 IAA?我的意思是,我们一直在讨论的那些优势似乎仍然大体上还在。我不认为 Copart 有什么根本性的改变。

So what changed there that you have insurers suddenly switching over to IIAa? I mean it seems like the modes we've been discussing are still largely in place. I don't think anything fundamentally has changed with Copart.

这再次是 Copart 的主要优势之一,即他们拥有这种网络效应,强化了整个飞轮。那么,到底发生了什么变化?保险公司有什么特别的原因想要选择 IAA 而不是 Copart 吗?

which is again one of the major benefits of Copart is that they have this network effect reinforcing the entire flywheel. So yeah, what really has changed? Is there any reason in particular that insurers are looking to choose IAA over Copart?

这基本上就是重新审视 Copart 时的大问题,对吧?有什么改变了吗?有没有什么我遗漏的地方,让 Copart 变得脆弱?我得承认,虽然存在问题——我们稍后会谈到——但并没有什么重大改变。

That was basically the big question for revisiting Copart, right? Has anything changed? Is there anything that I I sort of missed where Copart is vulnerable? And I got to admit while there are problems and we'll get to them that anything major has actually changed

所以 Copart 和 IAA 之间历史上的业务量分配相当不均衡。通常保险公司不会在两者之间五五分成,而更像是 75% 的业务量流向 Copart,25% 的业务量流向 IAA,仅仅是因为我们之前讨论过的 Copart 的所有优势。

So the historical split of volumes between Copart and IA is quite uneven. So usually an insurre is not splitting 50/50 between the two but more like 75% of the volume goes to Copart and then 25% of the volume goes to IAA just due to all the advantages of Copart that we have discussed earlier.

他们之所以一开始就分配业务量,而不是把 100% 的业务量都交给更好的运营商也就是 Copart,是因为他们不想制造垄断,因为显然在那种情况下 Copart 会获得显著的定价权,可以提高对保险公司的收费,因为保险公司再也无法转移业务量了。

The reason why they split volume in the first place and they're not just giving 100% of the volume to the better operator which is Copart is that they don't want to create a monopoly because obviously in that case Copart would gain significant pricing power and could increase the fees for insurance companies because they couldn't shift the volume anymore.

而 Copart 面临的问题是,Progressive 刚刚成为美国最大的汽车保险公司,每年新增 250 万到 300 万份保单。

And the problem for Copart is that Progressive has just become the biggest US autosurer adding 2 and a half to 3 million policies per year.

嗯,我认为我们这里有一个非常有趣的结构,基本上在供给侧,供应商如此强大,以至于他们能够进行某种程度的默契串通,阻止 IAA 或 Copart 任何一方形成垄断,而不管他们承认与否,这似乎是故意为之的。

Well, I think it's a really interesting structure we have here where basically on the supply side, the suppliers are so strong that they're able to do a degree of of tacet collusion and prevent either IAA or Copart from developing monopoly and whether they admit it or not something that is seemingly being done intentionally.

但坏消息是,Copart 也不太可能赢得 Progressive,而 Progressive 是这里增长最快的玩家。

But the bad news is that Copart is also unlikely to win over Progressive and Progressive is the fastest growing player in town.

目前这是个问题。而且我认为你甚至可以更进一步说,这里的二阶效应是 Progressive 显然正在从其他保险公司那里赢得份额,而那些保险公司是 Copart 的客户。所以 Copart 基本上正在失去业务量,不仅是因为 Progressive 更倾向于 IAA,把更多业务量送给他们,还因为那些业务量来自 Copart 的保险客户。

所以他们正在把客户输给 Progressive,然后 Progressive 又把其中更多的业务量转移给 IAA。这就是 Copart 正在经历的那种双重打击。

>> That's a problem right now. And I think you could even go a step further and say the second order effect here is that Progressive is winning share from other insurers obviously which are Copart customers.

So Copilot is basically losing volume not only because you know progressive tilts more to IIA and send more of their volume over to them but also because that volume is coming from Copart's insurance customers.

So they are losing customers to progressive and then progressive shifts even more of that volume to IIA. That's sort of the the double whammy that Copart is experiencing there.

我认为他们合作了很长时间,IAA 基本上为 Progressive 提供了优先服务。所以他们为 Progressive 提供更快的车辆拖运时间和更好的存放位安排,而且 IAA 也愿意以相当低的利润率来运营 Progressive 的业务,这是最关键的部分。

what I think is that they have partnered for a very long time and IA has basically provided priority services to progressive. So they offer them faster vehicle pickup times and better storage slot placements and it's also willing to operate and that's the major part at quite a low margin on the progressive business.

所以我的印象是,Adair 至少间接提到,Copart 就是不愿意给 Progressive 与 IAA 非常相似的费率,因为他没有特别点名他们,但鉴于他们是唯一失去的业务量,而且我斗胆提一句,Copart 选择不与某一方做生意,这大概就是我听完那通电话后的结论。

So it was my impression that Adair indirectly at least mentioned that Copart simply wasn't willing to offer progressive very similar rates compared to IIA because he didn't particularly name them but given that they are the only lost volume and dare I mention that Copa chose not to do business with one party that's sort of the takeaway that I had coming out of that call

你甚至可以从利润率中看到,Progressive 带来的业务量似乎伴随着相当低的抽成率,因为 Copart 的订单业务板块利润率为 36%。

and you can even see in the margin that the progressive volume seems to come with quite low take rates because copa's order segment has a margin of 36%

如果你去看 IAA 的所有者 Ritchie Brothers 的财报,他们会说汽车业务板块的利润率大约在 15% 到 20% 之间,明显低于 Copart。

and if you go through the filings of Richie Brothers which is the owner of IAA they say that the auto segment is somewhere the 15 to 20% range so significantly lower than Coparts

当我听到这两家公司之间的利润率差异时,我首先想到的是贝索斯那句老话——你的利润率就是我的机会。但如果 IAA 愿意接受更低的利润率,那么作为股东,我会非常担心 Copart 和 IAA 之间在定价上出现一场逐底竞争。

when I hear about the profit margin difference between these two companies I think the first thing that comes to mind is that old Bezos quote about your margin is my opportunity but if IAA is willing to accept a lower margin then I would very much worry as a shareholder about there being a race to the bottom bottom on pricing between Copart and IA.

我认为正如巴菲特和芒格大概会说的那样,只需要一个无情的竞争对手,就能毁掉一门本来很出色的生意。所以,目前我们谈论的只是 Progressive,但如果其他保险公司出于类似原因开始把业务量转向 IAA 呢?那我们面临的问题就更大了。

And I think as Buffett and Munger would probably say, all it really takes is one ruthless competitor to ruin what is otherwise a wonderful business. And so, right now, we're only talking about Progressive, but what if other insurers started switching volume over to IIA for similar reasons? Then we have a bigger problem on our hands.

所以并不是 Copart 在收费上收得过高,而且正如我们之前所说,大部分费用是由买方支付的。所以你未必是在向保险公司多收费,而保险公司正是你可能失去大部分业务量的地方。

So it's not that Copart is overcharging for fees and also as we said earlier most of the fees are paid for on the buyer side. So you're not necessarily overcharging the insurance companies which is where you could lose most of your volume.

所以,我并不太担心其他保险公司会因为费用或价格之类的因素而开始选择 IAA 而非 Copart,因为 Progressive 选择 IAA 也是因为它能获得特殊待遇,而按定义来说 IAA 无法向太多客户提供这种待遇,而且我们之前讨论过的其他那些模式依然存在,我并不觉得它们会消失。

So, I'm not too worried that other insurers will start to choose IIA over Copart because of fees or price or any of that cuz again, Progressive chose IIA because they also get special treatment and sort of by definition IIA can't offer that to too many customers and you set up all the other modes that we discussed earlier.

I mean, they are still in place and I don't necessarily feel like they will

你仍然可以依赖 Copart,因为——如果你还不知道的话——他们拥有土地。我们基本上能做的就是看看有多少保险公司从 Copart 转向 IAA,而看起来过去青睐 Copart 的那些公司都没有这么做。

you can still rely on Copart since, in case you didn't yet know it, they own the land. all we can do basically is just look at hey how many insurance companies go over from Copart to IIA and it doesn't look like any of the ones that favored Copart in the past have done that.

然而,如果情况发生变化,你看到保险公司真的开始改换阵营,那对 Copart 就不利了,而且你很可能在事情真正发生之前无法察觉,而到那时它也已经反映在股价里了。

However, should that change and you see insurers actually changing sides, that would be not good for Copart and also you probably can't see that before it's actually happening and then it's also priced into the stock.

如果我作为股东来看这件事,我会觉得份额流失主要来自一个客户,这一点非常令人安心。而如果你看到这种情况来自多个客户,那可能只是 Copart 开始缓慢失去市场份额的漫长时期的开端。

I would think it's very reassuring that the share loss is primarily due to one customer if I were looking at this as a shareholder. And if you were seeing this coming from multiple customers, this might have been only the beginning of a long period in which Copart began to slowly lose market share.

即使他们在纸面上仍保持第一,这也肯定会打击股价,因为与可比数据相比,数字会显得很难看。我认为值得关注的是,保险市场在成为 Copart 过去几年相当强劲的逆风之后,是否会再次成为它的顺风。

And even if they stay number one on paper, it would certainly hurt the stock because the numbers would look terrible compared to the comps. And I think what will be interesting to see is whether the insurance market actually becomes a tailwind for Copart again after being a pretty strong headwind for the last few years.

有太多数据点显示投保车辆明显减少,这显然对 Copart 是一个相当糟糕的数据点。Copart 自己的数据也印证了这一趋势:今年路上的汽车比去年多,但投保的汽车下降了约 4%。

There just many data points showing that significantly fewer vehicles are insured and there's obviously a pretty bad data point for Copart and Copart's own data is also proving this trend so there are more cars on the road this year than last year up to Copart but insured cars have dropped about 4%.

尽管 IAA 在增长,但这主要是一个 Progressive 转移业务的故事,总体而言这里确实涉及一个周期性因素,即路上投保的汽车少了很多。

Even though IRA is growing, this is primarily a story of progressive shifting over generally there simply is a cyclical factor here involved with a lot fewer cars by actually on the road insured.

我想问你,你是否看到你提到的这一趋势有任何逆转的迹象,还是说它只会在未来几年变得更糟,给 Copart 的业务量带来更大压力?

let me ask you, are you seeing any signs of this trend that you mentioned reversing or is it something that will only get worse in the years to come, putting more pressure on Copart's volumes?

也许这些保险费率会成为 Copart 的顺风。但我相当有信心,它很可能仍会是 Copart 的客户。Copart历来有CEO任期非常长的传统。

perhaps these, you know, insurance rates become a tailwind for Copart. But I'm quite confident most likely it will be a cobalt customer. Copart has this history of very long CEO tenures.

所以,今年他们解雇Mike Tomlin时,确实令人震惊。但在创始人Willis Johnson担任CEO近30年之后,由Jay Adair接任,随后执掌公司14年。

So, it was a real shock when they fired Mike Tomlin this year. But after Willis Johnson, the founder, served as CEO for almost 30 years, you had Jay Adair take over and then run the company for 14 years.

而他自1989年起就在Copart担任其他职务。所以与Copart的渊源相当长。

And he's somebody who had been with Copart doing other positions since 1989. So pretty long connection to Copart.

经验非常丰富。之后是Jeff Liao,他在与Jay共同担任联席CEO两年后,于2022年接任。而如今仅仅四年之后,Jay Adair将再次接任,Liao将卸任。

Uh plenty of experience. And then you had Jeff Liao who took over in 2022 after serving as co-CEO with Jay for two years. And now just four years later, Jay Adair will take over again and Lial will step down.

据我所知,Jeff甚至将不再进入董事会。所以他会有某种角色,比如特别顾问。但我并不太确定那意味着什么。但要说清楚Copart的CEO是如何产生的,这个决定究竟是如何做出的,还是有点难以弄明白。

And as far as I know, Jeff will not even be a part of the board anymore. So he'll have something of a role like a special adviser. But I'm not really sure what that means. But getting to to Copart CEO is it is a bit difficult to figure out how exactly that decision has been made.

Jay安排了一次电话会议,这基本上就是我今天整个录音中一直提到的那次电话会议,介于第三季度财报电话会议和上周第四季度财报电话会议之间。作为上市公司三十年里,他们从未这样做过。

I mean, J scheduled a call and this is basically the call I'm referring to throughout this recording today between the Q3 earnings call and last week's Q4 earnings call. They never did this in the three decades of being a public company.

总之,在那次电话会议上,Jay基本上特意说明,他和Jeff就这一决定达成了一致,他们仍然是朋友,他们住在同一条街上,诸如此类。

Anyway, on that call, Jaya basically made sure to say that he and Jeff agreed on the decision that they are still friends and they live on the same street and all of that stuff.

但尽管这些都是事实,很可能实际情况是,如果事情进展顺利,我认为Jeff不会卸任。我也认为,Jay和Willis Johnson觉得公司在某种程度上管理不善,而Jay是能够扭转局面的人。

But while that's all true, probably fact of the matter is that I don't think Jeff would have stepped down if things had gone great. And I also think that Jay and Willis Johnson thought the company has been mismanaged to some extent and Jay is the one who could turn it around.

否则,为什么不让两个人都参加电话会议呢?我认为那在一定程度上会有帮助。听起来Jay也觉得公司有一些东西需要修复。

Otherwise, why don't you have both people on the call? I think that would have helped to some extent. It also sounded like Jad thought there's some stuff that needs fixing at the company.

但没错,消息传出后市场下跌了8%,这有点令人意外,因为Jay曾将公司的市值从20亿美元提升到300亿美元。

But yeah, the market dropped 8% when the news came out and that is kind of surprising since Jay took the company from a market cap of $2 billion to $30 billion.

所以,你会以为,这位资深CEO兼公司缔造者回归,本应引发更多兴奋,尤其是他还表示自己不会做过渡性CEO。他计划留任十年甚至更久。

So, you would think that there should be more excitement about this veteran CEO and company builder coming back and especially since he also said he will not be a transitionary CEO.

He's planning to stay for a decade or even longer.

我认为,更多是因为这次交接感觉像是一种承认,即公司的事情进展得并不顺利,而在情绪本就不佳的时候,这显然没有帮助。

I believe it was more about the fact that this transition felt like an admission that things were not going that well at the company and that doesn't help obviously when the sentiment is bad anyway

而且,当我们报道这家公司时,它已经下跌了约30%。在这个决定做出的时候,股价跌得更多,情绪也更糟。而到现在,我应该说,股价已经大幅回升,较其低点上涨了约25%。

and again when we cover the company it was already down like 30%. back when you know this decision has been made um the stock was down even further and the sentiment was even worse and by now I should say the stock has recovered quite significantly it's up about 25% from its lows

而且,当消息刚传出、市场做出反应时,并不立即清楚Jay是否真的会长期留任,还是基本上只做一个过渡性CEO,那肯定不会是好的信号,因为那样你就需要寻找新的CEO,那更会是一个信号,表明我们不信任Jeff Liao以及他对公司的作为。

and also when the news first dropped and the market reacted it wasn't immediately clear whether Jad would actually stay on for the long term or basically would just you know be a transitional CEO which definitely wouldn't have been a great sign because then you would need to look for a new CEO it would even more be a sign of we didn't trust Jeff Liao and what he with the company

现在情况有点不同了,而且Jay也再次相当明确地表示,他认为当前关于Copart的说法就是错的,他非常强硬地反驳了某些客户对Copart不满或可能转向竞争对手的说法。

now that's a bit different and you know ADA has also been quite clear again that he thinks the current narrative on Copart is just wrong and he pushed very hardly back against the idea that some customers are unhappy with Copart or likely to switch to competitors

而且也是在那次电话会议上,他提到,至少在同等程度上,花在游艇上的开支已不再必要。所以我认为未来我们会看到很多东西,只是当时并不太清楚那具体会是什么。

and it was also during that call that he mentioned that spending on yachts is no longer necessary to at least the same extent so I think there's a lot of stuff that we will see in the future wasn't too clear about what that will actually

我很好奇,Adair 有没有进一步谈到未来的资本配置会是什么样子?我之所以这么问,是因为自我们上次研究 Copart 以来最重要的变化之一,就是他们开始大规模回购股票。

I'm really curious, did Adair say anything more about what capital allocation will look like going forward? And the reason I ask is because one of the most important changes since the last time we looked at Copart is that they started buying back stock massively.

这可能是一个非常积极的信号,尤其是考虑到他们在回购方面有着极其出色的过往记录,做得非常非常好,而且对股东具有增值效应。

And that could be a really positive signal, especially given their fantastic track record with doing buybacks very, very well in a way that's accreative to shareholders.

所以,在连续五年完全没有回购之后,Copart 启动了它历史上规模最大的回购计划,至少按绝对美元金额来看是这样。

And so after actually having five straight years of no buybacks, Copart has initiated the biggest buyback program that it's ever done, at least in absolute dollar terms.

因此,Copart 在过去两个季度回购了超过 16 亿美元的股票,其中超过 14 亿美元发生在最后一个季度,价格看起来相当接近底部。

And so Copart bought back more than $1.6 billion of stock in the last two quarters with more than $1.4 billion of that coming in the last quarter at what seems like fairly rock bottom prices.

所以基本上,管理层是在告诉你,他们认为这只股票便宜得惊人。我们在社区里的许多演示以及活动中,都把 Copart 当作如何进行回购的范例。

So basically what management is telling you is that they think that this stock is fabulously cheap. We use Copart as an example for how to make buybacks um in many of the presentations that we had in our community and also at events.

所以他们终于又开始买入了,这对这家公司来说很可能是一个非常好的信号,说明这只股票很可能被低估了。正如你所说,上一次真正有意义的回购发生在 15 年前。所以在很长一段时间里,他们认为这只股票很可能被高估了,至少相对于他们本可以投入资本的其他去处而言是这样,而这些去处某种程度上一直是游艇之类的东西。

So finally they started buying again which probably especially for this company is a very good signal that the stock is most likely undervalued and as you said the last really meaningful buyback happened 15 years ago.

So um for the longest time they thought the stock likely is overvalued at least compared to where they otherwise could invest at capital which again to some extent has been in yachts for example.

所以我认为,总体而言,对我而言 Copart 很大程度上是一个信任管理团队的故事,既信任他们的资本配置,也信任他们做出正确决策,为 Copart 在电动车、自动驾驶汽车以及国际扩张方面的未来做好布局。

So I think generally to me Copart is very much a story of trusting the management team both in capital allocation and also in making the right decisions to position Copart for a future of EVs, AVs and you know international expansion.

说到这个,管理团队的另一个变化是 Jen PCO 被提升为公司总裁,她此前负责 Copart 的英国业务,那是他们规模最大、最成熟的国际市场。我认为这又一次说明了国际扩张的重要性。

Speaking of which, another change in the management team is that Jen PCO has been promoted to president of the company and she ran Copart's UK business previously, which is the largest and their most established international market.

And I think this is just another point to the importance of the international expansion.

所以,如果你问我未来他们会把大部分资金投在哪里,我认为相当大的一部分很可能会投向国际业务。说到 Copart 的增长机会,随着 Adair 回归,我们现在应该预期会有哪些战略转变?

So, if you ask me where will they invest most of their money in the future, I think a significant chunk will likely go to the international business. Speaking of growth opportunities for Copart, with Adair coming back, what strategic shifts should we expect now?

我的意思是,你刚才提到了国际业务。所以我猜想,这对他以及整个管理团队来说会成为一个越来越重要的重点。看起来,除了核心保险业务量整体回归均值之外,Adair 想聚焦的有三大支柱。

I mean, you just mentioned the international business. So, I suspect that that will become an increasingly important focus for him and and the management team as a whole. It seems that there are three pillars that Adair wants to focus on besides a general reversion to the mean in the core insurance volume.

所以,第一个就是你刚才提到的、经常被讨论的国际业务。国际收入同比增长 14%。服务收入增长尤其迅速,而国际营业利润率——这可以说是最重要的一点——去年提高了 2.5 到 3 个百分点,而且这种情况目前已经持续了相当长一段时间。

So, the first is the often discussed as you just mentioned international business. Again, international revenue is up 14% year-over-year. Service revenue grew especially rapidly and the international operating margin and this is sort of the most important point increased 2 and a half to three percentage points last year and that happened for quite a long while right now.

所以 JL 确实指出,在德国的突破让他们有信心,现在可以把这当作蓝图,进入其他市场,并在那里启动服务模式。再说一次,目前那里的收入总体增长了 18%。所以如果我们假设它平均每年能增长 15%,那会为合并后的 Copart 增长贡献略低于 3 个百分点,而对利润的贡献还要更多一些,因为你知道,我们看到的利润率扩张。

So JL really pointed out that the breakthrough in Germany makes them confident that they can now use that as a blueprint to go into other markets and sort of initiate the service model there.

Again, currently the revenue there's up 18% total. So if we assume it can grow 15% per year on average that contributes a bit under 3 percentage points to consolidated copit growth and a bit more than that to the bottom line because of you know the margin expansion that we see.

第二个增长引擎来自非保险业务。正如我们上次谈到的,Copart 有一项名为 blue car 的业务,面向车队和商业客户,基本上提供资产回收、仲裁和车况报告等定制化服务。

A second growth engine is what happens in the non- insurance business. So Copart has as we talked about last time what is called blue car which is for fleet and commercial accounts which basically provides tailored services such as asset recovery, arbitration and condition reporting.

此外,他们还有一项名为 cashforcars.com 的业务,就是直接从公众手中收购车辆。这曾经是一个增长驱动力,但最近已经放缓。

And then they also have what's called cashforcars. com which is just for buying cars directly from the public. And this used to be a growth driver but it has slowed down recently.

它并没有对为何会出现这种情况给出太多解释。但他确实说了我们上次还谈到的另一项业务,是他们所称的 Purple Wave,这是一个面向重型设备、农业机械、工程车辆等类似物品的在线拍卖网站。他们其实在不久前收购了它。

And it didn't give much insight into why that has been the case. But he did say Another thing that we also talked about last time is what they have called Purple Wave, which is an online auction site for heavy equipment, agriculture, construction vehicles, those sort of stuff. They actually acquired it a while ago.

然后是 NPA,即 natural powersport auctions 的缩写,做的也是同样的事。所以,我们说的又是拍卖,面向摩托车、水上运动车辆如摩托艇之类,甚至还有雪地摩托、房车和高尔夫球车。

And then NPA, which is short for natural powersport auctions, which is doing the same. So, we're talking auctions again for motorbikes, water sport vehicles like jet skis or something like that, and even snowmobiles and RVs and golf carts.

最后一个增长支柱则是他们所称的技术服务。Copart 基本上运营着它所称的 title express,这是一款用于从银行或车主处取得车辆所有权凭证、然后偿清未结贷款的产品。这属于一种介于保险业务和整个整车业务之间的商业模式。

And then the last growth pillar would be what they call technology services. So Copart basically operates what it calls title express and that's a product for getting the vehicle title released from the bank or the owner then paying off the outstanding loan.

And that's part of a business model that sits somewhere between the insurance and the whole car business.

我认为诚实的回答是我不确定。我认为该板块的疲软存在周期性因素,主要是至少优质三年期租赁归还车辆的供应量处于十多年来的最低水平。

I think the honest answer would be I'm not sure. I think there's a cyclical element to the weakness in the sector, which is mainly that the supply of at least quality three-year lease returns is at its lowest in over a decade.

我不确定 Copart 的直接计划是什么,但也许我们可能会看到一次分拆或类似的动作,因为看起来 Copart 在整车业务上并不具备它在核心残值车业务中那样的模式和声誉。

And then I'm not sure what Copart plans are directly, but perhaps we could see a spin-off or something similar because it appears that Cop just doesn't have the same sort of mode and reputation in whole cost as it has in the core salvage business.

因为在残值车业务中,你要面对的是 IIA,他们在土地、流动性以及国际买家基础方面都占优。但到了整车业务,那完全是一套不同的竞争格局。

Um because again in your own salvage you're up against IIA and they win on land, they win on liquidity and they also win on the international buyer base. But then when it comes to the whole car business that's just a completely different competitive set.

所以你要面对的是 Manheim,这家公司我们上次也用过它的一些数据,还有众多已经经营了几十年的实体拍卖网络,人们真正想买一辆好车、而非事故车时就会想到它们,而事故车通常正是你在 Copart 上买到的东西。

So you're up against you know Mheim which is a company that we also used for some data um last time and just many of these physical auction networks that are in the business for decades that people know when they actually want to buy a good car which is not wrecked which is usually what you get on Copart.

所以我不知道,我可以想象公司会发生一些更结构性的变化。我想在几个季度前的一次电话会上,当时仍担任 CEO 的 Jeff Liaw 被问到,既然 Copart 在消费者中并不知名,品牌是否需要换一个,而且他们主要为人所知的是事故车和受损车,他说也许他们需要某种品牌重塑,那可能又是一次分拆,但这只是我个人的纯粹猜测。

So I don't know I could imagine some more structural change to the company. I think some quarters ago in a call Jeff Leao who was back then still CEO was asked whether the brand would need to be a different one since again Cobat is not well known to consumers and if so they're again primarily known for wrecked and damaged cars and he said that perhaps they would need a sort of rebrand and that could be again a spin-off but that's just pure speculation on my end.

那么 Purple Wave 和 National Power Sports Auctions(NPA)到底怎么样了?它们也被这个相当艰难的市场环境拖累了吗,还是表现良好?

Well, so what's the deal with Purple Wave and National Power Sports Auctions, NBA NPA? Did they also get dragged down by this pretty tough market environment or are they performing well?

遗憾的是,Copart 并未披露它们的具体数字,但他们确实提到,专门为 Purple Wave 扩充了销售团队,并做出了一个战略性决定,将业务扩展到全美范围,优先发展 GMV 最高的市场。

Unfortunately, Copa doesn't disclose specific numbers for them, but they did mention that they expanded the sales force for Purple Wave specifically and made sort of a strategic decision to expand the business coast to coast, prioritizing the highest GMV market.

所以我只能假设这意味着该业务表现良好,或者至少是对该业务未来的信心。但它似乎也不是核心重点,因为 Adair 在电话会上公开表示过,他还没有在这项业务上花太多时间,会先专注于核心保险业务,然后再随着时间推移转向 Purple Wave、NPA 这类业务。

So I just assume this means the business is doing well or at least a believing in the future of the business. But it doesn't appear to be a core focus either because Adair again has publicly said on the call.

He didn't yet spend much time on that business and would focus on the core insurance business first and then over time go to you know purple wave NPA and those sorts of things.

那就是,就在几天前有传言称 Copart 或许有意收购 CCC Intelligent Solutions,我承认我对这家公司了解甚少,但听起来它或许能帮助 Copart 业务中的数据方面,所以这笔交易可能与 Adair 在 7 月与投资者电话会上所做的那些含糊评论之一有关。

and and that is that just a couple of days ago there was a rumor spreading that Copart is perhaps interested in buying CCC intelligent solutions and admittedly it's a company I know very little about but it sounds like perhaps it could help with the data aspect of Copart's business and so the deal might be related to one of these vague comments that Adair made in his July call with investors.

不过,我们应该说明,至少在本期录制时,这笔潜在收购还只是传言。我认为它之所以出现,是因为彭博社报道称 Copart 正在与 CCC 洽谈。

Although, we should say that at the time of this recording at least, the potential acquisition is just a rumor. Um, I think was started because Bloomberg reported that Copart is in talks with CCC.

而 Copart 的管理层给我的印象不像是会为这样一笔交易出价过高的人,如果私募股权公司已经在竞争,他们可能不得不这样做。

And Copart's management doesn't strike me as sort of people who would overpay for such a deal, which they might need to if PE firms are already in competition.

总结一下,Copart 的核心业务显然依赖于保险公司决定将车辆报废而非维修。但现在 Copart 想要收购的,恰恰是那家帮助保险公司判断一辆车是否报废的公司。

To recap, Copart's core business is clearly dependent on insurers deciding to total cars rather than repair them. But then now you have Copart wanting to buy the company that essentially helps insurers to decide whether a car is totaled or not.

我认为 Copart 不会有意或公然影响算法,促使 CCC 将更多车辆标记为全损,尽管这样做对其业务有利,因为那听起来非常违法,会摧毁 CCC 的中立性和可信度,从而实际上摧毁其整个产品。

I assume Copart wouldn't intentionally or blatantly influence the algorithm to push CCC to label more cars as being totaled, even though that would be good for their business because that sounds very illegal and would destroy CCC's neutrality and credibility and and thereby really its entire product.

我想问你的是,他们收购 CCC 究竟想获得什么?我认为第一个潜在优势是更快的周期时间,因为在场天数对 Copart 和 IIA 这类公司来说是最重要的指标之一,而当 CCC 的全损触发直接将成本接入 Copart 的调度时,这些天数显然可以缩短。

my question for you is what exactly do they want to gain by buying CCC? I think the first potential advantage is faster cycle time because days in the yards is one of the most important metrics for companies like Copart and IIA and those could obviously be reduced when CCC's total loss trigger directly wires cost to Copart's dispatch.

CCC 拥有数百万条历史理赔记录,而 Copart 拥有其中数百万辆车的实际拍卖结果。因此,我能理解为什么两者结合后,这或许会成为他们能构建的、用于预测受损车辆能拍出多少钱的最佳商业模式。

the CCC has millions of historical claims and Copart has the actual auction outcomes for millions of those cars. And so, I can see why combined that would be maybe the best business model that they could build for predicting what a damaged car will fetch.

鉴于更高的拍卖回报使全损更有利可图,更准确的模型会带来更多全损。我确实理解你关于它如何融入 Copart 现有飞轮的观点。

Given that higher auction returns make totaling more attractive, a more accurate model surfaces more total losses. I do see your point on on how it can fit into the existing Copart flywheel.

它也会起到一种天然对冲的作用,因为它的运作方式与 Copart 恰好相反。因此,如果全损频率例如持续攀升,Copart 获胜,而 CCC 的维修业务量萎缩。但如果情况逆转,那么 CCC 的维修业务就会繁荣,而 Copart 的供给则会收紧。

it will also serve as a sort of natural hatch because it works the exact other way than copot. So if total loss frequency for example keeps climbing, cop wins and CCC's repair volume shrinks.

But if that reverses, then you have CCC's repair business boom and cop supply tightening.

所以显然,由于 Copart 会是业务中大得多的部分,你知道,这只是一个小对冲,但至少存在这样一种动态,让你能看到这笔收购带来某种优势。

So obviously since copot would be the much larger part of the business, you know, it's a small hedge, but at least the sort of dynamic where you could see some sort of advantage from that acquisition.

无论哪种情况,让这件事引人注目的是,这将是 Copart 迄今为止最大的交易。作为参考,Purple Wave 那笔交易在数亿美元区间,而 NPA 那家摩托车拍卖业务估计也在同一区间。

所以,这至少会是一笔 45 亿美元的交易,基本上相当于 Copart 的全部现金储备,尽管我相信他们会为这笔收购筹集一些债务,而不是烧掉所有现金。

what would make this remarkable either way is that this would be by far the biggest deal Copart has ever done. For context the purple wave deal was in the $und00 million range and for NPA that motorbike auction business that was estimated to be around in that same range as well.

So, this would be a minimum of a $4.5 billion deal, which is essentially Copart's entire cash pile, although I'm sure they would raise some debt for the acquisition instead of burning all their cash.

从历史上看,Copart 不是那种喜欢举债的公司,但显然在这种情况下,他们需要这么做,因为你肯定不会为了做一笔收购就烧光全部现金储备。

And historically, Cobalt is not the type of company that likes to raise debt, but obviously in this case, they would need to because you definitely not burn through all of your cash pile just to make an acquisition.

另外再提一次那场电话会,他确实在那场电话会上提到,如果合适的机会出现,他也会为此筹集资金。所以他会对此持开放态度。你知道,这只是猜测,但也许他当时说那番话时心里想的就是 CCC。

And also referencing the a dare call one last time, he did mention on that call that if the right opportunity comes up, he would also raise that. So he would be open to it. And you know, it's just a speculation, but perhaps he had his mind on CCC when he said that back then.

我其实对这只股票非常好奇,因为前面提到过,我们之前曾短暂持有过 Copart。所以,我们两人长期都看好这项业务,而如今价格比去年还低,如果你最终再次推荐买入它,而且这次可能是长期持有,我也不会太意外。

And I'm actually I'm really curious about this one because as mentioned earlier, we briefly owned Copart before. So, we're both fans of the business long term, and with the price being even lower than it was last year, I wouldn't be too surprised if you ended up recommending buying it again and maybe this time for the long haul.

所以,说了这么多,我也记得我们当初买入这项业务,主要是出于我们对公司质量的判断,而预期回报上次在你的模型中只是勉强达到我们 12% 的目标,也就是门槛收益率。

So, with all that said, I also remember that we primarily bought the business due to our perception of the company's quality and the expected return though just barely met the 12% target that we have or hurdle rate in your model last time.

你觉得以这些价格买入该股,是否更有可能带来超过我们门槛收益率的回报?嗯,在这种情况下,我们显然必须说,不只是价格下跌了,基本面没有变化。但实际上你的营收增长大幅下降,而价格也随之调整了,对吧?

Do you feel like buying the stock at these prices is more likely to deliver a return that clears our hurdle rate? Well, in this case, we clearly have to say that it was not only the price that went down, but the fundamentals were unchanged.

But you actually had revenue growth come down significantly and the price adjusted, right?

在这种情况下,如果只看每股价格,该股可能看起来比一年前更有吸引力,因为更便宜了,但增长也放缓了。所以,我更新了我做的 DCF 模型,结果我得说并不完全令人信服。

In this case, the stock might look more attractive because it's cheaper than a year ago if you just look at how much a share costs, but growth also slowed down. So, I've updated the DCF model that I did and the result is not totally convincing I got to say.

我的意思是,总营收增长大约 5% 到 6%,与历史相比偏低,但目前也接近于零。得益于一些回购,EPS 增长 9%,再加上一些轻微的利润率扩张——你知道,Copart 基本上在过去二三十年里一直如此——那么从今天的价格出发,假设退出倍数为 20,预期回报大约会是 10%。

I mean, a total revenue growth of about 5 to 6% which is low compared to the history, but it's also close to none right now. an EPS growth of 9% thanks to some buybacks and then some slight margin expansion which um you know Copart has seen basically throughout the last two or three decades then the expected return would be about 10% from today's prices assuming an exit multiple of 20

如果只看历史,这或许显得便宜,但我确实认为该股已经被重新估值,在某种程度上我们不会再看到 40 或 50 倍的倍数了,我认为那不太可能。

which again if you just look at the history it might seem cheap but I do think the stock has been repraised and to some extent we won't see multiples of 40 or 50x again I think that's kind of unlikely

你解出这项业务的增长率。所以,本质上就是市场目前根据今天给这项业务的估值价格,预期Copart所能实现的增长率。

you solve for the growth rate of the business. So, essentially the growth rate the market currently expects Copa to achieve based on the price that the market values the business at today.

现在,鉴于我在常规 DCF 中的增长率假设一直是中个位数,而结果是该股今天或多或少定价合理,那么根据反向 DCF,市场目前为实现高个位数到低双位数回报所预期的增长率约为 5%,这应该不会太令人意外。

Now, given that my growth rate assumption in the normal DCF has been in the mid single digits and the results have been that the stock is more or less fairly priced today, it shouldn't come as a major surprise that the growth rate the market currently expects for a high singledigit to low double-digit return based on the reverse DCF is about 5%.

简单给大家做个概括,我认为结论是:如果未来5年保持中个位数增长,你可能可以预期8%到10%的回报,再加上回购之类的因素。

Just to give folks a little easy summary, I think it would be that at a mids singledigit growth rate over the next 5 years, you could probably expect an 8 to 10% return complemented by buybacks and things like that.

而如果Copart恢复到两位数的营收增长,你可能会看到年化中高十几个百分点的非常有吸引力的回报。

And should Copart return to doubledigit topline growth, you would probably see a very compelling return in the mid to high teens on an annualized basis.

所以,如果Copart基本维持当前的增长率,回报大概会与市场持平,没什么特别的,而这正是我们说一只股票估值合理时的真正含义,而且是在当前几乎接近于零的增长率下。

And so if Copart basically stays at current growth rates, returns will be probably in line with the market, nothing special, which is really what we mean when we say that a stock is fairly valued and at current growth rates, which are close to nothing basically.

显然,未来几年你会大幅跑输市场,但没错,我认为目前看起来就是这样。在这种情况下,我认为他们真正实现并回到这些两位数增长率的可能性算是高的。所以,我大概会说有40%的可能性会发生。

而基准情形,也就是中个位数回报,同样是40%,然后还有20%的可能性是他们实际上停留在0到3%的增长率。

Obviously, you would massively underperform the market in the next couple of years, but yeah, I think that's what it currently looks like. In this case, I think the likelihood of them actually achieving and going back to these doubledigit growth rates is kind of high.

So, I would probably say there's, you know, a 40% likelihood that happens. And the base case, which would be mid single digit return, is also 40% and then you have a 20% likelihood of them actually staying in this 0 to 3% growth rate.

所以我认为,对于那些非常喜欢这项业务、一直想拥有它、并且觉得现在是个好机会的人来说,这很可能是一个相当不错的机会,因为我们正处在这些信号低点。

So I think it likely is a pretty good opportunity for people who very much like the business, always wanted to own it and sort of feel like now is a good opportunity because we are at these signal lows.

就我个人而言,我还没到那一步。我不觉得Copart是那种当我看着我们投资组合里其他持仓时会立刻跳出来吸引我的机会,让我马上觉得得卖掉其中一家公司,然后促成这笔交易、买入Copart。

Personally, I'm not quite there yet. I don't feel like Copart is the opportunity that now stands out to me when I look at the rest of our portfolio where I immediately feel like we got to sell you know one of the companies then make it happen and buy Copart

因为例如从最大输家那一期节目里,我的主要收获之一就是,我们在那些营收下滑、或者至少营收增长率下滑的企业上做得并不太好,而我认为我确实理解Copart的原因所在,我们刚刚看到管理层亮出了一些黄旗,比如突然的CEO更换,然后对新CEO Jadair将如何改变业务的说法或多或少有些含糊。

because one of my major takeaways from for example the biggest loser episode is that we did not do too well on businesses where the revenue is declining or at least the growth rate of the revenue is declining and what I believe I do understand the reasons for Copart we just saw the management raising some yellow flags with you know the sudden CEO change and then um more or less vague statements on what Jadair the new CEO will change about the business

我们多少看到了这一点,比如在Lulu这样的公司上看到了,在PayPal上也看到了,我们以为Adobe在某种程度上也是如此,尽管情况不同,而这确实让我无法真正对这个机会感到兴奋。

and we sort of saw that you know we saw it with companies like Lulu we saw it with PayPal we thought to some extent although it's different with Adobe and just sort of stops me from really being excited about the opportunity

而这确实让我现在无法真正对这个机会感到兴奋,再说一次,如果你逼我表态,那我会说Copart未来会是一笔不错的投资,但也许不是在未来几个月,而是要等周期转向之后。

and just sort of stops me from really being excited about the opportunity right now and again if you put me on the spot then I would say you know Copart will be a good investment going forward but perhaps not in the next couple of months but once the cycle turns

显然我们想为长期投资,但如果我看我们的投资组合,我实在看不到有哪家公司是我现在愿意卖掉、以便买入Copart的,而且我们实际上只剩大约2%的现金,其实还略少一点,所以基本上我们需要做的就是卖掉一家公司,然后拿这笔钱去买Copart。

and obviously we want to invest for the long term but if I look at our portfolio I just don't see a company that I would want to sell right now in order to buy cop and we only have about 2% cash left actually a bit less than that so basically what we would need to do is sell one company and then buy copot for it

我非常喜欢Copart,因为它恰恰完美体现了为什么你会听到人们说应该投资无聊的生意。但Copart的业务非常直观、也很无聊,从某种意义上说就是它哪儿也不会去。

I really like Copart because it's just such a perfect epitome of why you'll hear people say that you should invest in boring businesses. But Copart's business is very intuitive and boring in the sense that it's not going anywhere.

尽管我们今天甚至没有真正讨论自动驾驶汽车,而它确实有望至少从根本上改变我们的驾驶方式,我们也还不真正知道那会如何影响这项业务。

Even though we didn't even really discuss AVs today, which does promise to at least fundamentally change how we drive and we don't really yet know how that will affect the business.

但无论是人工驾驶还是自动驾驶,我确信尤其在美国,有着庞大的高速公路系统,汽车在我们有生之年都不会消失。而且如果说有什么影响,自动驾驶汽车反而可能导致驾驶的激增,从而给Copart带来更多业务,尤其是考虑到这样一个假设:通过在汽车中嵌入更多技术使其实现自动驾驶,让它们报废会变得更容易。

But whether human driven or automated, I'm sure that in the US in particular, there are vast highway system cars are not going anywhere in our lifetimes. And if anything, AVs could lead to a proliferation of driving and therefore business for Copart, especially with the assumption that by baking in even more technology into cars to make them autonomous, totaling them becomes easier.

所以我会说,这大概就是我对Copart的看多理由。但再说一次,在20倍市盈率、增长加速、CEO更换、以及围绕自动驾驶汽车的一些根本性不确定性的情况下,我只能同意这只股票并不明显便宜,尽管价格已经下跌了很多,这对某些人来说有违直觉,但这正是内在价值运作方式的现实。

So I would say that's probably my bull case on Copart. But again, with a 20 times earnings, with the accelerating growth, a CEO swap out, some of this fundamental uncertainty about autonomous vehicles, I would just agree that the stock is not obviously cheap, even though the price has come down a lot, which is counterintuitive to some people, but that's just the reality of how intrinsic value works.

所以,如果我们等待,我们很可能能够以低价捡到股票,并让自己免于经历一些过山车般的波动。我认为最后一点对我来说才是关键,基本上我会问:这是不是我迟早必须持有的一家公司?如果答案是肯定的,我认为现在的价格就很好,可以说,好吧,也许它还会再便宜一点,但如果我确实想拥有这门生意,我就应该趁现在这个机会买入,然后等它进一步下跌时再可能加仓。

And so, if we wait, we may very well be able to pick up shares at a bargain bin price and spare ourselves some of the roller coaster ride. I think the last point is what it comes down to me to where basically I would say is this a company that I need to own at some point?

And if it would be, I think it's at a great price right now to say, okay, well, maybe it gets a bit cheaper, but if I definitely want to own this business, I should, you know, use the opportunity right now to buy it and then potentially buy more when it comes down further.

我真的很喜欢研究Copart。我喜欢这门生意。我喜欢它是我们在这个节目上看过的业务最多元化的公司之一。但正如我之前所说,它并没有让我兴奋到非买不可的程度。

I think I really enjoy looking into Copot. I like the business. I like that it's one of the most multi businesses that we looked at here on the show. And yet, as I said before, it doesn't excite me so much that I want to buy it necessarily.

这并不是因为它是一门无聊的生意。我认为无聊的生意通常是很不错的机会,但我觉得它需要更便宜才行。但我认为Copart目前的情况并非如此。我认为仍然有足够多的人看好这家公司,所以这可能还不是底部。

And that's not because it's a boring business. I think boring business is generally a great opportunity, but I think it needs to be cheaper. But um I think that's not the case where we are currently with Copart.

I think there are still enough people who are bullish on the company so that this might not be the bottom.

如果你想买入这家公司,我认为它正处于周期低点,我觉得这可能会有意思。但对我们两人来说,考虑到我们内在价值组合中已经持有的公司,我认为我们目前会先放弃。而如果该股进一步下跌,我认为那会是另一种情形。

If you want to buy the company, I think it is at a cyclical low and I think it could be interesting. But for the two of us, considering the companies we already have in the intrinsic value portfolio, I think we're going to pass for now.

And should the stock decline even further, I think that would be a bit of a different scenario.

另外,我应该说明,我在播客里提到过,该股已经上涨了25%。所以,我们已经不在底部了,我认为在底部时它会比今天更有吸引力。

Also, I should say, you know, I mentioned in the podcast here, the stock is already up 25%. So, we're not at the bottom anymore, where I think it would have been even more attractive than it is today.

Copart是过去几十年表现最好的股票之一,自1994年IPO以来回报率达到21% KGA。而且我要说,仍然有充足的成长空间。

Copa has been one of the best performing stocks over the last few decades, returning at 21% KGA since its IPO in 1994. And I would say there's still plenty of room to grow.

我猜市场只是对某些短期不利因素感到不确定,尤其是对自动驾驶汽车长期将如何影响Copart感到不确定。但我相信这些担忧大多被夸大了,我认为在今天的节目中你就会看到Copart的护城河有多宽。

I guess the market is just uncertain about some short-term headwinds and especially about how AVs will impact Copart in the long run. But I believe those fears are mostly overblown and I think you will see just how wide Copart's mode is in today's episode.

观察点

股价自当前水平进一步下跌
显著跌破当前价格(当前价格较低点已上涨25%)
近期市场价格
进一步下跌将使该股更具买入吸引力,可能改变“放弃”的决定。

这个频道对 $CPRT 的历次判断

The Intrinsic Value Podcast 在这只股票上共 2 条判断,这里只列相邻的几条。

2026-09-13本条
大约10个月前,我们介绍过Copart,它是优质复利股最常被引用的例子之一:这是一门借贷型生意,利润率很高,资本回报率很高,并且身处一个双寡头行业。而它在这个双寡头格局中长期占据主导地位。
2026-09-03看涨
Copart也是。所以我们也会得到关于那个的更新。
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